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I. INTRODUCTION
They were the answers ,to their dreams. The children they had
always wanted and never been able to conceive. Some were in-
fants, others were older children. The parents decorated a room,
bought teddy bears, and welcomed the children joyously when the
adoption agencies placed them in their homes. The agencies had
assured the parents that there were no significant health prob-
lems. Desperate to have a family and realizing how fortunate they
were to be able to adopt at all, perhaps they had not probed.
The majority of these families lived happily ever after-but
not all.1 For some unfortunate adopted children and their adop-
tive families, the placement became a nightmare. Adoption agen-
cies, either intentionally or negligently, failed to transmit critical
1 Because this Article focuses on adopted children with severe physical or psycho-
logical impairments, it is important to note at the outset that the majority of adopted
children do not have significant impairments and are well adjusted.
One California study of agency and independent adoptions in 1981-82 determined
that 11% of the children placed by private agencies and 34% of the children placed by
public agencies had health problems. NATIONAL COMMI=TEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION
FACrBOOK 203 (1989) [hereinafter ADOPTION FACTBOOK]. See also Kathlyn Marquis & Rich-
ard Detweiler, Does Adoption Mean Different? An Atiributional Analysis, 48 J. PERSONALrIY &
Soc. PSmHOL. 1054, 1062, 1064 (1985). (Research study of nonclinic population of 46
adopted and 121 nonadopted persons between the ages of 13 and 21 found that the
adopted group felt more confident, more in control of their lives, and more positive
about others than the nonadopted group.); Robin Henig, Body and Mind Chosen and
Given, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1988, § 6, at 70 (quoting Dr. David Brodzinsky, a psycholo-
gist who has conducted one of the largest studies of adopted children, who reports that
the majority "do very well in life").
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medical and psychological background information to the adoptive
parents. As a result, the children did not receive appropriate med-
ical or psychological treatment when it was needed, often resulting
in permanent or more severe impairment.2 The adoptive families,
unprepared to meet their child's special needs, were emotionally
and financially devastated.'
In 1986, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Burr v. Board of County
Commissioners,4 became the first American appellate court to recog-
nize a right to compensatory damages against an adoption agency
for misrepresentations to adoptive parents concerning their child's
medical history. The Burr decision unleashed a wave of litigation5
filed by adoptive parents on behalf of themselves and their adopt-
ed children seeking damages6 from adoption agencies and other
2 See infra notes 138-39, 142-45, 185-86 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 151-57, 199-213 and accompanying text.
4 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986).
5 E.g., Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990), crt. denied, 111 S. Ct.
712 (1991); Collier v. Krane, 763 F. Supp. 473 (D. Colo. 1991); Michael J. v. County of
Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoption, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Wallerstein v.
Hospital Corp. of America, 573 So. 2d 9 (Fla. App. 1990); Roe v. Catholic Charities, No.
5-89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 (I1. App. CL Feb. 14, 1992); Krueger v. Leahy, No. 89L
18751, (Cook Cty. Civ. CL, Ill. filed Dec. 28, 1989); Mohr v. Massachusetts, No. 87-0152
(Bristol Cty. Super. Ct., Nov. 4, 1991); M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 475 N.W.2d 94
(Minn. CL App. 1991), review granted (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991); Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d
967 (Miss. 1990); Allen v. Children's Services, 567 N.E. 2d 1346 (Ohio App. 1990);
Wristen v. Jansen, No. 86CV-10-6421, (CL C.P. Franklin Cty., Ohio filed Oct. 15, 1986);
Gibbs v. Ernst, No. 90003066, (Ct. C.P., Bucks Cty., Pa. filed April 4, 1990); In re Lisa
Diane G., 537 A.2d 131 (R.I. 1988); Richards v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs., No.
476799, (Travis Cty. Dist. CL, Tex. filed April 18, 1990); Martin v. Methodist Home, No.
90-07815, (Dallas Cty. Dist. CL, Texas filed July 2,, 1990); Phillips v. Texas Dept. of Hu-
man Services, (Travis Cty. Dist. Ct., Tex.); Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d
532 (Wis. 1989).
See also accounts of wrongful adoption suits filed by Linda and John Murphy for
$4.1 million in Massachusetts, Daniel Golden, When Adoption Doesn't Won, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 11, 1989 (Magazine) at 16; by Tom and Janice Colella in California, Id. and Dianne
Klein, An Adopted Bay-And Terror Begins, LA. TIMEs, Jan. 4, 1988, part 1, at 3; and by
Thomas Tinor and Elisabeth Novakovich against Bethany Christian Services in Illinois, $1
Million Sought in Adoption Suit, CHi. TRIB., May 23, 1990 (Chicagoland) at 3. Prof. Neil
Cogan of Southern Miethodist University has filed twelve wrongful adoption actions, in-
cluding the three actions listed above. Telephone Interview with Neil Cogan (Oct. 2,
1991).
At least two unsuccessful cases were filed prior to the Burr decision. See Richard P.
v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. CL App. 1980); Allen v. Al-
len, 330 P.2d 151 (Or. 1958).
6 The focus of this Article is the extent to which liability for compensatory damages
should be imposed upon adoption agencies or other intermediaries for failure to accu-
rately transmit health-related information to adoptive parents.
Some lawsuits brought by adoptive parents alleging misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure of health information have sought specific relief in addition to, or instead of, com-
[Vol. 67:850
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intermediaries7 for failure to provide essential medical and psy-
pensatory damages. In some cases adoptive parents sued for revocation of the adoption
in addition to monetary damages. See In re Lisa Diane G., 537 A.2d 131 (RI. 1988)
(adoption revoked, adoptive parents withdrew request for damages). Telephone Interview
with Stephen Cicilline, attorney for plaintiffs (Aug. 8, 1990); Allen v. Allen, 330 P.2d 151
(Or. 1958) (relief denied); see also account of suit by Tom and Janice Collella seeking
both revocation and damages in Golden, supra note 5 (Adoption was revoked and adop-
tive parents settled the case for $70,000). Others just seek revocation of the adoption.
Christopher C. v. Kay C., 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1991) (court affirmed revocation of adop-
tion in action brought by minor child appealing revocation and challenging constitution-
ality of revocation statute). See also M.L.B. v. Department of Health & Rehab. Serv., 559
So. 2d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding one year period to attack adoption judg-
ment on grounds of "irregularity" did not bar motion to set aside adoption on grounds
of fraudulent concealment of child's psychiatric problems by agency); County Dept. of
Pub. Welfare v. Morningstar, 151 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1958) (court annulled adop-
tion based on fraud perpetrated upon adoptive parents regarding child's background); In
re Leach, 128 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. 1964) (court denied revocation based upon fraud); In
re Anonymous, 213 N.Y.2d 10 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1961) (refused to annul adoption on
ground natural father failed to disclose mental illness in family); In re Adoption of
Haggerty, No. CA-741, 1991 Ohio LEXIS 3004, (Ohio Ct. App. June 7, 1991) (request to
vacate adoption on basis of fraud denied because motion not timely filed).*
See also accounts of the following revocation actions: Revocation action by Anthony
and Dona Ricci, who were never told of psychological report prior to adoptive placement
that advised against adoption, Golden, supra note 5; Termination of parental rights grant-
ed to adoptive parents of Monica Shoemaker, after her medical bills and institutional-
ization became financially overwhelming, because agency concealed family history of
schizophrenia, although court also awarded them visitation rights, Dianne Klein, "Special"
Children, Dark Past can Haunt Adoptions, LA. TIMES, May 29, 1988, § 1, at 1; Action by
Roberta and Clem Wendling to surrender custody of adopted child, Lisa Belkin, Adoptive
Parents Ask States for Help With Abused Young, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 22, 1988, § 1, at B8; At-
tempted revocation of adopted child by the Marvelli family to obtain assistance with med-
ical care of child, Marshall Marvelli & Sylvia Marvelli, Tom and Janice Colela, PEOPLE,
August 1, 1988, at 6.
The propriety of revocation of adoptions on grounds of fraud is a related but sepa-
rate issue from suits for damages and will not be the focus of this Article. For recent
literature addressing the problems with permitting revocation of adoption, see, eg., Eliza-
beth N. Carroll, Abrogation of Adoption By Adoptive Parents, 19 FAM. L.Q. 155 (1985); Ann.
H. Howard, Note, Annulment of Adoption Decrees on Petition of Adoptive Parents, 22 J. FAM. L
549 (1983-84); see also John R. Maley, Note, Wrongful Adoption: Monetay Damages as a Supe-
rior Remedy to Annulment of Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV.
709 (1987).
A different type of specific relief was sought in one recent "wrongful adoption"
case, Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 712
(1991). The plaintiffs requested that the public adoption agency be ordered to disclose
to them the contents of the agency's files, with appropriate privacy omissions, to facilitate
medical treatment. Appellants Brief at 6, Grffith. The need for this relief became moot
when the Texas legislature enacted legislation while the suit was pending which enabled
the adoptive parents to have access to the records they were requesting. 899 F.2d at
1434.
7 Throughout this Article the term "adoption intermediaries" is used to refer to
both adoption agencies and other professionals, primarily attorneys, who assist in the
placement of children for adoption as facilitators, see generally DAVID LEAVIr, COUNSELING
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chological history. Although brought under a variety of legal the-
ories, these suits have often been denominated as actions for
"wrongful adoption."
This Article explores the extent to which liability should be
recognized for failure to provide complete and adequate health-
related information8 to adoptive parents. In Burr liability was im-
posed against an adoption agency for intentional misrepresenta-
tions regarding an infant's background. The court found the
adoption agency had literally made up a story about their child's
birth parents that was totally untrue, thereby hiding the high risk
of hereditary impairment that existed.9  Courts," commenta-
tors," and adoption experts12  have unanimously approved the
imposition of liability for intentional misrepresentations of this
nature. Similar unanimity does not exist, however, as to whether
CLIENTS IN INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS (1980), or as counsel for adoptive parents in adop-
tion proceedings, see generally JOAN HOLLINGER ET AL, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE §§
6.01, 6.02, 6.04 (1990).
8 Health-related information should include the medical history of the child, includ-
ing prenatal and neonatal history; diagnosis and treatment for physical, psychological, and
emotional problems; dental treatment; diagnostic test results; immunization records; and a
developmental history of the child. It should also include the medical and genetic history
of parents and other biological relatives; the social and educational history of the child;
and relevant social history of the biological parents and ancestors, such as race, ethnic or
tribal heritage, religion, occupation and talents; and any familial relationship between the
parents. For a more detailed discussion of the nature of health-related information that
should be disclosed, see D. Marianne Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veik Blueprint for Legisla-
tive Reform of the Disclosure of Health-related Information in Adoption, 70 N.C. L REV. 681,
732-42 (1991).
9 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1103-04 (Ohio 1986).
10 Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 512-
13 (Cal. CL App. 1988); Foster v. Bass, 507 So. 2d 967, 980-81 (Miss. 1990); Roe v. Cath-
olic Charities, No. 5-89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 (11. App. CL Feb. 14, 1992).
11 Claire G. Combs, Case Note, Wrongful Adoption: Adoption Agency Held Liable for
Fraudulent Representations, 56 CINN. L. REV. 343, 354-55 (1987); Shannon M. Connelly,
Note, The Need for Disclosure Laws: A Survey of the Wrongful-Adoption Cause of Action and
Statutoy Remedies for Adoption Fraud, 10 REv. LITIG. 793, 797-800 (1991); Janet H. Dickson,
Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter, 38 UCLA L REv.
917, 957-958, 962-63 (1991); Susan IL LeMay, Comment, The Emergence of Wrongful Adop-
tion as a Cause of Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 488 (1988-89); Maley, supra note 6, at 734;
Michele Schiffer, Comment, Torts: Fraud in the Adoption Setting, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 707, 710,
722 (1987).
12 See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT art. 10, § 10(e) (Proposed Draft Aug. 9, 1991) which
suggests sanctions for failure to provide health information and further provides:
The penalties provided . . . do not preclude an adoptive parent or adoptee
from bringing a common law action in tort against a person [other than a birth
parent or guardian?] who negligently or intentionally fails to perform the duties
required under Article 3, Section 16 [Disclosure of Information on Background].
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liability should be imposed upon adoption intermediaries for in-
tentionally withholding adverse medical or psychological history
from adoptive parents when no affirmative misrepresentation has
been made. Nevertheless, the three appellate courts to directly
face this issue have been willing to recognize liability for such
intentional nondisclosure. s Disagreement also exists about wheth-
er liability should extend to negligent misrepresentation, which
was recently found sufficient to justify a cause of action against an
adoption agency by the Wisconsin Supreme Court 14 A further
extension of liability against an adoption intermediary would be to
recognize a cause of action for negligent failure to discover or to
transmit to adoptive parents critical health-related information.
Recognition of liability in this context would impose a duty to
make reasonable efforts to investigate, and adoption intermediaries
would be expected to accurately transmit not only the information
they have, but also that which they reasonably should have, to
adoptive parents. No published opinion has yet recognized liability
against an agency on this basis, although suits of this nature have
recently been brought. 5
Part II of this Article presents the history of disclosure of
health-related information in adoption. Examination of this history
reveals substantial fluctuation in the attitudes of American courts
and legislatures toward the confidentiality of adoptions and a
corresponding fluctuation in the revelation of background infor-
mation about a child to his or her adoptive parents. 16 In recent
years, the majority of adoption agencies, prompted by unanimity
among adoption experts, professional guidelines, and significant
statutory reform, have endorsed, at least in theory, a policy favor-
ing disclosure of health-related information in adoption. 17 Never-
theless, many families who have adopted during the last few de-
13 Midoelj., 247 Cal. Rptr. 504; Roe v. Catholic Charities, No. 5-89-0411, 1992 WL
29911 at *12 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 14, 1992) (opinion addressed both intentional misrepre-
sentation and intentional nondisclosure); M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 475 N.W.2d 94, 99
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review granted, (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991).
14 Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989). See also Wallerstein
v. Hospital Corp. of America, 573 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); M.H., 475 N.W.2d
at 98.
15 Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 976 (Miss. 1990), rejected liability on this basis. In Call-
fornia, a wrongful adoption action seeking damages for failure to investigate, Muir v.
Children's Home Soc'y, was recently settled. Telephone Interview with Sheldon
Rosenfield, attorney for plaintiffs (Sept. 25, 1990), and with his office, (Oct. 8, 1991).
16 See infra notes 23.81 and accompanying text.
17 See infta notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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cades have failed to receive accurate or complete information
about significant health problems their children have experi-
enced.' 8
Part III examines the extent to which liability against adoption
agencies and other intermediaries should be recognized on behalf
of these families. The central thesis of this Article is that adoption
intermediaries should be held liable not only for intentional mis-
representations, but also for intentional nondisclosure, negligent
misrepresentations, and negligent failure to investigate and trans-
mit health-related information to adoptive parents, when any of
these actions result in harm to adoptive parents or adopted chil-
dren. Recognition of liability for these types of conduct would not
make adoption intermediaries the guarantor of healthy children. It
would, however, enforce reasonable standards of conduct upon
adoption intermediaries and compensate parents and children
injured when those standards are not met. When adoption inter-
mediaries have undertaken reasonable efforts to investigate and
have fully and accurately disclosed the health-related information
they possess, liability should not be imposed solely because physical
or mental impairments subsequently become evident in a child
after the placement or adoption. 9
Part III summarizes the extent to which liability to adoptive
parents and adopted children for each- type of conduct has thus
far been recognized by the courts. This section then examines the
policy arguments surrounding the recognition of liability for such
conduct on the part of adoption intermediaries. Finally, the legal
theories on which liability may be imposed and the particular
advantages and limitations of each theory are discussed.
When the adoption intermediaries are governmental agencies
or private attorneys, additional theories of liability, including Sec-
tion 1983 actions for deprivation of constitutional rights and mal-
practice, must be examined. The viability, advantages, and limita-
tions of these theories are explained in Part IV.
The focal point of any discussion regarding the liability of
adoption intermediaries must be the conduct of the adoption
intermediary and the reasonable expectations society may impose
upon those who undertake the important responsibility of creating
a family. When evaluating liability in the context of wrongful
adoption litigation, one must reject an approach that treats the
18 See infra notes 82-86, 171-75 and accompanying text.
19 See Allen v. Children's Servs., 567 N.E.2d 1346 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
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child as a product. A child is not a used car, nor can a health im-
pairment be equated with a faulty carburetor. The real issue is
whether an adoption intermediary's conduct maximizes the oppor-
tunity of adoptive parents to make a choice about the responsibili-
ty they are undertaking while providing the child with a family
emotionally and financially prepared to meet the child's special
needs.
Ii. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF DISCLOSURE
OF HEALTH-RELATED INFORMATION IN ADOPTION
Adoption, unlike most other American legal proceedings, is
not a creature of the common law.2" Early in our nation's histo-
ry, adoptions took place through private agreements, like a convey-
ance of real estate. These agreements were authenticated by mak-
ing a public record, and in some instances, accompanied by a
proceeding for a name change.2 In 1851, Massachusetts enacted
the first American statute that required judicial supervision over
the adoption process. 22
The extent to which health-related information has been
transmitted to adoptive parents in America has varied tremendous-
ly and has been heavily influenced by the fluctuating emphasis
upon confidentiality in the adoption process. Prior to the 1920s,
adoptions were often open proceedings; adoption court records, to
the extent they were maintained, were not sealed. 23 In fact, news-
papers routinely reported details of adoption proceedings during
the late 19th century.24 Adoptees were allowed to obtain copies
20 Ruth-Arlene Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues and Laws 1958-1983, 17 FAM. LQ. 173,
175 (1983).
English society's strong focus on blood relationships as a basis for class distinction,
as well as its antipathy toward illegitimacy, deterred the development of adoption practic-
es that resemble American adoption law until well into the 20th century. A general adop-
tion statute was not enacted in England until 1926. HOLUNGER ET AL, supra note 7, §
1.02 [1] at 1-18 to 1-19.
Many scholars believe that American adoption practices find their roots in Roman
law. I&; Howe, supra, at 175.
21 Howe, supra note 20, at 173, 175-76; Sanford N. Katz, Rerriting the Adoption Story,
5 FAM. Anvoc. 9 (1982).
22 HOLiNGER Er AL, supra note 7, § 1.02[2], at 1-22; Howe, supra note 20, at 175;
Katz, supra note 21, at 9.
23 HOLLINGER Er AL, supra note 7, § 1.03[4], at 1-37, § 13.01[1][b], at 13-5.
24 LINCOLN CAPLAN, AN OPEN ADOPTION 85 (1990); HOLLrNGER Er AL, supra note 7,
19921
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of their original birth certificates, if recorded.' The earliest stat-
utes interjecting some secrecy into the process, enacted during the
second decade of the 20th century, were designed only to shield
the adoption and the "fact of illegitimacy" from public view. These
statutes did not operate as a barrier between biological parents
and adoptive parents, who all retained a right of access to the files
and records."6 Although very little information about the children
was maintained in the records, 27 in many instances the birth
mother knew the adoptive parents, allowing health information to
be informally transmitted. It was common practice for a birth
mother to stay with the adoptive family during pregnancy.28
Beginning in the 1920s, adoption professionals fostered a
movement to transform the adoption process to achieve complete
anonymity between adoptive parents and birth parents.' A major-
ity of states enacted statutes that sealed adoption records and pre-
vented even the birth parents, adoptive parents, and adoptee from
gaining access without a court order upon a showing of "good
cause," a standard that was often difficult to meet.' Underlying
this movement was the philosophy that adoption constitutes a re-
birth, severing all ties with the biological family and creating the
illusion that the child was born into the adoptive family."1 Adop-
tive parents and children were matched by physical characteristics
so that the child appeared to be the birth child of the adoptive
parents.3 2 In fact, new birth certificates were issued, listing the
adoptive parents as the birth parents.33
In conformity with this philosophy of rebirth, for most of the
20th century adoption agencies and other intermediaries have
§ 1.03[4], at 1-37.
25 HOLuNGER Er AL, supra note 7, § 1.0314] at 1-37.
26 Id. § 13.01[1][b], at 13-5.
27 Id. § 13.01[1][b], at 13-4.
28 CAPLAN, supra note 24, at 85.
29 Adoption agencies used promises of confidentiality to entice adoptive parents to
use their services rather than seek a direct placement. They also coerced birth mothers
to relinquish their babies by threatening not to honor their desire for confidentiality
unless they relinquished. HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 7, § 1.0314], at 1-36 to 1-37.
30 Se eg., Id. § 13.01[1], at 13-6; Howe, supra note 20, at 190; Ann T. Lamport,
Note, The Genetics of Secrecy in Adoption, Artficial Insemination, and In Vitro Ferlilization, 14
AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 112 (1988); Barbara Prager & Stanley A. Rothstein, Note, The
Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 137, 137-39 (1973).
31 HOLLINGER Er AL., supra note 7, § 1.04, at 1-49; ARTHUR P. SORosKY ET AL, THE
ADOPTION TRIANGLE 38 (1978).
32 Katz, supra note 21, at 9; Lamport, supra note 30, at 110.
33 SoRosKY Er AL., supra note 31, at 38.
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given very limited information to adoptive parents about the
child's medical and social background and biological family.'M
The conventional wisdom of adoption agencies was that adoptive
parents and their children were better off not knowing back-
ground information, 5 and that any potential impact of a child's
biological inheritance should be minimized.' Adoption experts
advised that to foster the bond between adoptive parents and
children, "the adoptive parents should be provided with as little
information as possible on the 'shadowy figures' of the birth par-
ents."
37
Agencies withheld negative information in particular, such as
mental illness, criminal behavior, alcoholism,M  and other "'sordid
or irrelevant details'" about a child's biological family.3 9 As older
children began to comprise an increasingly larger number of the
children adopted during the last several decades,40 critical infor-
mation about the child's own health history was also often with-
held.41
34 SoRosKY ET AL., supra note 31, at 35-36; Golden, supra note 5. See also Elizabeth
Neuffer, State Liable for Hiding Key Records in Adoption, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 29, 1991, at
21 (Massachusetts Department of Social Services did not require, disclosure of medical
history to adoptive parents until 1990.).
35 David Schneidman, spokesperson for the Illinois Dept. of Children and Family
Services, made such a statement describing the policy of agencies in Illinois prior to the
enactment of Illinois' disclosure law in 1985. Rob Karwath, Teenager's Parents Sue in Wrong
fid Adoption, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1989, § 1, at 12.
36 See Rita Beck Black, Genetics and Adoption: A Calenge for Social Work, in SOCIAL
WORK IN A TROUBLED WORLD 193, 200 (Miriam Dinerman ed., 1981) (Seventh National
Association of Social Workers Symposium).
37 SOROSKY Er AL., supra note 31, at 36, (quoting E.W. Goldey & R.M. Sands, The
Wcissitudes of the Adoption Prces, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 590, 590-95 (1971)).
38 SOROsKY ET AL., supra note 31, at 36.
39 HOLLNGER Er AL, supra note 7, § 13.01[1] [b], n.21, at 13-7 (citing MICHAEL
SHAPIRO, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, A STUDY OF ADOPTION PRACTICE (1956).
40 In 1986, infants comprised slightly less than half (48.1%) of all domestic unre-
lated adoptions. Special needs adoptions comprised slightly over one-fourth of domestic,
unrelated adoptions. ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 4. See also RICHARD P. BARTH
& MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION AND DISRUPTION: RATES, RISKS, AND RESPONSES 8-11 (1988).
The authors observe that "special-needs" often refers to children over age three, "minori-
ty children, handicapped children, emotionally or intellectually impaired children, or
groups of siblings of three or more." Id. at 8. Other groups use a more restrictive defini-
tion of "special needs": "black children over 3, white children over 10, emotionally dis-
turbed or mentally retarded children of all ages, physically handicapped children, or
sibling groups of three or more." Id. at 10.
41 See BARTH & BERRY, supra note 40, at 107-113; Belkin, supra note 6, at B8; Gold-
en, supra note 5; Klein, supra note 5, at 3; Neuffer, supra note 34, at 21.
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In addition to the philosophical underpinnings of this policy,
agencies were often motivated by several concerns. Caseworkers
feared that negative information might hamper placement4 2 or
potentially stigmatize the child in the eyes of the adoptive fami-
ly.4  The concern was expressed that knowledge of information
perceived as negative by the adoptee would harm the child's devel-
oping self-image," or create tremendous anxiety about the possi-
bility of later developing a genetic disorder.' Opponents of dis-
closure of health information further argued that extensive medi-
cal and social background information might facilitate tracing
efforts by adoptees to find birth parents' and invade the birth
family's privacy.47
In the last two decades, however, a complete turnaround has
occurred in the attitude of experts in the adoption field toward
the disclosure of nonidentifying information to adoptive parents.
In 1971 the Child Welfare League of America, a national organiza-
tion of adoption agencies and one of this country's foremost
adoption authorities, recommended in its Guidelines for Adoption
Service that adoptive parents be given all pertinent nonidentifying
background information on the child.4" Today, adoption experts
are virtually unanimous in their agreement that complete and
accurate medical and social history should be communicated to
adoptive parents. 49 Most agencies currently adhere to these rec-
42 See KATHERINE A. NELSON, ON THE FRONTIER OF ADOPTION: A STUDY OF SPECIAL
NEEDS ADOPTIVE FAMIuEs 87 (1985); see also Golden, supra note 5; Klein, supra note 6.
43 Black, supra note 36, at 199-202; Norman Fost, Disclosing Genetic Information to
Adoptive Parents: Ethical Considerations, in GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY. AN AID TO BETTER
HEALTH IN ADOPTIVE CHILDREN 51 (Wisconsin Clinical Genetics Center and Waisman
Center on Mental Retardation and Human Development 1984) [hereinafter GENETIC
FAMILY HISTORY]; Gilbert S. Omenn, et al., Genetic Counseling for Adoptees at Risk for Spedfic
Inherited Disorders, 5 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 157, 162 (1980).
44 Black, supra note 36, at 199-200; Fost, supra note 43, at 51.
45 Deborah Franklin, Wat a Child Is Given, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1989, § 6, at 36, 41;
Omenn et al., supra note 43, at 162.
46 Timothy N. O'Connell, Note, S.B. 340: Disclosure of Social and Medical Histoy of the
Biological Parents of an Adopted Child, 4 U. DAYrON L. REV. 533, 537 (1979).
47 See SOROSKY ET AL, supra note 31, at 50; Lamport, supra note 30, at 123;
O'Connell, supra note 46, at 535, 537; Dirk Johnson, Debate on Adoption'is Focusing on
Rights to See Family Histories, N.Y. TIMES, February 11, 1990, § 1, at 36; see generally,
Omenn et al., supra note 43, at 162-63.
48 See SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 31, at 36.
49 HOLLINGER ET AL-, supra note 7, § 13.01[1], at 13-10 to 13-11; SOROsKY PT AL.
supra note 31, at 36. See also NELSON, supra note 42, at 92-93 (recommending complete
disclosure based on study of special-needs adoptive families); CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF
AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 25-28, 37-39 (1988) [hereinafter CWLA STAN-
DARDS] (standards recommend thorough investigation of medical, developmental, psycho-
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ommendations by declaring as their official policy that health-relat-
ed information will be provided to adoptive parents,' although
some have only recently revised their practices.5'
Many considerations affected this recent reversal of opinion.
First and foremost, nondisclosure of health information often im-
paired subsequent medical and psychological diagnosis and treat-
ment of adopted children,5 2 many times with devastating conse-
quences.5" Failure to alert prospective adoptive parents to known
health problems and risks often resulted in placement of a child
with a family that was totally unprepared to cope with the chal-
lenges the child's special needs presented.' This lack of fore-
warning has caused emotional trauma for both the child and oth-
er members of the adoptive family and sometimes has led to dis-
ruption of the adoption itself.55 Moreover, access to accurate
medical and genetic history will allow the adoptees to make in-
formed childbearing decisions.56
Competent, professional practices on the part of the adoption
intermediary can eliminate many of the concerns voiced by early
opponents of disclosure. For example, through concentrated ef-
forts by specially trained professionals and appropriate support
services, adoptive families can be found and prepared to accept
the physical or mental limitations of children with special
needs. Experts who specialize in placing children with special
logical and family history and in general full disclosure to adoptive parents of this in-
formation); Summary of testimony of adoption experts in Backes v. Catholic Family &
Community Serv., 509 A.2d 283, 287, 289, 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
50 HOLUNGER ET AL. supra note 7, § 13.01[1], at 13-10 to 13-11; Golden, supra note
5.
51 Golden, supra note 5; Karwath, supra note 35, at 12; Neuffer, supra note 34, at
21.
52 See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying, text.
53 See Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 976 (Miss. 1990), discussed infta notes 466-86 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
54 See infra notes 150-51, 156 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
56 &e infra note 163 and accompanying text.
57 In its introduction to the most recent edition of its standards, the Child Welfare
League of America observes that the experience of child welfare agencies who aggres-
sively seek families for waiting children has shown that "adoptive parents can be found
for ethnic and racial minority, older, disabled, and emotionally disturbed children. Adop-
tive parents have successfully been found for these children among single applicants,
those who initially applied for infants or problem-free children, and the children's own
foster parents." CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 5-6.
See also Black, supra note 36, at 195 (Many adoptive parents may be willing to adopt
a newborn in the face of uncertainties over higher risk of genetic disorders due to in-
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needs state that good adoptive homes are available,58 but that it
is agency understaffing and bureaucratic red tape that often im-
pedes the placement process.5 9 Summarizing the prevalent ap-
proach, one specialist in special needs adoption observes: "It
makes no sense to place a child with a family who won't be able
to deal with that child .... This is not a poker game. These kids
need families with the ability to nurture them."'
Although the concerns regarding stigmatization are not frivo-
lous, the prevailing view today is that these can be addressed with
appropriate counseling and education.6 1 Nondisclosure, by inhib-
iting trust, has its own detrimental effects on the dynamics of rela-
tionships in an adoptive family.6 2 Furthermore, professionals in
cest.); Lamport, supra note 50, at 115 (Author provided genetic counseling to prospective
adoptive parents who chose to adopt child after being advised of significant risk of
schizophrenia.); San Francisco, 5 AIDS POLICY AND LAW, July 11, 1990, at 7 (Program in
Yonkers, N.Y. placed HIV positive children who have been abandoned by their parents in
foster care rather than hospitals and discovered that 52% of the foster families were
willing to adopt the HIV children placed with them.).
Katherine Nelson, who conducted a study of special needs adoptive families for the
Child Welfare League of America, concluded that even if more healthy infants were avail-
able for adoptions, the pool of prospective adoptive parents for special needs children,
while perhaps reduced, would have a stable core. She feels that interest in these children
is partly independent of the supply and demand phenomenon. Foster parents will contin-
ue to form attachments to children for whom they care. Special needs children will also
continue to be sought by parents motivated by altruism and by families whose own needs
or lifestyles are particularly compatible with these children. NELSON, supra note 42, at 85.
58 Gloria Hochman commented that there is no child for whom she would say they
could not find a family. Telephone Interview with Gloria Hochman, Communication Di-
rector of National Adoption Exchange (Sept. 18, 1990). Judy Gustafson reported that
there are waiting lists of families willing to adopt spina bifida children. Telephone Inter-
view with Judy Gustafson, Coordinator of the Spina Bifida Adoption Referral Program,
(Sept. 18, 1990). This is also true for Down's Syndrome children at all functioning levels.
Telephone Interview with Janet Marchese, Director and Founder, Down's Syndrome Adop-
tion Exchange (Sept. 18, 1990). Diane Mahon also reported that they have no trouble
finding homes for children with all types of special needs, whether the disabilities are
physical, mental, or emotional. Telephone Interview with Diane Mahon, National Director
of AASK American Adoption Exchange (Sept. 24 1990).
59 Mahon, National Director of AASK America Adoption Exchange, reported that
her primary problem is "getting the kids out of the system." She observed that if the
family willing to adopt a child lives in a different state than the child, the receiving state
will often be reluctant to facilitate the adoption due to concern over public services and
expenditures the child might require. Telephone Interview with Diane Mahon (Sept. 24,
1990). Janet Marchese also commented about problems with bureaucratic delays and
interstate transfers. Telephone Interview with Janet Marchese, Down's Syndrome Adoption
Exchange (Sept. 18, 1990).
60 Telephone Interview with Gloria Hochman, Communications Director of National
Adoption Exchange (Sept. 18, 1990).
61 See BARTH & BERRY, supra note 40, at 169; Black, supra note 36, at 199, 202-03;
Omenn et al., supra note 43, at 159.
62 Adoption experts who originally opposed revealing background information to
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the mental health and social services fields now recognize that
access to information regarding genetic heritage plays an impor-
tant role in the adoptee's development of a personal sense of
identity.6" The term "genealogical bewilderment" has been used
in psychological literature to describe symptoms associated with
identity conflict that many adoptees experience in adolescence or
adulthood. Often, this conflict results from the adoptee's lack of
knowledge about the medical, social, and ethnic backgrounds of
her biological parents and family.6 Appropriate counseling and
support services can counteract the impact of information per-
ceived as negative by the adoptee.' In addition, this information
may be less threatening than fears adoptees harbor when their
background is unknown to them.6
Because identifying information is still kept confidential by
agencies and other intermediaries when the birth parents choose a
closed adoption, the concern that health information might facili-
tate tracing has not been viewed as significant, particularly in com-
parison to the compelling arguments favoring disclosure.
67
adoptive parents changed their positions five years later, claiming "[flamily therapy has
clearly shown us that there cannot be a family secret, that under conditions where com-
munication becomes blunted or corrupted the secret grows to be a conspiracy in which
energies must be devoted to its maintenance . . . On-going communication leads to basic
trust." R.M. Sands & G. Rothenberg, Adoption in 1976. unresolved problems, unrealized goals,
new perspectives (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association of
Psychiatric Services for Children, San, Francisco, Calif.), (quoted in SOROSKY ET AL., supra
note 31, at 37).
63 See SOROSKY Er AL, supra note 31, at 132-42; Black, supra note 36, at 203-05;
Henig, supra note 1, at 72; see also Backes v. Catholic Family & Community Servs., 509
A.2d 283, 286-87 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (summarizing testimony regarding effect
on adoptees); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't. of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 650, 655 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (summarizing testimony of adopiees and psychologists empha-
sizing the importance of knowledge of one's background to an adoptee's identity, self-
image, and perceptions of reality); Maureen A. Sweeney, Between Sorrow and Happy End-
ings: A New Paradigmn of Adoption, 2 YALE J.L & FEMINISM 329, 348 (1990).
64 The term "genealogical bewilderment" originated in an Article by HJ. Sants, Gene-
alogical Bewildement in Children with Substitute Parents, 37 BRTrr. J. MED. PSYCHOL 133
(1964). It has since been employed by many others. Se In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383,
1388 & n.5 (RI. 1986) (summarizing testimony of expert witness Dr. Brandon Quails);
CAPLAN, supra note 24, at 82; SOROSKY ET AL, supra note 31, at 113.
65 Black, supra note 36, at 205-06; SOROSKY Er AL, supra note 31, at 224.
66 FLORENCE FISHER, THE SEARCH FOR ANNA FISHER 52 (1973) ("The adoptee goes
back only into himself. Beyond that there is a wall. And it is the fear of what is behind
that wall-magnified a thousand rational and irrational times in one's imagination-that
causes all the mischief."); SOROSK'Y ET AL, supra note 31, at 124; Black, supra note 36, at
205 (discussing fear of adoptees about passing on unknown genetic defects to their chil-
dren).
67 See O'Connell, supra note 46, at 537; see also Blair, supra note 8, at 697-98, 743-
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Moreover, the philosophical underpinnings of nondisclosure
of background information have weakened as adoption experts
during the last decade have recognized that adoption cannot "mir-
ror biology.' s Families created by adoption are different than
those created by birth, and these differences must be acknowl-
edged and appreciated.' Matching of physical characteristics has
been deemphasized 7° and current standards emphasize placing
children with families who are willing and prepared to meet the
individual needs of the particular child.71 In fact, experts now
contend that disclosure of background information strengthens the
bond between adoptive parents and the child because it facilitates
more appropriate placement and a better understanding by the
parents of the child and the child's needs.72 It also enables adop-
tive parents to respond to the child's questions about her birth
family.'3
Responding to the recent awareness of the importance of
transmittal of health-related information, the vast majority of state
legislatures have enacted legislation during the past decade permit-
ting greater disclosure of background information to adoptive
parents. The contents of these statutes vary widely, however. While
most mandate some disclosure,74 others leave the decision of
62, for a more detailed discussion of the privacy interests of birth parents that may be
affected by disclosure.
68 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 21, at 9; Sants, supra note 64, at 140.
69 H. David Kirk, Foreword to WILLIAM FEIGELMAN & ARNOLD R. SILVERMAN, CHOSEN
CHILDREN: NEW PATrERNS OF ADOPTVE RELATIONSHIPS xiv (1983); see geeraly Marquis &
Detweiler, supra riote 1.
70 CWIA STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 34, 36 (Placement Standard 4.2, addressing
suitability of adoptive families and children for each other, states that "similarities in
background or characteristics should not be a major factor in selection of a family." Stan-
dard 4.9 states that physical resemblance "should not be the basis for selection of a fami-
ly.").
71 Id. at 33-34 (Standard 4.2).
72 Id. at 37 (Standards 4.12, 4.13).
73 Id. at 38 (Standard 4.14).
74 See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31 (Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (1986); Aiuz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Mitchie 1991); CAI CW.
CODE § 224(70) (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-207(2) (West 1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68e (West 1981 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162
(West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578.14.5 (Supp.
1990); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §
31-3-4-14 (West Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8.C (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-213 (Supp. 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520 (Baldwin 1991); LA. CH.
CODE ANN. art. 1124-11279 (West Special Pamphlet 1992); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-
329.1 (1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5A (Law-Co-op Supp. 1991); MICH. COMe.
LAWS ANN. § 710.68 (West Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121 (Vernon Supp. 1992);
[V7ol. 67:850
LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL ADOPTION
what should be disclosed to the discretion of adoption agencies,75
and a few require a court order for release of information.76
Many of these statutes are not applicable to all types of adop-
tion.' Significant differences exist among the states as to the
content of the information to be disclosed. Some statutes focus
only on the medical history of the parents, 8 others on the medi-
cal history of the child.79 Few adequately specify that the medical
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-122 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-107 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 170-B:19 (1990 & Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West Supp. 1991); N.Y.
SOC. SERV. LAW § 373-a (MeKinney Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25 (1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-15-16 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.12(D)(6), 3107.17(D)
(Anderson 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342(4) (1990); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2909
(1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15.2 (Supp. 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
16.032 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 15, §
461 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-223(D) (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.33.350 (West Supp. 1992); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. §
1-22-116 (1988).
75 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 924 (Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53
(1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 57 (West Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
1780(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
76 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 534 (West
Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.140 (Michie 1986). See also DEL CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 925 (Supp. 1990).
77 Some states' nondisclosure statutes do not apply to independent adoptions. e
OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 57 (West Supp. 1992) (allowing only state or private agencies
to release medical history to prospective adoptive parents, despite the fact that a large
percentage of nonrelative adoptions' in Oklahoma are independent rather than agency
adoptions); see also the following disclosure statutes that refer only to state and private
agencies: GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (1991); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522.4 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1991); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 373-a (McKinney Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
Several states exclude stepparent or relative adoptions from coverage of the disclo-
sure statute. See e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.867) (West Supp. 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 16-032 (West Supp. 1992).
Some disclosure statutes have been drafted so that they appear to apply only to
adoptions following a voluntary relinquishment, and not to adoptions preceded by invol-
untary termination. See e.g., LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1124-1127 (West Special Pamphlet
1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West Supp. 1991).
78 The following states with statutes providing for disclosure of health-related infor-
mation in adoption omit reference to the inclusion of the child's medical history in the
information to be disclosed: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont,
and West Virginia.
79 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie 1991) (requiring only "written health history
and genetic and social history of the child"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-207 (West
1990) (requiring written report including "physical and mental condition of the child"
and the "child's family background"); MISs. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (Supp. 1991) (requiring
"doctor's certificate showing the physical and mental condition of the child"); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-114 (1991) (requiring only "information concerning the child's social
and medical history").
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and genetic history of relatives should be included. 8 Only a
handful describe the efforts that should be undertaken by an
adoption agency or other intermediary to collect necessary infor-
mation and transmit it accurately."'
Unfortunately, despite the endorsement of full and accurate
disclosure of health-related information by professional guidelines
and adoption experts, the revision of most agencies' official poli-
cies to reflect this position, and legislative reform, many adoptive
parents still do not receive complete and accurate health-related
information. Understaffing, bureaucratic and financial pressures to
80 Currently, fewer than half the states' disclosure statutes actually specify that "ge-
netic" history or information must be disclosed. They are: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129
(1992); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-505-06 (Michie 1991); CAI- CIV. CODE § 224.70(b) (West
Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578.14.5(a) (Supp.
1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130(a)(1)
(Supp. 1991); LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1125 (West Special Pamphlet 1992); MINN. STAT.
ANN §§ 259.46-.49 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West Supp.
1991); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373-a (McKinney Supp. 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3107.12 (Anderson 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. 20-7-1740
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-30-16, -17 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West Supp. 1991); WYO.
STAT. § 1-22-116 (1988).
Fewer than half the states provide for collection and disclosure of the medical histo-
ry of biological relatives other than the birth parents. The statutes which do have such a
provision are: ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (1991); AiuZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (1992);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 45a-748 (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West
Supp. 1992); AW. REV. STAT. § 578.14.5(a) (Supp. 1990); ILt ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para
1522.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West Supp. 1991); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199.520(4)(a) (1991); LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1125 (West Special Pamphlet
1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121.1(5), .3 (Vernon Supp. 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-107
(Supp. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:19(II-a) (1990 & Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 48-25 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12(D)(3) (Anderson 1989); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 57(D) (West Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 25-6-15.2
(Supp. 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
48.432(4) (a) (West Supp. 1991).
81 Ohio has a fairly detailed statute describing the manner in which an investigation
to obtain medical and social history should be conducted. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
3107.12 (Anderson 1989).
Other states, if they address the issue at all, simply require reasonable efforts. Se4,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-6 8 g (West 1981 & Supp. 1991) ("Each agency or de-
partment shall be required to make a reasonable effort to obtain the information provid-
ed for in section 45-68e . . . "); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578-14.5(b) (Supp. 1990). ("All
affected public agencies and all child placing organizations . .. shall make reasonable
efforts to complete this form with medical information on both natural parents, to obtain
from the natural parents written consent to the release of this information to or for the
benefit of the adopted child, and whenever possible, to obtain from the natural mother
a signed release to receive a copy of all of her medical records, relating to the birth of
the adopted child, which are within the possession of the hospital or other facility at
which the child was born.") For further discussion of the need for greater regulation of
the "reasonable efforts" that need to be taken, see Blair, supra note 8, at 713-42.
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generate placement statistics, 2 and the antipathy of individual
caseworkers, or sometimes whole agencies,as to full disclosure
have resulted in widespread failure to transmit critical medical and
psychological information to adoptive parents." The problem has
82 Frequently, adoption agencies do not have the staff to perform adequate investiga-
tions. The Los Angeles Times recently reported that "public adoption officials describe a
system swamped with children who need to be placed, a situation that social workers say
has created pressure to place more and more children at a faster rate." Klein, supra note
6. The shortage of staff necessary to conduct appropriate investigations could force chil-
dren to wait years to be adopted. Because social workers know the delay may exacerbate
a child's problems, the shortage of agency resources contributes to hasty placements. Id.
Katherine Nelson, in her study of special needs adoption, found that the parents who
were dissatisfied with the information they had been given about their child most often
attributed this to organizational factors such as "worker turnover, heavy caseloads, and in-
adequate interviewing procedures." NELSON, supra note 42, at 35.
Bureaucratic and financial pressures have been cited by a number of experts as a
leading cause of nondisclosure. Jeffrey Rosenberg, MSW and Director of Public Policy for
the National Committee for Adoption, observed that "[t]here is a great deal of pressure
to place these kids, 'move 'em, move 'em, move 'ed,' [s]o what happens is this wrongful
adoption stuff. We hope not too much, but we don't know." Klein, supra note 6. One
social worker reported that the director of her adoption agency told her "[p]lace them
as rapidly as you can. If we have to disrupt (a placement), fine. We can disrupt it. That
makes for more placements and that means better statistics." Id.
For public agencies state funding is often related to the number of placements, and
placement statistics become the measure of a worker's efficiency. Id. Private agencies,
which are funded in large part through fees paid by adoptive parents, are also not im-
mune from the financial pressure to generate placements. See Sharon Gustafson, Regulat-
ing Adoption Intermediaries, Ensuring that the Solutions Are No Worse than the Probem, 3 GEo.
J. LEGAL ETHIcs 837, 848 (1990).
83 Katherine Nelson found that one of the reasons that health information was not
accurately communicated was that "[s]ome workers . . . apparently did not want to dis-
close all of the available information about the child. Perhaps some workers feared that
full disclosure would discourage a seemingly good family. Other workers may have felt
that the parents did not need to have certain information. Still other workers (or agency
policies) might have tried to maintain the secrecy about the child's background that
characterizes traditional adoption practice." NELSON, supra note 42, at 87.
84 Several recent studies and experts have documented this failure. Katherine Nelson
found that half of the families interviewed, who had not previously been foster parents
to their special needs child (she labels these families outright adopters) felt that the
agency's information about the child had been insufficient or inaccurate. Id. at 86. She
also found that "[t]he preferences of more than 1 in 10 outright adopters were stretched
because the worker failed to provide, or ineffectively communicated, information about
the child's problems in functioning." Id. at 84. She concluded that "[t]his practice ex-
ploited parents as resources for waiting children, particularly when the agency could have
provided better information than it did." Id.
Similarly, a study of older child adoptions and adoption disruptions conducted in
the early 80s revealed that over half of the families interviewed whose adopted child had
been sexually abused had not been told prior to placement, and almost one-third of the
adoptive families of physically abused children had not been told of the abuse. Twenty-
eight percent of the families were not informed of a developmental disability and over
one-third were not told of a learning disability or emotional or behavioral problems. In
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received extensive media attention85 and prompted the plethora
of lawsuits examined in this Article, most of which stem from
adoptions that occurred within the past twenty years.' Although
additional statutory reform should ultimately help curtail nondis-
closure,8 7 the compensation of victims of this practice promises to
be a topic demanding the attention of the courts for many years
to come.
only 23% of these cases did the social worker claim that the reason for nondisclosure
was that the condition was not known to the social worker. BARTH & BERRY, supra note
40, at 105, 108-09.
The Los Angeles Times has reported that adoption experts "contend that vital infor-
mation on adopted children, ranging from past abuse to important medical and psycho-
logical information about birth parents, is frequently withheld from adoptive parents,
despite professional guidelines-and in some cases laws-calling for full disclosure." Klein,
supra note 6. Reuben Pannor, former director of a private Los Angeles agency, declared
his open criticism of public agency practices. 'The goal is to get them off the rolls, find
them permanent homes, adoptive homes, which means the state and county no longer
have financial responsibility . . . But there has been an over-zealousness about placing
these 'special needs' children . . . . Many have been placed without proper preparation,
background testing, without information about what problem the child has, and about
recessive problems that may show up later." Id. The extent of nondisclosure was dramati-
cally illustrated during a recent trial of a wrongful adoption case, in which five or six
people were struck from the jury during voir dire because "they had been involved in
adoptions in which facts had been withheld." State Is Liable for Failing to Disclose Child's
History to Adoptive Parents, 35 ATLA Law Rep. 34 (Feb. 1992) [hereinafter State is Liable].
85 See, e.g., Adoptive Parents Sue Agency for Concealing Child's Background, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL, Aug. 16, 1990; Cameron Barr, Due Process for Adoptive Parents, AM. LAW., Oct. 1988,
at 182; Belkin, supra note 6; Franklin, supra note 45; Jack Friedman, He's Not Our Son,
PEOPLE, July 11, 1988, at 38; Golden, supra note 5; Henig, supra note 1; Bonnie Jacob,
Raising Cain, NEW DOMINION, May/June 1989, at 32; Kevin Johnson, Family Sues over Adop-
tion, U.S.A. TODAY, March 8, 1990, at 3A; Johnson, supra note 47; Karwath, supra note 35;
Klein, supra note 6; Dianne Klein, Adoption Gone Awry; Psychotic Child Disrupts a Household
WASH. Posy, Jan. 5, 1988, at 10; Klein, supra note 5; Marvelli & Marvelli, supra note 6;
Neuffer, supra note 34; Andrea Sachs, When the Lullaby Ends, TIME, June 4, 1990, at 82;
Randall Samborn, Full Disclosure?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15, 1990, at 6; State Reviews Policy on
Special Needs Adoption, Proprietary to the United Press International, Sept. 6, 1981; .
In addition, several lawyers representing plaintiffs in wrongful adoption actions have
been asked to appear or be interviewed by television programs. Samuel Totaro and
Enrico Mirabelli appeared on Philadelphia Today and have been asked to appear on
Good Morning America. Telephone Interview with Samuel Totaro (Aug. 19, 1990). Neil
Cogan was contacted by 60 Minutes about a segment. Telephone Interview with Neil
Cogan (August 8, 1990).
86 See supra note 5.
87 See generally, Blair, supra note 8.
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III. LIABILITY OF ADOPTION INTERMEDIARIES:
WHAT CONDUCT SHOULD BE ACTIONABLE?
A. Intentional Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure
The earliest decisions and the majority of lawsuits filed have
focused on intentional behavior on the part of adoption interme-
diaries, consisting of purposeful misrepresentations regarding
health-related matters or conscious nondisclosure of critical infor-
mation that would indicate the presence or risk of severe physical
or mental impairment.
1. Treatment by the Courts
(a) Intentional Misrepresentation.-The seminal decision' in
the area of wrongful adoption is Burr v. Board of County Commis-
sioners, a 1986 opinion of the Ohio Sureme Court which affirmed
a jury award of damages in the amount of $125,000 to adoptive
parents whom the court found had been fraudulently misled by
the material misrepresentations of a public adoption agency.89 In
1964, the Burrs applied to the Stark County Welfare Department
to adopt a baby boy under six months of age.' To their surprise,
they were contacted several weeks later by a county caseworker
who advised them a seventeen-month-old boy was available for
adoption and arranged for them to meet this child. At the meet-
ing the Burrs were told that the child was born to an eighteen-
year-old unwed mother in the city hospital and had been cared
for since birth by his mother and her parents.91 They were fur-
ther advised that the mother was employed during the day, that
she feared the grandparents mistreated the child while she was at
88 Allen v. Allen, 330 P.2d 151 (Or. 1958) may actually have been the first 'wrong-
ful adoption' case for intentional misrepresentation. In Allen adoptive parents sued an
adoption agency who had placed a three-year-old girl with them several years before. The
child had severe emotional problems requiring institutionalization. The suit sought both
revocation of the adoption and monetary damages for medical bills they incurred for the
child. The court dismissed the case, finding it had no jurisdiction, but appeared to focus
on the request to set aside the adoption. The court in dicta also noted it found no
evidence of fraud, but the decision did not discuss the facts of the case in detail so it
offers little guidance.
89 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1108-09 (Ohio 1986).
90 Id. at 1103.
91 Id.
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work, that she wanted to move to Texas to pursue an opportunity
for better employment, and thus she had decided to surrender the
child for adoption.9" Mr. Burr also testified he was told the child
"was a nice, big, healthy baby boy." The Burrs decided to adopt
the child and named him Patrick.9"
As Patrick grew older, it became apparent his physical and
mental development were delayed. He experienced poor motor
skills, a speech impediment, learning disabilities, and at age nine
was placed in special education classes for the educable mentally
retarded. 4 By age seventeen, he had begun to hallucinate and
his behavior became violent and abnormal.5 Over the years the
Burrs took him to numerous hospitals and doctors for
evaluation' and ultimately, when he was nineteen, he was diag-
nosed to have Huntington's Chorea, a genetically inherited pro-
gressive neurological disease characterized by .movement disorders,
delusions and hallucinations, and intellectual deterioration.9 7 he
condition is fatal, with an average life expectancy after onset dur-
ing childhood of 8.5 years.9 His care required his parents' con-
stant attention.' Ultimately, Patrick required twenty-four-hour
nursing care,"°  and had to be institutionalized for the re-
mainder of his life.'01
In 1982, the Burrs obtained the sealed adoption records by
court order and learned for the first time the truth of Patrick's
origins. The county department's own records revealed Patrick's
mother was a thirty-one-year-old mental patient at Massillon State
Hospital, where Patrick had been born. She was mildly mentally
retarded with a speech impediment and psychotic reactions of
92 Id.; Complaint at 3-4, Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, (Stark County Ct. CP.,
Ohio) (No. 83-470).




97 Id. See also STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 299 (25th Ed. 1990).
98 491 N.E.2d at 1103.
99 In August, 1990, counsel for plaintiffs, Wylan Witte, reported that Patrick's father
had spent all of his time off and taken extra time off of his job to take care of Patrick.
Patrick was in an institution as of August, 1990, in the final stages of the disease, and
his father still visited him every day. Telephone Interview with Wylan Witte (Aug. 13,
1990).
100 At the time of the trial, Patrick made a courtroom appearance with two nurses
who attended to him twenty-four hours a day. Letter from Wylan Witte to Marianne Blair
(Aug. 23, 1990).
101 Telephone Interview with Wylan Witte (Aug. 14, 1990).
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unknown origin. His father was unknown but presumed to be
another mental patient. Prior to placement with the Burrs, Patrick
had lived in two foster homes. The department was aware he was
developing slowly and had performed psychological testing prior to
his placement with the Burrs that indicated his intellectual func-
tioning was below normal."0 2 Moreover, the records revealed the
agency had misrepresented facts to the court in, a confidential
report filed as part of the initial adoption proceedings, in which it
was stated the child's intelligence was average and his family histo-
ry regarding mental disease was unknown.03
Shortly after learning of the agency's massive fabrication, the
Burrs filed suit against the Stark County Board of County Commis-
sioners, the County Welfare Department, its director, and the
then-retired caseworker who had made the misrepresentations to
them, seeking damages for the medical expenses, and transporta-
tion and lodging costs they had incurred seeking treatment for
Patrick, ultimate funeral expenses, other expenses incurred for his
support, and mental pain and sufferifig. °4 At trial, the Burrs tes-
tified that had they known his true history, they would not have
chosen to adopt this particular child, due to their limited financial
circumstances and the fact that Mrs. Burr was already disabled her-
self due to the loss of a leg from polio. 0 5 Expert testimony re-
vealed that Patrick's family background and history indicated a
high risk of disease. 1' At the time of trial Patrick's medical bills
had thus far exceeded $81,000.107 Counsel for plaintiff suggests
that statements by jurors after the suit was over indicated the
reason their verdict was not more than $125,000 was that they
assumed the child was covered by insurance.108
The Ohio Supreme Court had little trouble affirming the
verdict, holding that the adoptive parents had sufficiently proven
each element of the tort of fraud."° "It would be a travesty of
justice," proclaimed the court, "and a distortion of the truth to
conclude that deceitful placement of this infant, known by appel-
102 491 N.E.2d at 1104.
103 Id.; Complaint at 4, Burr (No. 83-470).
104 Complaint at 10, Bur (No. 83-470).
105 491 N.E.2d at 1106.
106 Id. (states that this testimony came from the defendants' expert).
107 Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 21, Burr (No. 85-786).
108 Telephone Interview with Wylan Witte (Aug. 13, 1990).
109 491 N.E.2d at 1105-07.
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lants to be at risk, was not actionable when the tragic but hidden
realities of the child's infirmities finally came to light.""'
International misrepresentation that is far less blatant and
elaborate than the statements made to the Burrs has also been
held actionable in fraud. In Roe v. Catholic Charities,"' three
adoptive families alleged that defendant advised the parents that
their children were normal in physical and mental condition and
developments, that the children would require no extraordinary
medical care, and that the agency had no information concerning
the children's background. Plaintiffs further alleged their state-
ments were false when made, because the agency knew two chil-
dren had a history of psychiatic treatment, and because all three
children had exhibited severely abnormal behavior while in foster
care." ' This disturbed behavior continued after the adoptions
and required professional treatment, including institutionalization
of one of the children. The Illinois appellate court determined
that these allegations of intentional misrepresentation on the part
of an adoption agency constituted grounds for a fraud claim and
were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." 3
(b) Intentional Nondisclosure.-The Burr court was unwilling
to be expansive in defining the conduct for which liability would
be imposed by its holding. "It is not the mere failure to disclose
the risks inherent in this child's background which we hold to be
actionable . . . . " the court declared, but rather, "it is the delib-
erate act of misinforming this couple .... "114 In Burr, address-
ing nondisclosure was not critical, because the factual findings at
the lower court level supported the imposition of liability for affir-
mative misrepresentation. Since Burr, however, several courts have
been willing to impose liability for intentional nondisclosure.
In Michael J v. County of Los Angeles, Department of Adop-
tions"5 a California appellate court addressed the issue of liability
for intentional nondisclosure of health information head-on in
their review of a summary judgment dismissing a wrongful adop-
110 Id. at 1107.
111 No. 5-89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 at *1-2 (Il. App. Ct. Feb. 14, 1992).
112 Id. at *2. Plaintiffs allege one child had a history of extensive mental health
treatment prior to her adoptive placement for "violent and uncontrollable behavior as
well as intellectual, social and emotional retardation." The other two had engaged in
behavior such as smearing feces on walls and killing the family dog. Id.
113 Id. at *5.
114 Id. at 1109.
115 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. CL App. 1988).
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tion case. The agency's conduct that was subject to scrutiny in
Michael J. was the alleged intentional concealment of a material
fact."6 When Michael was adopted as an infant in 1970, the skin
on his upper torso and face had the color of a "port wine stain."
County records, reflecting a medical examination the County had
procured prior to placement, described the birthmark and report-
ed "doctor will not make a definite statement as to the prognosis
for this child."" 7 The adoptive parents were aware of the stain,
of course, but were not advised of the doctor's statement regard-
ing his prognosis, which would have highlighted the stain's signifi-
cance. When Michael was eleven, he suffered an epileptic seizure
and was diagnosed with Sturge-Weber Syndrome, a congenital
degenerative neurological condition"' involving loss of coordina-
tion and epilepsy, for which the port wine stain is diagnostically
significant.'19
In the suit brought by the adoptive mother on behalf of her-
self1 2' and the child, the court found that if the evidence at trial
establishes that the adoption agency 'intentionally failed "to dis-
close a material fact within the agency's possession that the exam-
ining physician would not render a prognosis for Michael ... "
liability could be imposed upon the agency for such conduct. 121
The court's pronouncement was forceful:
Public policy cannot extend to condone concealment or
intentional misrepresentation which misleads prospective adop-
tive parents about the unusual calamity they are assuming. The
adoption of a child is an act of compassion, love and humani-
tarian concern where the adoptive parent voluntarily assumes
enormous legal, moral, social, and financial obligations. Accord-
116 Id. at 513.
117 Id. at 505.
118 Id. at 506.
119 Id. at 513.
120 Suit was filed by the adoptive mother because at the time of filing, the adoptive
parents were divorced, the mother had custody, and the father chose not to be a party.
Telephone Interview with Sheldon Rosenfield (Sept. 25, 1990).
121 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513. The published opinion was issued following the second trip
to the appellate court for this case. After the suit was originally filed, the county took a
statute of limitations issue through appeal which took 5 years to resolve. It was ultimately
resolved in plaintiffs' favor, the case was remanded for trial, discovery ensued, and the
county then raised the sovereign immunity issue which went up through the appellate
system for four years, culminating in the published opinion cited herein. The case was
again remanded in May of 1988, set for trial in September, 1990, and ultimately settled
just prior to trial. Telephone Interview with Sheldon Rosenfield (Sept. '25, 1990); and
with his staff (Oct. 8, 1991).
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ingly, a trustworthy process benefits society, as well as the par-
ent and child. As keepers of the conscience of the community,
we cannot countenance conduct which would allow persons
who desire entrance into the emotional realm of parenting to
be unprotected from schemes or tactics designed to discharge
societal burdens onto the unsuspecting or unwary. As trustees
of the child's destiny the agency was obligated to act with mor-
als greater than those found in a purveyor's common market-
place.122
Two appellate courts have recently reached a similar conclu-
sion. In M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, 12 a Minnesota appellate
court upheld a cause of action for intentional nondisclosure on
appeal of a summary judgment by the lower court. The adoption
agency was alleged to have told the adoptive parents only that
there was a possibility of incest in the child's family and did not
reveal that the child was conceived by siblings and his father had
a history of below average intelligence and mental problems. As
the child grew, his behavior problems became more apparent,
including violence and setting fires, and he was ultimately diag-
nosed as having attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. 124 The
appellate court determined that intentional nondisclosure of mate-
rial facts can subject an adoption agency to liability, because the
parties are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship and one
party has special knowledge that is not accessible to the other.
125
Similarly in Roe v. Catholic Charites126 an Illinois appellate court
found that not only affirmative misrepresentations, but also the
intentional failure to disclose necessary medical and psychological
information to adoption parents, will subject the agency to liabili-
ty 127
The most recent imposition of liability for intentional nondis-
closure came in the form of a jury verdict for $3.8 million against
the state in Mohr v. Massachusetts. 2  The state agency that ar-
122 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
123 475 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review granted, (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991).
124 M.H., 475 N.W.2d at 97.
125 M.H., 475 N.W.2d at 99.
126 No. 5-89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 (Ill. App. CL Feb. 14, 1992). See supra notes 111-
13 and accompanying text for an additional discussion of this case.
127 Id. at *8, *12.
128 No. 87-0152 (Bristol County Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1991). There is no published
opinion. The case is reported in the following sources: Neuffer, supra note 34; State Is
Liabe, supra note 84, at 34; "Wrongful Adoption" Verdict May Open New Class of Tort Plain-
iffs, MASS. LAWS. WEEKLY, Nov. 4, 1991, at 1. The case is currently on appeal. The ver-
[Vol. 67:850
LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL ADOPTION
ranged for the adoption of six-year-old Elizabeth in 1973 intention-
ally withheld medical records indicating that Elizabeth had been
diagnosed in infancy as mentally retarded with cerebral atrophy
and that her birth mother was a schizophrenic who had been
institutionalized in a state mental facility. The records were in fact
provided to the child's pediatrician without authorization to re-
lease them to the adoptive parents. The jury apparently was unper-
suaded by the state's contention that nondisclosure was the policy
of the state agency and that disclosure was not required by statute
at the time of the adoption. 29
2. Policy Considerations Favoring Recognition of Liability
Before examining in detail the theories of liability available to
adoptive parents and adoptees, it is important to address more
generally the policy considerations favoring recognition of liability
for intentional misrepresentation and nondisclosure by adoption
agencies regarding health-related matters. Imposition of liability in
cases of this nature may generate concern that adopted children
will be viewed as commodities.'" Such concern is unwarranted if
the courts continue to recognize, as they have been doing, that it
is the inappropriate conduct by the adoption agency that triggers
liability, not merely detection of a subsequent problem with the
health of an adopted child.
Significant benefits will be attained by the continued recogni-
tion of liability foi both intentional misrepresentation and inten-
tional nondisclosure of health-related matters. These include (1)
deterring such conduct' in the future by adoption intermediaries
and thereby avoiding the tragic consequences which have resulted
from these practices; (2) compensating adoptive parents who have
been denied the ability to make an informed decision about the
commitment they will undertake and adopted children who have
failed to receive proper medical care or nurturing as a result of
dict was reduced to $200,000 in compliance with the limitations of the Massachusetts
Tort Claims Act, which limits recovery to $100,000 per plaintiff. Telephone Interview with
Stephen Sheehan, counsel for plaintiffs (Feb. 11, 1992); State Is Liable, supra note 84.
129 Neuffer, supra note 34, at 21; State Is Liable, supra note 84, at 34.
130 The courts in both Burr and Michael J. felt it necessary to discuss and dispel such
misgivings. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109; Michael J, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 511, 513. For a
recent expression of this concern in the media, see Sachs, supra note 85, at 82 ("In a
risk-averse age when consumer standards have become more exacting and family commit-
ments seem less binding, there is a danger that adopted children could be viewed as
commodities that come with an implied warranty.").
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the intermediary's conduct; and (3) promoting confidence in the
adoption process.
(a) Deterrence-One of the most compelling arguments
favoring the imposition of liability for both intentional
misrepresentation and intentional nondisclosure is the deterrent
effect of the threat of liability upon the future practices of
adoption agencies and other intermediaries. Deterrence has long
been recognized as a primary underlying rationale in the field of
tort law. Traceable to the writings of English legal philosophers,
Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, in the late eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries,"'1 the "prophylactic""2 role of tort liability in
preventing future harm remains a central concept in the current
writings of tort scholars, particularly those in the school of law
and economics."' "The action in tort," it has been said, "is a
'judicial parable,' designed to control the future conduct of the
community in general."1" The purpose of contract law, to
ensure that promises are performed," 5 is also promoted by the
deterrent effect of legal enforcement, that is, knowledge of
potential liability for noncompliance surely motivates performance
of contracts.
Why is it so important to deter both intentional misrepresen-
tation and nondisclosure of health-related information? An exami-
nation of the tragic consequences of these practices provides the
answer. Regardless of whether an adoption agency misrepresents
factors affecting a child's mental or physical health, or simply
chooses to say nothing at all, the net result is that the adoptive
parents do not receive information that is critical to future diagno-
sis and health care for the child.
131 Glanville Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CuRR. LEGAL PROBs. 137, 144
(1951).
132 See W. PAGE KEETON, Er AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS- § 4, at
25 (5th ed. 1984), which discusses prevention of future harm as one of the primary
factors affecting the recognition of tort liability.
133 Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Personal Injury Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON
TORT LAW 126 (Robert Rabin ed., 3d ed. 1990). See generally, e.g., Walter Blum & Harry
Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi. Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 239 (1967); Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, in PERSPECTIVES IN TORT LAW,
supra, at 169, 173-190; Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligenc, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29
(1972).
134 Williams, supra note 131, at 144.
135 KEETON ET AL, supra note 132, § 1, at 5.
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The damaging effects of nondisclosure of the presence or risk
of psychological problems, in particular, has been the recent focus
of much litigation and media attention. In many instances chil-
dren have received ineffective or no treatment for years because
their adoptive parents and medical caregivers lacked information
that would signal a particular type of intervention was necessary.
For example, prior physical or sexual abuse experienced by a child
is an indicator that a child is at risk for serious behavior and men-
tal problems, which can be dealt with most effectively if the psy-
chiatrist is aware of this history."5 6 This type of information has
been particularly susceptible to being withheld by adoption inter-
mediaries."5 7 Tina Chandler's story illustrates the importance of
this knowledge. Tina was institutionalized in adolescence after a
long history of violent and destructive behavior, including threats
to kill siblings and setting fires,138 and after she had undergone
years of therapy. Through litigation against the adoption agency,
her parents ultimately learned the extent to which their daughter
was severely physically and sexually abused prior to her adoption
at age four. This knowledge, and the recovery of photographs
taken when she was a child to document her injuries, enabled her
psychiatrists to help her confront and resolve the effects of her
abuse and resulted in a remarkable turnaround, enabling her to
return home to her family." 9
Other types of medical and social history are also integral
factors in the diagnosis of psychological impairment. Knowledge
regarding substance abuse during pregnancy can facilitate diagno-
sis of fetal alcohol syndrome or other drug-related neurological
problems.1" Awareness of a family history of schizophrenia, man-
136 See John W. Mclnturf, Preparing Special-Needs Children For Adoption Through Use of a
Life Book, 65 CHILD WELFARE 373, 376, 378, 381 (1986).
137 See BARTH & BERRY, supra note 40, at 105, whose study of older child adoptions
found that fewer than half of the families whose children had been sexually abused had
been told, and almost one-third of the families whose children had been physically
abused had not been told; see also Belkin, supra note 6, § 1, at 1; Golden, supra note 5;
Klein, supra note 6.
138 Belkin, supra note 6, § 1, at 1.
139 Telephone Interview with Neil Cogan, attorney for Tina's parents and other adop-
tive parents in Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111 S. Ct.
712 (1991) (August 8, 1990).
140 See Jacob, supra note 85, at 48 (Adoption agency withheld information collected
from foster mother that provided strong indicatibns child suffered organic brain damage
from fetal alcohol syndrome, a condition that ultimately caused his institutionalization);
see also Don Hadley & Barbara Peterson, Family Histoyy Workshop, in GENETIC FAMILY HIS-
TORY, supra note 43, at 108; Renata Laxova, Minor Signs of Major Problems, in GENETIC
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ic-depression, and other mental disorders which are subject to
genetic influence141 can hasten diagnosis and appropriate drug
therapy. Often adoptive parents of children who ultimately re-
quired institutionalization report that for years they sought medi-
cal help and were told that the child's problems were not serious,
or improper diagnosis impeded effective treatment.14 2 One adop-
tive mother did not obtain information revealing a family history
of manic-depression until her daughter, after years of therapy, was
ultimately diagnosed at seventeen with the same problem. The
mother, who had tried for several years to obtain her daughter's
medical history, lamented, "Laura had so much pain and went
undiagnosed for so long. She didn't just need family therapy, she
needed lithium."43
The consequences of delaying appropriate treatment can
sometimes be irreversible. Psychiatrists who specialize in the treat-
FAMILY HIsTORY, supra note 43, at 72; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
1429-1430 (1991).
141 Black, supra note 36, at 200-03. See also State Is Liable, supra note 84, at 34
(Seymour Kety, senior research psychiatrist at National Institute of Health, testified at
Mohr trial that "children of schizophrenic mothers are 15 times more likely to exhibit
schizophrenic behavior").
142 See Golden, supra note 5 (Adoptive parents of Lisa G. were not told of psychiatric
evaluation prior to adoption that recommended the child be institutionalized immediately
for long term care. Five years after the adoption, she was ultimately institutionalized and
the adoption revoked, but she was denied years of the care she needed.); Jacob, supra
note 85, at 48 ("'The cruel thing is that not knowing about John's condition has caused
him so much time,' said his father. 'Time we spent on therapies that didn't work, time
wasted when the doctors said 'he's just a hyperactive, normal kid. He'll grow out of it.'
Now it may be too late to help John or it may take 10 times longer than it would have
if we'd started right in the first place.'"); Karwath, supra note 35, at 12 (Carol Krueger,
adoptive mother of an institutionalized mentally retarded son with attention span and
conduct disorders, learned for the first time 12 years after the adoption that both of the
child's parents had been institutionalized for mental problems. "'If we had had this infor-
mation earlier," she stated, "maybe we could have been more aware of things to look for
and gotten more expert help sooner.'"); Klein, supra note 6, at 1 (Monica Shoemaker
(pseudonym) endured years of inappropriate therapy before she was diagnosed as having
multiple personality disorder and schizophrenia, information that social workers withheld
from her adoptive family); Klein, supra note 85, at 3 (Adoptive mother of Tommy
Colella, whose diagnosis of fetal alcohol syndrome with psychotic behavior was not shared
with his adoptive parents, observed, "'[a]s awful as it was, we know that Tommy suffered
more than we did. He was denied the treatment he needed. The system failed him.'").
See also Roe v. Catholic Charities, No. 5-89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 at *7 (Il1. App. Ct.
Feb. 14, 1992) in which the court observed that the children of three adoptive families
could have received proper treatment at a much earlier time if the adoption agency had
provided them with diagnostic evaluation that had already been performed prior to place-
ment.
143 Franklin, supra note 45, at 41.
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ment of psychopathic children report that the chances of therapy
achieving a successful outcome are greatly increased if the child is
diagnosed at a young age. They indicate that for children over
seven, the chances of success are only about 50%. When treatment
is delayed past age eleven, the chances for recovery are not
good.' Thus, the price of nondisclosure is not only to be
found in the turmoil experienced by the child and the adoptive
family prior to accurate diagnosis, but may include permanent
inability to function and institutionalization.145
The need for accurate health history to facilitate diagnosis
and treatment of physical impairments is equally compelling. Some
hereditary disorders can be life-threatening if not properly diag-
nosed and treated.1'4  Adopted children often undergo painful
and sometimes hazardous diagnostic testing that would have been
unnecessary if adequate medical history had been provided.1
47
Knowledge regarding a hereditary risk not only warns adoptive
parents and physicians to watch for certain symptoms, but also
alerts parents that certain activities or medical procedures may
create a particular risk for their child.14 1 Information that would
assist with early identification of children with developmental delay
is particularly important to maximize their potential, as develop-
mental progress will be further retarded absent early intervention.'
144 KEN MAGID & CAROLE A. McKELVEy, HIGH RISK 149, 216 (1987).
145 See supra note 142, describing five children who were ultimately institutionalized;
see also, Belkin, supra note 6 (describing Tina Chandler and other adopted children who
were institutionalized following nondisclosure).
146 For example, familial polyposis causes polyps to form in late childhood, creating
symptoms of chronic colitis. Carcinoma of the colon almost invariably develops if the
disease is left untreated. STEDMAN'S, supra note 97, at 1238; Omenn et al., supra note 43,
at 162.
147 John R. Ball & Gilbert S. Omenn, Genetics, Adoption, and the Law, in GENETICS
AND THE LAW II 277 (Aubrey Milunskey & George J. Annas eds., 1980); Franklin, $upa
note 45, at 40-41 (Adoptee Robert Morse underwent many painful tests to reach a diag-
nosis of juvenile chronic arthritis, a disease he later discovered was prevalent in his birth
family.); Omenn et a., supra note 43, at 162; Ginny Whitehouse, Consumers Viaupoint"
Panel Disasion in GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY, supra note 43, at 19 (Discovery by adult
adoptee of history of fibrous breast lumps avoided repetition of painful treatment that
might otherwise have been avoided).
148 For example, a genetic clinic contacted the adoptive parents of a child after her
birth mother was diagnosed with von Willebrand disease, a bleeding disorder which the
child had a 50% risk of developing. The adoptive parents were warned to take preventive
measures in situations in which bleeding might occur and to perform certain tests before
any elective surgery on the child. Omenn et al., supra note 43, at 161.
149 Susan Heighway, Develofmental Approach to Casefinding. Part 1, in GENETIC FAMILY
HISTORY, supra note 43, at 93.
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Accurate and complete disclosure of nonidentifying health-
related information is also essential to appropriate placement for a
child. Professionals who specialize in placing children with special
needs for adoption stress that providing prospective adoptive par-
ents with the most complete information available is essential to
ensuring that the family is both emotionally and financially able to
cope with the challenges that a child who has or develops special
needs may present.150 Social scientists who have conducted stud-
ies of adoptions of older and special needs children confirm that
providing incomplete or inaccurate information about a child's
special needs or problems in functioning contributes to dissatisfac-
tion with the adoption on the part of the adoptive parents
15
'
and is a significant factor contributing to adoption disruption.
5 2
These findings are supported by a study of California's own state
records which indicated that between 1983 and 1987, sixty-nine
adoption annulments were attributed to fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion regarding a child by a county agency.' 5 When an adoptive
placement is disrupted, the child experiences tremendous instabili-
ty, emotional upheaval, and a sense of rejection that can be per-
manently damaging. The child's chances for successful adoption
thereafter are diminished.15 Less obvious may be the devastating
effect that disruption has on the adoptive parent, who is beset by
feelings of inadequacy and failure. Observed one researcher, "Dis-
solution was not the parents' easy way out; it was their trage-
dy."15 5 Even if the adoption is not disrupted, lack of information
150 Diane Mahon stressed the need for full disclosure and observed that the more a
family is told about a child's needs and history, the more likely the family is to adopt
and care for the child. Telephone Interview with Diane Mahon, National Director for
AASK American Adoption Exchange (Sept. 24, 1990); Gloria Hochman, Communication
Director of the National Adoption Exchange expressed a similar sentiment. Telephone
Interview with Gloria Hochman (Sept. 18, 1990). See also CWLA STANDARDS, supra note
49, at 36-37 (Standard 4.12); NELSON, supra note 42, at 92.
151 BARTH & BERRY, supra note 40, at 108-09; NELSON, supra note 42, at 71, 73.
152 The term adoption disruption is used to describe any adoptive placement that has
ended, whether before or after finalization of the adoption. BARTH & BERRY, supra note
40, at 20.
"Among, families that reported no information gaps, the disruption rate was only 19%.
Among families reporting one or more gaps, the disruption rate was 46%." Id. at 108-09;
NELSON, supra note 42, at 74-75. See also supra note 6, for a list of revocation actions,
many of which were preceded by inadequate disclosure.
153 Klein, supra note 6.
154 NELSON, supra note 42, at 71-72, 75 (History of previous disrupted adoption is a
predictor for both parent dissatisfaction and adoption disruption); BARTH & BERRY, supra
note 40, at 72, 156-7.
155 NELSON, supra note 42, at 77.
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can seriously diminish the adoptive parents' ability to accept the
challenges a child, particularly one with emotional or psychological
problems, may present, and can create an atmosphere in the
home that is dysfunctional and harmful to the child. 5
Failure to transmit information regarding health problems
adversely impacts an adoptive family's financial ability to meet a
child's needs in two ways. Children are placed with families who
do not have the financial resources to provide the medical care,
special education, equipment, or other needs the child may have
because the adoptive parents were not forewarned and could not
make an assessment of their ability to meet these needs prior to
making the commitment.1 7 Second, adoptive families who are
not aware of their child's special needs are not alerted to the
possibility of federal and state adoption assistance, or may have
insufficient information to qualify. Federal and state programs
provide benefits to families who adopt special needs children and
meet certain eligibility requirements. 5  The benefits include
medical assistance under Medicaid and various state programs, as
well as social services such as respite care, specialized day care,
counseling, and in home supportive services such as housekeeping
156 Id at 32-33, 68-69, 73.
157 See id. at 39, 84; see also Belkin, supa note 6, at Al, B8 (Residential psychiatric
care can cost as much as $15,000 per month); Johnson, supra note 47, at 36. Some
adoptive parents have sought revocation to obtain governmental assistance. Klein, supra
note 6 (adoptive parents sold family business and sought revocation to pay child's medi-
cal bills); Marvelii, supra note 6.
158 Since passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the fed-
eral government has provided reimbursement to the states for adoption assistance bene-
fits to families who adopt eligible children with special needs. In addition, each state has
its own state-funded adoption assistance program. The intent of the federal program is to
complement rather than replace the state programs, which often cover children who do
not meet the requirements for federal assistance and provide benefits not available in the
federal program. HO.JNGER FT AL, supra note 7, § 9.01[2].
To establish eligibility for federal benefits, a state must determine that the child is
a child with special needs and that the child meets the financial and categorical criteria
of either the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program or the Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI) program. To be classified as a child with special needs, the
state must find that the child cannot or should not be returned to the child's parents,
that there is a specific factor which makes it reasonable to conclude that the child can-
not be placed for adoption without assistance, and that reasonable efforts have been
made to place the child without assistance, unless such efforts would not be in the best
interest of the child (i.e., the child has become attached to the prospective adoptive
parents). Id. § 9.03 and 9.03[1]. Factors which may make a child eligible include physi-
cal, mental or emotional handicaps. Id. § 9.03[1][b].
State eligibility requirements vary, although they also tend to limit adoption assis-
tance to children who, because of special needs, are more difficult to place. Id. § 9.03.
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and personal care.159 To qualify for assistance, adoptive parents
must apply in most cases prior to finalization of the adoption 160
and show that the child's special needs existed at that time. The
federal program recently amended its regulations to allow adoptive
parents to apply after finalization if they can show they were not
provided with all relevant information about the child's condition
at the time they requested assistance. 161 Nevertheless, full disclo-
sure at the outset is necessary to alert prospective adoptive parents
of the need to apply for these benefits prior to finalization and to
ensure eligible adoptive families will receive benefits for the full
period in which they are entitled to them.162
In addition to their affects on future health care and suitabili-
ty of the placement to meet the child's needs, misrepresentation
and nondisclosure of health-related information have other long-
term negative effects. When information regarding potential hered-
itary risks is withheld, adoptees as they reach adulthood are de-
nied critical information that may affect their own choices regard-
ing childbearing. Furthermore, this may have adverse consequenc-
es for the health of their own descendants."6 Lack of knowledge
159 Federal medicaid benefits include assistance with in-patient hospital services (ex-
cept institutions for a mental disease or tuberculosis), outpatient hospital services, labora-
tory and X-ray services, early periodic screening and diagnosis for physical or mental
disorders, and some types of medical treatment. States may choose to include in their
medicaid programs home health care services, private duty nursing services, physical ther-
apy, dental care, prescription drugs, in-patient psychiatric services, or other diagnostic,
preventative, or rehabilitative services. Id. § 9.04[3], at 9-25 and § 9.04[4], at 9-27 to 9-
28.
160 Id. § 9.04[6][a]. Some states allow adoptive parents to apply for state adoption
assistance benefits based upon preexisting conditions if the adoptive parents did not have
knowledge of these conditions at the time of the adoption. Id See Jacob, supra note 85,
at 48, indicating that Virginia, as of 1989, intended to adopt a policy allowing parents to
apply for state aid even if a child were not diagnosed as a special needs child until sev-
eral years after adoption.
161 HOLUINGER ET AL., supra note 7, § 9.04[6] [a] (citing Human Development Servs.,
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs. Policy Interpretation Question, ACYF-plQ-88-06,
Eligibility for Title IV-E Adoption Assistance (Dec. 2, 1988)).
162 Federal law permits states to negotiate an adoption assistance agreement with
adoptive parents that will take effect upon placement, so that the family will be eligible
for benefits without having to wait for issuance of an interlocutory or final decree of
adoption. Id. § 9.04[6][a].
163 See Black, supra note 36, at 198; Omenn et al., supra note 43, at 162; Diane
Plumridge et al., ASHG Activities Relative to Education, 46 AM. J. HUM. GENETICs 208, 209
(1990). Adoptees who are alerted to possible genetic disorders may consider prenatal
genetic screening or amniocentesis.
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about their background can also create identity conflict in some
adopted children, particularly as they reach adolescence.'16
Assuming then that disclosure of health-related information is
essential, and taking note of professional guidelines that endorse
disclosure i" and statutory reform that now requires it," why
is the deterrent effect of liability for nondisclosure necessary? In
the first place, several states still do not mandate the disclosure of
health-related information to adoptive parents by statute,167 and
many other states provide statutes which are insufficiently compre-
hensive in coverage and scope. 16 Moreover, enforcement pro-
visions and sanctions for noncompliance are almost totally ab-
sent.1 69 Thus, while state statutes provide limited guidance, they
do not motivate compliance. Additionally, professional guidelines
recommending disclosure fall short. These guidelines have been in
place since 1971,170 and yet intentional nondisclosure of health-
related information still occurs frequently.'17 Agencies experience
financial pressures to place special needs children quickly to con-
serve public or agency resources. 172 Counsel for plaintiff in the
Burr case expressed his opinion that the fraud in Burr was commit-
ted simply to avoid the expense and additional paperwork of plac-
ing the child through the special needs program. 3 Further-
more, funding for agencies is linked to placement; as a result
social workers often experience bureaucratic pressure to place
164 See supra note 63-64 and accompanying text.
165 CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 37-38.
166 See supra note 74.
167 &e supra notes 75-76.
168 &e supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
169 See Blair, supra note 8, at 775-76, for a more comprehensive coverage of this top-
ic. Currently, only a few states impose sanctions for failure to comply with disclosure
statutes. &e IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8(11) (West Supp. 1991) (making it a misdemeanor
for any person to "assist[] in or impede[] the placement or adoption of a minor person
in violation of this section" which requires placement investigation and disclosure of med-
ical background information); LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1127 (West Special Pamphlet
1992) (Failure to make good faith effort to obtain and disclose health information is
punishable by fine of $150 to $500.) The Uniform Conference of Commissioners is con-
sidering a revision to the Uniform Adoption Act that would make it a misdemeanor
when someone with a duty to disclose knowingly fails to provide information that is rea-
sonably available. &e UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § art. § 10-e (Proposed Draft Aug. 9, 1991).
170 SOROSKY Er AL., supra note 31, at 36.
171 &e BARTH & BERRY, supra note 40, at 108-11; NELsON, supra note 42, at 31-35; see
also supra notes 5, 83-85.
172 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
173 Maley, supra note 6, at 730 n.141.
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children quickly to generate placement statistics.1 74 In some in-
stances individual workers fear disclosure may discourage a particu-
lar placement, or the worker or agency continues to adhere to the
traditional policy that secrecy about a child's background should
be maintained. 75 Thus, the incidence of misrepresentation and
nondisclosure is still sufficiently frequent to necessitate the deter-
rent effect that liability for such practices would create.
Due to the organized and professional level of the activity
being affected, it is quite reasonable to conclude that liability will
indeed have a deterrent effect on intentional practices of adoption
intermediaries. Unlike tortfeasors who become subject to liability
through random, everyday misfortunes, adoption practice is highly
regulated and conducted by licensed professionals with a great
deal of training.1 76 Social workers employed in both public and
private agencies have specialized training, supervised direction, and
the ability to implement specified internal procedures and regula-
tions. Private attorneys who handle independent adoptions are also
legally trained, licensed, subject to professional regulation and
ethical codes, and have access to continuing legal education that
can provide specialized training in appropriate adoption practices.
Furthermore, both adoption agencies and private attorneys fre-
quently carry malpractice insurance and are thus subject to the
pressures of insurers to conform their procedures to limit liability
exposure. 77
174 See supra notes 82, 84 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 83; BARTH & BERRY, supra note 40, at 110.
176 See generaly CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 67-68. Standard 6.20 directs that
social work staff members, including at least the director of the adoption service, the
caseworker directors, and the social work supervisors should have graduate degrees in so-
cial work. It further provides:
All aspects of adoption service require specific knowledge and skills that are ac-
quired through a combination of professional education and experience in social
work, and through ongoing inservice training and supervision.
Professionally trained social workers should be used for those adoption
service tasks that involve casework and groupwork interviewing, assessing and
preparing children and parents for the adoptive placement, and assisting birth
and adoptive parents to arrive at their decisions.
Id. at 67.
177 See Jeffrey Rosenberg & William Pierce, Adoption Practice T day: The Current Judicial
Boundaries, 13 FAM. L REP. 3025, 3030 (1987), reprinted in ADOPTION FACrBOOK, supra
note 1, at 137, 142. Stephen Juech, counsel for defendants in Meracle v. Children's Seres.
Soc'y., 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989), advised that most private agencies have EEO coverage
(error and omission coverage) that would apply to wrongful adoption actions. Telephone
Interview with Stephen Juech, Esq., Frisch Dudek, Ltd. (Aug. 9, 1990).
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Recent court decisions imposing liability have already had an
impact. In the Journal of Law and Social Work, an Article appeared
in 1989 advising child welfare agencies of the Burr decision and
recommending precautions agencies should take in order to re-
duce, legal liability for the placement of children for adop-
tion." 7' The Article recommended that agencies systematically
review their policies and procedures to ensure full disclosure of all
known important medical and background information to poten-
tial adoptive parents prior to placement. It also proposed training
and specific disclosure procedures to implement the policy. 179
Additional evidence of the effect of litigation may be found in the
recently revised Texas disclosure statute,80 enacted at least par-
tially in response to the wrongful adoption litigation filed against
the Texas Department of Human Services.' 8 '
(b) Compensation.-Liability for intentional misrepresentation
and nondisclosure also functions to compensate those who have
been harmed by such behavior-adopted children and their adop-
tive parents. Compensation of losses has long been recognized as
one of the underlying functions of tort law,' despite criticism
from scholars that it cannot serve as the sole rationale for all tort
liability.8 3 Contract law also seeks to compensate parties for
losses sustained as the result of a breach.
8 4
Adoptees deserve compensation when intentional failure by
adoption intermediaries to accurately disclose health-related infor-
mation delays or impairs appropriate medical treatment. They may
experience physical, mental, or emotional suffering which could
have been reduced or alleviated. 8 ' For some children, their
physical or mental impairments may become permanent or more
178 Carol Amadio, Wrongful Adoption-A New Basis for Litigation, Another Challenge for
Child Welfare, J.L & SOCAL WORK, March 1989, at 23.
179 Id. at 29-O.
180 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1991).
181 Telephone Interview with Neil Cogan, Associate Dean at S.M.U. College of Law,
drafter of the recent amendments to the Texas disclosure statute, and plaintiff's attorney
in Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 712 (Oct. 2,
1991).
182 KEETON ET" AL, supra note 132, § 4 at 20; Posner, supra note 133, at 30-31; Wil-
liams, supra note 131, at 151.
183 Posner, supra note 133, at 30-31.
184 &eJoHN D. CMAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, CONTRACTs § 14-1 (3rd ed. 1987).
185 &e supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text; see also discussion of Foster v. Bass,
575 So. 2d 967 (Miss. 1990), infra part III.(B).1.b.
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severe because of delayed or ineffective treatment. They may face
a lifetime with a reduced functioning capacity, in terms of physi-
cal, mental, or emotional limitations, or a reduced life expectancy,
as a result of conditions that could have been less severe or im-
proved if accurate information had prompted appropriate medical
care.186 These children are entitled to compensation for their
impairments, physical and mental pain and suffering, medical ex-
penses, and loss of earnings they will incur as adults, which result-
ed from the intentional failure to disclose.
Adopted children should also be entitled to compensation for
emotional trauma or deprivation of needed medical care or other
services when placement with a family incapable of meeting their
needs is directly traceable to a failure to provide health-related
information to adoptive parents. As discussed above,18 7 nondisclo-
sure of information about a child's impairments may result in
placement in a family that is emotionally or financially unable to
cope with the child's needs or limitations. Such placements can
create a home atmosphere that is hostile, tense, psychologically
damaging and possibly even physically abusive to the child, and
may result in a disruption of the adoption, creating further insta-
bility and emotional pain. Due to their limited financial resources
or lack of access to adoption subsidies, families who received inad-
equate information about a child's needs may discover they are
unable to provide the medical or psychiatric care, special educa-
tion, or special equipment that the child might require.1" When
an adoptive placement is inappropriate or the child is deprived of
needed services because the adoptive parents were not adequately
prepared and informed of the child's health background, the
child is entitled to compensation for the resulting physical, men-
tal, or emotional harm.
To discuss the compensation to which an adoptive parent is
entitled, it is essential to first focus clearly on the nature of the
harm that is caused by misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Failure
to transmit accurate and complete health-related information to
prospective adoptive parents denies them the opportunity to make an
informed choice about the commitment they are about to undertake
and their own capacity to meet a particular child's special needs
and challenges. The harm to them is not simply that they endured
186 Id.
187 See supra notes 150-62 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
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the emotional and financial devastation that can accompany rais-
ing a child with severe mental, emotional, and/or physical impair-
ments. The harm results from the fact that, by withholding essen-
tial information, they were denied the opportunity to choose
whether they would voluntarily assume those burdens. The nature
of the injury was clearly understood by the Ohio Supreme Court
in Burr, when it proclaimed:
Adoptive parents are in the same position as, and confront
risks comparable to those, of natural parents relative to their
child's future. Our decision should not be viewed as altering
traditional family relationships and responsibilities, nor should
it be read as shifting part of the burden of parenting to soci-
ety. However, just as couples must weigh the risks of becoming
natural parents, taking into consideration a host of factors, so
too should adoptive parents be allowed to make their decision
in an intelligent manner."
One might question why adoptive parents should be compen-
sated for being denied the opportunity to choose, when birth
parents often endure the same hardships without being given a
choice. The response is on several levels. First, the nature of the
wrong in the adoption context is that information was available
that could have provided an opportunity to make an informed
choice, and thus a duty should be imposed on the party in con-
trol of that information to release it to the prospective adoptive
parents. Our society does in fact now widely recognize a cause of
action for wrongful birth."9 Natural parents are allowed to re-
cover for pecuniary losses 91  and for emotional distress1 92
against physicians for failing to provide parents with accurate med-
ical information concerning a risk their child would be severely
impaired, in time to prevent conception or permit termination of
a pregnancy. Providing compensation for pecuniary losses and
emotional distress awarded in the wrongful adoption context is
clearly analogous.
193
189 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1109 (Ohio 1986).
190 See KE.TON Er AL, supra note 132, § 55, at 371.
191 Id. at n.47.
192 Id. at n.47-48. See infra notes 386-415 and accompanying text for a discussion of
some of the obstacles still encountered in some courts to the recovery of damages for
emotional distress; see also Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Recoverability of Campensatoiy
Damages for Mental Anguish or Emotional Distress For Tortiously Causing Another's Birth, 74
A.LR. 4TH 798 (1989).
193 See LeMay, supra note 11, at 486-87 (comparison of wrongful adoption and
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To simply argue that adoptive parents should be treated simi-
larly to parents in wrongful birth actions is the easiest course. To
do so, however, ignores the fact that creation of a relationship by
birth and creation by adoption are different, and the differences
should affect society's expectations. It is both a fundamental legal
principle'94 and a sociological norm 95 in our society that natu-
ral parents are primarily responsible for the care of their children.
When natural parents cannot or for some reason do not properly
exercise that responsibility, the state, under the principle of parens
patriae, assumes responsibility for the care of their children
through its juvenile court system. By the 1950s, adoption in this
country became recognized as a valuable child welfare service,
196
that is, a method of addressing the needs of children whose birth
families were unable or unwilling to adequately care for them. By
the 1970s child welfare experts reached agreement that adoption
as a means of raising and nurturing a child was preferable to state
institutions or foster care, not just for infants, but also for older
children and children with physical, mental or emotional prob-
lems. 197 Through adoption, the adoptive parents assume respon-
sibility for the care and support of their children, and we recog-
nize that once the adoption is final, their duties are identical to
those of natural parents. 9 Yet few would advocate that the state
could discharge its burden to care for children by simply assigning
them to selected families for adoption. Adoption is a voluntary as-
sumption of the responsibilities of parenting. Prior to the adoptive
placement, there exists no special bond between a potential adop-
tive parent and a particular child. When undertaking the adoption
commitment involves foreseeable extraordinary challenges, adoptive
parents should have the right to make an informed choice wheth-
wrongful birth actions); Maley, supra note 6, at 727-29 (discussing analogy to wrongful
birth damages).
194 See HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNrED STATES § 6.2
(2d ed. 1988). "Today both mother and father are responsible for the support of their
children, to the extent of their respective resources and abilities." Id. The parent's re-
sponsibility for the education for the child arises out of our "traditional assumption that
the basic social unit is the nuclear fhmily and that that unit is the best instrument for
transmission of social values to preceding generations." Id. § 9.2, at 332. The parent
decides what medical care is to be provided. Id. § 9.3, at 335.
195 See general!y JOSEPH K. FOLSOM, THE FAMIL. ITS SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSVCHIATRY
20 (1934); CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN, FAMILY AND CVIUZATION 700-01 (1947).
196 Howe, supra note 20, at 177.
197 Id. at 188; HOLuiNGER ET AL., supra note 7, § 1.04, at 1-51, § 9.01, at 9-3.
198 See CLARK, supra note 194, § 20.10, at 927-28.
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er or not to assume this responsibility based upon all information
reasonably available about a particular child.
What then, are the damages incurred when adoptive parents
are denied the opportunity for informed choice? Just as natural
parents who recover under a wrongful birth claim, adoptive par-
ents experience emotional trauma and financial losses when an
adopted child presents challenges with which they were not pre-
pared to cope.
Much of the sociological literature19 and media
coverage21 that present case studies have focused on the trauma
of families that encountered unexpected, severe psychological
problems in adopted children. Destructive behavior, theft, ar-
son,20 1 violent attacks, and threats or attempts to kill siblings,
other children, or the adoptive parents202 are commonly report-
ed by parents who were not given accurate information regarding
their child's mental problems prior to placement. It is also com-
mon for some of these seriously disturbed children to practice
self-mutilation or attempt suicide."° Living with a seriously dis-
199 See BARTH & BERRY, supra note 40, at 175-76; NELSON, supra note 42, at 31-35, 68-
69, 76-77.
200 See supra note 85 and articles cited therein.
201 See M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 475 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), reiewm
granted, (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991); NELSON, supra note 42, at 33, 69; Belkin, supra note 6;
Jacob, supra note 85, at 37; Marvelli & Marveli, supra note 6.
202 &e Belkin, supra note 6, at 1 (Mark Richards, whose adoptive parents were told
only that he had a mild learning disability, attempted to burn down his home and
threatened his younger brother with a butcher knife. His parents subsequently learned
the state had a large file on Mark, describing horrible abuse by his father, who had
bitten the child's left forefinger off. Attacks by other children are also described.); Gold-
en, supra note 5 (Jacob Clemens, in an apparent suicide attempt, killed two of his youn-
ger brothers in a fire. "Debbie" attacked her adoptive mother with a knife. Lisa G. at-
tempted to poison her adoptive father with Lysol.); Jacob, supra note 85, at 37; Klein,
supra note 6 (Twice Monica Shoemaker tried to suffocate her baby sister and three times
she threatened her mother with a butcher knife.); Sachs, supra note 85, at 82 (One child
attempted to cut off his cousin's arm and, on another occasion, bum down the room
while the cousin slept. After the adoption, the adoptive parents learned he had been
horribly abused as a child.).
In Colorado 'an organization founded for parents of adoptive children who are
violent and mentally ill gained 2,000 members in its first five months of operation. Gold-
en, supra note 5.
203 BARTH & BERRY, supra note 40, at 176 (Eight-year-old child, who practiced Satanic
worship and sliced his penis to draw blood for ceremonies, was placed with adoptive
father who was unaware of this behavior at time of placement.); Friedman, supra note 85
at 38; Golden, supra note 5; Klein, supra note 6, at 3 (Tommy Colella, a child whose
adoption revocation received national media coverage, attempted repeatedly to set fires,
mutilate himself, and commit suicide by hanging prior to his institutionalization. Only
later did his parents learn the state had extensive files on his psychiatric disorder.);
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turbed child is disruptive for other children in the family2°4 and
extremely stressful for the parents, often causing marital discord
between the parents and not infrequently contributing to their di-
vorce.2°5 Parents who were not prepared for this behavior feel
manipulated, angry, frustrated, victimized, inadequate, and some-
times afraid of their children.2°
It is not only psychological problems, however, that can cause
emotional trauma. Parents of children with debilitating, progressive
neurological impairments, such as Huntington Disease, grieve
intensely. As courts have observed in other contexts, "[tjhere is no
joy in watching a child suffer and die . ... 20
Many families have also been financially devastated by the
unexpected medical costs that they incur. For example, at the
time of trial, medical expenses for the care of Patrick Burr ex-
ceeded $80,000.2°' Expenses for the care of Erin Meracle, anoth-
er child afflicted with Huntington Disease whose case is discussed
below,209 were estimated at the time of settlement to be approxi-
mately $30,000 per year. The Kruegers, who are currently suing an
adoption agency in Chicago for failing to reveal an extensive histo-
ry of mental illness in the birth parents, have expended up to
Marvelli & Marvelli, supra note 6 (describing one adopted daughter's self-abuse and pre-
occupation with fire and death); State Is Liab, supra note 84, at 34 (Elizabeth Mohr
made several suicide attempts.).
204 See Golden, supra note 5 (account of Lisa G.); Klein, supra note 6 (Mother stated
that her other children lived in constant turmoil and fear because of Monica's behav-
ior.); see also Jacob, supra note 85, at 36 (indicating a previously well adjusted sister be-
gan staying in her room behind closed doors). The impact on siblings can be particularly
harmful if biological siblings are adopted together and the adoption of one is later re-
voked, causing their separation. See generay Belkin, supra note 6, at B8; Sharman Stein,
Spurned Adoptee Just Wants to See Brother, CI. TRIB. April 5, 1990, at 1.
205 NELSON, supra note 42 (One adoptive mother was hospitalized for two months
with a nervous breakdown). The adoptive parents of the child in Collier v. Krane, 736 F.
Supp. 473 (D. Colo. 1991), were divorced prior to filing the action, in part related to
stress of child's behavior. Telephone Interview with Paul Radosevich, counsel for plaintiffs
(Oct. 18, 1991); Golden, supra note 5 (One adoptive mother, who now leads workshops
for adoptive families, commented, "[a] lot of people stay in the [adoptive] commitment
after it doesn't work out. And to me, that's really unhealthy because it affects the rest of
the family. I've seen so many marriages break up over it."); Jacob, supra note 85, at 36
(The stress caused the adoptive couple to fight continuously.).
206 NELSON, supra note 42, at 32, 76-77.
207 Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 842 (NJ. 1981) (wrongful birth action against
physicians who failed to warn of danger of cystic fibrosis).
208 Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1108 (Ohio 1986).
209 Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989). See infra notes 437-
47 and accompanying text. The estimate was made by Charles Steirman, counsel for
plaintiffs, in a telephone interview (Oct. 11, 1990).
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$70,000 for therapists, doctors, specialists and tutors for their son,
who is currently institutionalized.2 1 The cost of residential psy-
chiatric care can be up to $15,000 per month.211 One adoptive
family iwas forced to sell a family business and ultimately seek
revocation because they could no longer pay their child's mount-
ing medical bills.21 2 Often parents who file wrongful adoption
actions are motivated by the desire to obtain financial assistance to
help provide necessary services for their child.2 13 Adoptive par-
ents who were denied the opportunity to make an informed
choice about whether they could meet a particular child's needs
with the resources available to them are entitled to reimbursement
for the extraordinary medical and other expenses incurred as a
result of the child's condition.
Certainly, adoptive parents who are fully informed also may
encounter emotional trauma and financial strain. The distinction
from uninformed adoptive parents is that the informed adoptive
parents made a voluntary choice to assume that particular burden.
Moreover, the fact that the choice was voluntary may lessen the
burden. While a child with severe psychological or other impair-
ments creates stress under the best of circumstances, parents who
are informed and anticipate these problems are likely to have
received more counseling and tend to be better prepared emo-
tionally to deal with them. Informed adoptive parents will have
determined that the problems a particular child experiences are
ones with which they can cope.21 4 Moreover, they do not have to
210 Johnson, supra note 85, at 3A. Cost of medical care for Michael Gibbs, another
adopted child who is the subject of litigation, has totalled over $400,000 so far, over
$100,000 of which was not covered by insurance. Telephone Interview with Samuel
Totaro, counsel for plaintiffs (Aug. 13, 1990).
211 Belkin, supra note 6, at Al.
212 Rein, supra note 6.
213 Johnson, supra note 85, at 3A (discussing Krueger case).
The plaintiff in Allen v. Children's Servs., 567 N.E.2d 1346 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990),
sought help with obtaining special schooling and medical appliances. Telephone Interview
with Blaine Schwarz, attorney for plaintiff (Sept. 17, 1991). The plaintiffs in Griffith v.
Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990), similarly filed suit to seek services for their
children. Telephone Interview with Neil Cogan, attorney for plaintiffs (Aug. 8, 1990). In
another case, Wristen v. Jansen, No. 86CU-10-6421 (Franklin County Ohio Court of Com-
mon Pleas, filed Oct. 15, 1986), the adoptive mother sued in an attempt to obtain help
with costs of medical care. Telephone Interview with Pete Milless, attorney for plaintiffs
(October 16, 1990).
214 NELSON, supra note 42, at 18, 92. One specialist in special needs adoption ob-
served that you must look for a good match between the child and the family. For ex-
ample, some families can tolerate one kind of abnormal behavior, such as setting fires,
but not another, such as a sullen child. Telephone Interview with Gloria Hochman, Com-
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deal with the additional frustration of feeling manipulated or the
anger that compounds an otherwise stressful situation. Further-
more, adoptive parents who have been fully advised of health risks
are more likely to have assessed their financial resources and are
alerted to the possibility of financial assistance through adoption
subsidies. And most importantly, their situation is not the result of
inappropriate conduct by an adoption intermediary, the critical
factor that entitles parents from whom essential information is
withheld to compensation for their emotional trauma and finan-
cial losses.
(c) Foster the Institution of Adoption.-Adoption as an institu-
tion serves important societal interests.21  Through adoption,
children who might not otherwise have a permanent family or be
provided with appropriate care and stability can have the opportu-
nity to receive the care and nurturing they need in a familial
setting from parents who have made a long term commitment to
them. To the extent that children have the opportunity to develop
a positive self-identity in a supportive, stable environment, society
is spared the social problems that often accompany societal failure
to meet the physical and emotional needs of its youngest mem-
bers. Birth parents who are not prepared emotionally or financial-
ly to raise a child are provided an option that allows them to plan
for the care of their child and postpone parenting until they feel
ready for it. Research indicates "that unwed teenage mothers who
relinquish their infants for adoption are much less likely to re-
main socially, educationally and economically disadvantaged
throughout their lives than those who keep their babies."216
Adoptive parents have the opportunity to experience the joys of
parenthood. Two researchers studying the outcome of adoptive
placements concluded: "No other form of substitute care offers
children-or adults seeking children-the quality of legal, psycho-
logical, and familial belonging that adoption creates."217  Of
munications Director, National Adoption Exchange (Sept. 18, 1990).
215 See generaly BARTH & BERRY, supra note 40, at 24-41; Gustafson, supra note 82, at
841; HOLLINGER Er AL, supra note 7, § 1.01(1), at 17; Heidi A. Schneider, Adoption Con-
tracts and the Adult Adoptee's Right to Identity, 6 LAW & INEQ. 185, 194 (1988).
216 HOLLINGER ET AL, supra note 7, § 1.01(1), n.16 (citing 1 NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SExuALrr, PREGNANCY AND CHILDBEARING
(C.D. Hayes ed. 1987)); ADOPTION FACrBOOK, supra note 1, at 148 (reporting that one
study indicates that teenage mothers who choose adoptions are less likely to live in pov-
erty, less likely to receive public assistance, and more likely to complete high school).
217 BENSON JAFFE & DAVID FANSHELL, How THEY FARED IN ADOPTION: A FoLLow-Up
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course, beyond the sociological and psychological benefits, the
state realizes certain economic benefits by being spared the cost of
fully supporting children who might otherwise be in state custody.
Recognition of liability for wrongful adoption practices fosters
confidence in the adoption process by prospective adoptive par-
ents.218 Widespread media coverage 219 given to nondisclosure
by adoption agencies in recent years and the tragic consequences
of that nondisclosure could undermine the public's trust in adop-
tion intermediaries and impede willingness to adopt. While it
might be persuasively argued that infertile couples are so desper-
ate for babies that they will continue to adopt,20 negative pub-
licity regarding deceptive practices or nondisclosure may steer
families away from agency adoption. Families may particularly shy
away from adoption of special needs children, fearing that the
problems may be far worse than represented to them. Publicized
decisions by trial and appellate courts that condemn misrepresen-
tation and nondisclosure by adoption intermediaries and compen-
sate victims should counteract this erosion of public confidence.
Such decisions send an important message that these practices are
not appropriate, will not be tolerated, and must be deterred.
Advocates for adoption agencies in wrongful adoption suits
have argued that the institution of adoption may be weakened
because the cost of increased liability exposure might force agen-
cies out of business.221 Such fears appear exaggerated. Most pri-
vate agencies have insurance coverage that would include this type
of liability. 22 Private attorneys have malpractice insurance. And
public agencies clearly are not going to get out of the adoption
business because of increased exposure to liability. They are
charged with the care of children who must be placed for adop-
tion or put in foster care. Foster care is an expensive option for a
STUDY v. (1970).
218 See, eg., M.H. v. Caritas Family Serys., 475 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991),
review granted (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991).
219 See, e-g., supra note 85.
220 See ADOPTION FAcTnoOK, supra note 1, at 6 (reporting that one million infertile
American couples compete for the 50,000 adoptable children who become available each
year, and that at least 20 prospective adoptive couples exist for each adoptable child).
221 See Adoptive Parents Sue Agency for Concealing Child's Background, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL, Aug. 16, 1990, at 2 (quoting Dennis Minichello, defense counsel in Krueger v.
Leahy, who stated, "I believe it's going to expose adoption agencies to a lot of liabilities.
We are creating liability exposure that never was contemplated. We believe it could stop
adoptions or bankrupt them.").
222 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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state, and foster parents have brought similar suits when harmed
by a foster child whose condition was not disclosed to the foster
parents2 3  Moreover, future liability -can be minimized by
amending the intermediaries' procedures to provide complete
disclosure of nonidentifyring background information.
In sum, continued recognition of liability for intentional mis-
representation and nondisclosure of health-related information
serves important policy goals. Future practices by adoption inter-
mediaries will be modified to ensure accurate transmission of
medical and social history to adoptive parents. Victims of inten-
tional misrepresentation and nondisclosure, some of whom have
suffered traumatic and devastating consequences, will be compen-
sated. Finally, public confidence in the integrity of the adoption
process will be strengthened, thereby promoting the continued
availability of adoptive homes for children with special needs.
3. Theories of Liability
(a) Fraud
(t) Affirmative Misrepresentation.-In Burr v. Board of County
Commissioners, 4 the adoptive parents recovered damages from
the defendants on a tort cause of action for fraud."5 The Ohio
Supreme Court in Burr found the elements of the tort of fraud to
be:
(a)a representation or, where there is a duty to disclose, con-
cealment of a fact,
(b)which is material to the transaction at hand,
(c)made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter
disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that
knowledge may be inferred,
(d)with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it,
(e)justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment,
and
(f)a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.2 6
223 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (foster mother at-
tacked by foster child whose emotional problems were not revealed was allowed to bring
a claim against state); Snyder v. Mouser, 272 N.E.2d 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971) (cause of
action stated by foster mother whose husband was killed by foster child about whom
county did not warn).
224 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986).
225 Id. at 1105-07. See Roe v. Catholic Charities, No. 5-89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 at *2-
7 (I1. App. CL Feb. 14, 1992). See also KEETON Er AL., supra note 132, § 105, at 726-27.
226 491 N.E.2d at 1105 (citing Cohen v. Lamko, Inc., 462 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio 1984)).
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The elements set forth by the Burr court summarize the ele-
ments generally recognized as necessary to recover in tort for
affirmative misrepresentation, also known as the tort of deceit.227
(1) Existence of Material Misrepresentation.-The applica-
tion of some of these elements in the context of wrongful adop-
tion deserves particular attention. The existence of an affirmative
misrepresentation is a factual issue. Although advocates for adop-
tion agencies have argued that recognizing liability for misrepre-
sentations will open the door to false claims that a misrepresenta-
tion occurred, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed in
Meracle v. Children's Service Society,228 "[t]here is no greater chance
of fraud [on the part of the claimant] in a case like this than in
any case in which the dispute centers over what words were spo-
ken during a particular conversation."22 9 Moreover, agencies can
protect themselves by adopting procedures to disclose health-relat-
ed information in writing and to place a copy of the report,
signed by both prospective adoptive parents, in their own files and
in the court file.' Typically, the mental element of the tort, in-
tent or recklessness, has been shown by the existence of informa-
tion in the files of the adoption agency that was not revealed or is
contrary to what was revealed to the parents. 23' However, in
some cases, proof may be found in other sources.
To sustain recovery, the misrepresentation must be material,
as opposed to trivial. Generally the test for this element is an
objective one: would a reasonable person attach importance to
227 S&e KEErON ET AIL, supra note 132, § 105. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 525 (1977), which provides:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in
reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss
caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.
228 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989); see infra notes 437-47 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the case.
229 Merade 437 N.W.2d at 537.
230 See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring a copy of health
history report to be signed by adoptive -parents and filed with court prior to granting
adoption); Amadio, supra note 178, at 30 (recommending disclosure forms signed and
dated by social worker and adoptive parents).
231 Telephone Interview with Wylon Witte, counsel for plaintiffs in Burr (Aug. 13,
1990); see also Johnson, supra note 85 (discovery of nondisclosure came about in Kneger
when caseworker read to adoptive mother information from the file); Complaint at 13-15,
Gibbs v. Ernst (No. 90003066) (Ct. Common Pleas, Bucks County, Pa.).
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these facts in making a decision." 2 A corollary to this rule adds
a subjective element. A misrepresentation will be regarded as ma-
terial if the maker is aware that the recipient considers this partic-
ular factor important, even though the objective reasonable person
would not do so." Thus, it is a question for the fact-finder to
determine whether particular factors in a child's health history
would cause a reasonable person to choose not to adopt that
child. Obviously, this concept must be modified in the context of
adoption. Factors enter into adoption that do not affect commer-
cial transactions. Although we presume people enter into commer-
cial transactions largely out of self interest, many reasonable peo-
ple adopt severely impaired children based upon altruistic motives.
Thus, the nature of the inquiry in this context should be whether
the misrepresented or nondisclosed facts constitute information a
reasonable person would want in order to make an informed choice,
and which could persuade a reasonable person not to adopt a
particular child. However, the subjective corollary must also be
applied. If prospective adoptive parents have indicated that a par-
ticular health factor is important to their willingness to adopt a
particular child, an intentional misrepresentation of that factor
should be regarded as material even though it might not alter the
decision of the objective "reasonable person."
(2) Justifiable reliance.-In the context of adoption,
adoptive parents' justifiable reliance upon the adoption agency or
other intermediary should not be a difficult hurdle in most cases.
Prior to placement, the adoption intermediary is normally the sole
source of information for the prospective adoptive parents, and it
is entirely reasonable for them to put their trust in the
intermediary's representations. In M.H. v. Caritas Family
Services,23 4 an adoption agency argued that because their social
worker had told the adoptive parents that there was incest in the
family background, without revealing that the child's birth parents
were siblings, the adoptive parents' reliance was unreasonable be-
cause they made no inquiries about the incest. The appellate
court appropriately found that no burden of inquiry should be
placed upon adoptive parents as a matter of law, and the reason-
ableness of their behavior in a given situation is a question of fact
232 KEaTON ET AL, supra note 132, § 108, at 753-54.
233 Id. at 754.
234 475 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Minn. CL App. 1991), reiew granted (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991).
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for the jury.235 It would be unfair to place upon adoptive par-
ents a duty to, in effect, cross-examine social workers in order to
prove justifiable reliance. While each case must be judged by its
circumstances, the nature of the relationship should also be kept
in mind when determining what is reasonable. Often placement
occurs with very little notice. 6 The adoption intermediary is not
a commercial vendor, but rather a governmental agency or private
agency charged with fostering the welfare of the child,1 7 or an
attorney in a fiduciary relationship with the parents.3 There-
fore, the intermediary is likely to be trusted by the adoptive par-
ents. The period prior to placement is often very emotional for
adoptive parents. 9 Moreover, adoptive parents are in a vulner-
able position 240 and may fear offending a caseworker or other
intermediary with questions. 4 Thus, in most instances, it would
be reasonable for adoptive parents to rely upon the representa-
tions of an intermediary. Requiring extensive probing to meet this
element would be unfair.
A more difficult question is presented when adoptive parents
learn of the misrepresentation after placement but prior to final-
ization. For example, if adoptive parents discover the true nature
of a child's impairment or risk of impairment from medical
caregivers within days of placement, then, depending upon the
circumstances, it normally would be fair to find no justifiable reli-
ance. However, strong public policy reasons dictate against reach-
ing.a similar result in every case in which the discovery is prior to
235 Id. at 99.
236 Often infants are placed, both through an agency or privately, with just a few
days notice to the adoptive family. Even when older children are placed for adoption,
adoptive parents have sometimes reported pressure to accept placement very quickly. For
example, Tom and Janice Colella, who recently settled a wrongful adoption case with the
Orange County Department of Social Services, were called by a social worker who told
them a seven-year-old boy was available for adoption and asked them to take the child
that day, sight unseen. Friedman, supra note 85, at 40. Another family, who adopted two
boys with severe psychological and social problems, was asked at the end of the first visit
to decide if they wanted to adopt, without being provided any information on the boys'
history of abuse and neurological impairment. Klein, supra note 6.
237 CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 9 ('he placement of children for adoption
should have as its main objective the well-being of children.").
238 See Ronald E. Mallen, Recognizing and Defining Legal Mapradice 30 S.C. L REV.
203, 205 (1979).
239 See NELSON, supra note 42, at 32.
240 See supra note 220 (regarding the large number of families looking for a child to
adopt); NELSON, supra note 42, at 87.
241 Se NELSON, supra note 42, at 87.
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finalization. Adoptions normally are not finalized for six months to
a year after placement, and it can be much longer.242 It would
be unfair to deny recovery to the parents who discover the truth
after months of caring for the child, if during that time the child
and parents have emotionally bonded. By that time, the parents
may be too attached to the child to give the child up,245 or they
may decide to proceed with the adoption because they feel the
child would be harmed by further transfers. Taking the child away
from a family to which he or she has bonded promotes instability
and risks psychological harm to the child. Courts should not inter-
pret the reliance requirement in a way that promotes such practic-
es.
(3) Causation.-Finally, to recover for fraud, a claim-
ant must show that reliance upon the representation caused injury.
Causation can be shown in two ways. If the misrepresentation
directly concerns the impairment the child has developed, then
proof of the other elements-justifiable reliance upon an inten-
tional or reckless material misrepresentation-should constitute
proof that the parents' harm-the denial of an informed choice
and the resulting expense and emotional stress they endured-was
caused by the misrepresentation. If we conceive of the nature of
the harm as the denial of the opportunity to make an informed
choice, and if the test for materiality is an objective one-a mis-
representation of information that a reasonable person would want
in order to make an informed choice-then proof of materiality
and causation could be accomplished without testimony by the
adoptive parents that "I would not have adopted [this particular
child] if I had known the true facts." When this type of testimony
can be avoided, it should be. One commentator has observed that
a conceivable disadvantage of recognizing liability in a wrongful
adoption context is the potential adverse psychological effect upon
a child who is aware or later learns of the lawsuit.244 As this
commentator argues, this concern should not outweigh the bene-
242 The current Uniform Adoption Act § 13(c), 9 U.L. 35 (1988), provides a wait-
ing period of six months after the interlocutory decree of adoption is issued before a
final decree of adoption is entered.
243 For example, see Allen v. Children's Sevs., 567 N.E.2d 1346, 13 18 (Ohio Ct. App.
1990), wherein an adoptive mother had formed a strong emotional bond with a child in
the two- to three-month placement before discovering the child's profoand deafness.
244 See Maley, supra note 6, at 730.
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fits of imposing liability upon adoption intermediaries. 245 Many
children, due to their impairments, will not reach a level of aware-
ness that would subject them to adverse psychological effects. In
other instances, receiving guidance from professionals may help
parents to communicate with their children about the suit in a
way that would avoid any harmful effects. Nevertheless, it would be
beneficial to avoid the need for such testimony. Furthermore, in a
theoretical sense, such testimony misrepresents the true nature of
the injury. The adoptive parents who bring these suits are often
totally devoted to their children at the time the suit is initiat-
ed.2' The injury is that the adoptive parents were denied the
opportunity to make an informed choice about whether to risk
the extraordinary expenses and emotional distress that accompany
the child's particular impairment.24
7
However, courts have been willing to recognize another ave-
nue of causation. A direct link between the matter about which
the misrepresentation was made and the impairment later suffered
by the child has not been required, as long as it was established
that the adoptive parents would not have adopted this particular
child if they had known the true facts. For example, in Krueger v.
Leahy,248 an adoptive couple in Illinois sued an adoption agency
for failing to disclose that both birth parents had been hospital-
ized for mental illness, that the birth mother was described as
"low-functioning" and depressed, that she had been treated during
the pregnancy with various medications, and that the pregnancy
was considered "high-risk."2 49 Their son required years of special
education, tutors, testing, and therapy. He was eventually diag-
nosed as "mildly retarded," with "Attention Span Disorder," "Con-
duct Disorder," and "Oppositional Disorder." He ultimately re-
quired institutionalization." The agency argued that to show
causation, the Kruegers needed to allege and prove that the
245 See generally supra part 1I1A2.
246 Cf supra note 99.
247 Having made this argument, I must concede that in every intentional misrepresen-
tation or nondisclosure case of which I am aware, the parents have, in fact, pled that
they would not have adopted this particular child had they known of the information
prior to placement.
248 No. 89 L 18751 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill. filed Dec. 5, 1990).
249 Complaint at 7, Krueger v. Leahy, No. 89 L 18751 (Circuit Court of Cook Coun-
ty, IIl., filed Dec. 5, 1990). This case is currently awaiting hearing on defendant's motion
to dismiss an amended complaint, set for late April 1992. Telephone Interview with Of-
fice of Enrico Mirabelli, attorney for plaintiff, April 23, 1992.
250 Id. at 8.
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child's present condition was the result of a hereditary defect.25
Ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court advised defense coun-
sel that if plaintiffs could establish that the condition of the birth
parents was relevant to their decision to adopt and that they never
would have adopted the child had they known of the psychologi-
cal difficulties of the birth parents, this would be sufficient to
establish causation for all damages the plaintiffs incurred, regard-
less of whether the child's condition was hereditary. 252
A similar attack by defense counsel in Burr v. Board of County
Commissioners255 was unsuccessful. Defense counsel argued that
there was no proof that defendants knew that either of the birth
parents had Huntington's Disease. The information concealed was
that the birth parents were in a mental institution, and the birth
mother was mildly retarded and psychotic. 4 At trial, the defense
counsel went to great lengths to elicit testimony from the father
that he could accept the fact that his son was mentally retarded,
but it was the symptoms of Huntington's Disease that caused him
the most distress and financial burden. 5 Defense counsel then
argued that no causal connection existed between the "lie" and
the expenses incurred by plaintiffs in the care and treatment of
the child's Huntington's Disease. 6 The Ohio Supreme Court
was not convinced. Noting the testimony that the Burrs never
would have adopted Patrick had it not been for the lie, the court
found that "had they not relied on the representations, their sub-
sequent damages would never have resulted. In short, appellants
knew the history was false, intended reliance, and in fact misled
the Burrs to their detriment."257 Thus, when the misrepresen-
tation is not directly related to the child's impairment, but is still
material, it appears that testimony that the parents would not have
adopted this particular child had they known the true facts is both
essential and sufficient to establish causation.
(4) Damages.-None of the published decisions in-
volving intentional misrepresentation or nondisclosure have ad-
251 Transcript of proceedings on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 15, Krueger v.
Leahy (No. 89 L 18751) (Cir. Ct. of Cook County Ill. Aug. 15, 1990) [hereinafter Kraeger
transcript].
252 Id. at 21, 25, 27, 31-32.
253 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986).
254 Id. at 1104.
255 Appellant's Brief at 7-10, Burr (No. 85-786).
256 Id. at 25-26.
257 Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1106.
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dressed in much detail the nature of the damages that are recov-
erable for fraud. In Burr the court recited the general principle
that a person who is damaged as the result of fraud may recover
consequential damages that naturally and proximately result from
the fraud. 25 ' The court found the jury award of $125,000 appro-
priate in light of the medical bills, other expenses, and alleged
emotional damage.2
9
Clearly, adoptive parents should be compensated for any ex-
traordinary expenses they incur as a result of their child's impair-
ments. Because the nature of this tort is intentional, punitive dam-
ages may also be appropriate in many circumstances. 2 ° A more
difficult issue is whether they should be compensated for the ordi-
nary costs of rearing the child-food, clothing, ordinary medical
costs, etc. In Burr, plaintiffs sought damages for these expenses as
well, 2"' but it was not clear from the opinion whether they were
calculated as part of the jury award. In Krueger v. Leahy,25 2 the
trial court, ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss, orally advised
counsel that if plaintiffs could establish that they would not have
adopted this child had they known of the parents' psychological
difficulties, damages would include "every penny they spent rear-
ing the child."2' A comparable trend is emerging in wrongful
birth cases. In such cases, courts compensate parents for the ordi-
nary costs of raising a child, reduced by the amount of the bene-
fit-the joy of raising a child.2 Compensation for the normal
costs of raising a child in the wrongful adoption context is more
troubling, however, because most parents who adopt wanted to
adopt a child and fully anticipated incurring the "normal" expens-
es of child rearing.Y Consistent with the position that the injury
in a wrongful adoption case consists of being denied the opportu-
nity to make an informed choice about a particular child, the
pecuniary losses truly caused by the misrepresentation are the ex-
traordinary expenses related to the child's impairment. In cases
258 Id. at 1106-1107; see KFEON Er AL, supra note 132, § 110, at 767.
259 Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1108.
260 KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 2, at 9.
261 Complaint at 10, Burr (No. 85-786).
262 No. 89 L 18751 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Il. filed Dec. 5, 1990).
263 Krueger transcript, supra note 251, at 32.
264 See Maley, supra note 6, at 728; see also KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 55, at
372. Some cases have offset damages for mental distress by the benefit rule. Se Sarno,
supra note 192, at 828-30. -
265 Admittedly, this could also be said of many parents who file wrongful birth ac-
tions.
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brought by adoptive parents who truly did not contemplate adop-
tion prior to active recruitment by an agency to adopt a particular
child, an award of child rearing costs might be appropriate. How-
ever, if the evidence indicates that the couple was actively seeking
to adopt a child, the normal child rearing costs may be a wind-
fall.26
Emotional distress will often constitute a major element of the
injury suffered by adoptive parents who were denied the opportu-
nity to make an informed choice to adopt a child with severe
mental or physical impairments. Grief, stress resulting from unan-
ticipated and overwhelming nursing and caretaking responsibilities,
interfamily tension, and sometimes fear generated by a child's
abnormal or violent behavior are all possible components of the
mental anguish that may be experienced in this situation. Unfortu-
nately, parents seeking to recover damages for emotional distress
under a theory of fraud may encounter a major obstacle. At pres-
ent, the state courts are divided on the issue of whether damages
for emotional distress are recoverable in an action for fraud.267
Professor Merritt, in a recent article advocating the award of
damages for emotional distress in fraud actions,29 evaluated the
two diverging approaches the courts have taken. He concluded
that the decisions awarding damages for mental anguish were by
far the better reasoned. Courts that denied recovery tended to
266 Cf Maley, supra note 6, at 728-29 (arguing that because adoptive parents would
have adopted and enjoyed the benefits of parenthood anyway, the benefits offset should
not be applied).
267 In 1989, Professor Andrew Merritt published a study of the availability of damages
for emotional distress in fraud litigation. Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Distress
in Fraud Litigation: Dignitaiy Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1989). At
that time, he concluded that jurisdictions that had directly addressed the problem were
almost evenly split, with no basis to declare a clear majority or an emerging trend. Id. at
4-5 & n.11. Since publication of his Article, several other decisions have been issued that
continue to indicate a split. In addition to the cases cited by Professor Merritt, see the
following cases, which allow recovery for emotional distress in fraud claims: Malandris v.
Merrill Lynch, 703 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1983) (based on Colorado law), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 824 (1983); Allen v. Jones, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Kilduff v. Ad-
ams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478 (Conn. 1991); Laubach v. Franklin Square Hosp., 556 A.2d 682
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Coble v. Bowers, 809 P.2d 69 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990), cert.
denied; Nord v. Shoreline Say. Ass'n., 805 P.2d 800 (Wash. 1991). Other courts continue
to refuse to award damages for emotional distress for fraud. See e.g., Adriana Int'l. Corp.
v. Thoerem, 913 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding California statute governing action
for fraud did not provide for award of damages for emotional distress), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 1019 (1991); Olssen v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prod., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.
Ind. 1987) (damages for mental anguish in fraud case recoverable only if malic of de-
fendant is shown); Sparrow v. Toyota of Florence, 396 S.E.2d 645 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
268 Merritt, supra note 267.
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articulate three rationales: (1) fraud is an "economic" tort and
emotional distress damages are not awarded for fraud-an argu-
ment that overlooks the now substantial body of precedent that
does allow recovery of emotional distress in fraud cases; (2) such
damages are not within the contemplation of the parties-a con-
tract principle that should not be imposed upon tort law; and (3)
fraud damages should return plaintiffs to the position they occu-
pied before the fraud-a rationale that actually would support
compensation for emotional distress rather than undercut it.269
These justifications are even less persuasive in the wrongful adop-
tion context because existing precedent, i.e. Burr, recognizes a
right to recover for emotional distress. Moreover, emotional dis-
tress, while not intended, is easily foreseeable by adoption interme-
diaries (unlike many commercial transactions in which the emo-
tional impact may be far less apparent). Finally, although return-
ing plaintiffs to the position they occupied previously is impossible,
recompensing emotional distress comes closer to achieving this
than failure to compensate for it. Cases that allow damages, Pro-
fessor Merritt argues, recognize that allowing such awards best
serves the "twin goals" of tort law: compensation and deterrence.
Such awards will not impair efficient judicial administration by
creating a new class of lawsuits because these plaintiffs are already
before the courts bringing fraud suits for pecuniary losses.270
Moreover, forcing plaintiffs to rely upon other causes of action,
such as negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, is
inadequate in many cases due to the additional limitations that
have been imposed upon recovery under these theories. 7
A third approach used by some states has been to allow recov-
ery for emotional distress in fraud cases only if specific factors are
present 2 The allowance of damages for mental anguish in per-
sonal frauds, as opposed to business frauds, is relevant to wrongful
adoption casesY7  Presumably an adoption transaction would be
considered a personal, rather than a strictly commercial, matter.
269 Id at 28-29.
270 Id. at 23-28.
271 Id. at 15-23. For a discussion of the requirements of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, see infra notes 305-32 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
limitations on recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, see infra notes 384-
415 and accompanying text.
272 Merritt, supra note 267, at 7.
273 Id. at 10-12.
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Thus, adoptive parents in the many states now willing to
award damages for emotional distress in fraud actions, or at least
in "personal" fraud actions, will have an opportunity to seek full
compensation under a fraud theory. Yet, in some states, adoptive
parents will be required to pursue damages for emotional distress
under the theories of intentional or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.
(ii) Nondisclosure.-When the adoption intermediary fails
to disclose material health-related information, as opposed to mak-
ing an affirmative misrepresentation, adoptive parents should still
be entitled to seek damages under a tort theory of fraud or deceit
(sometimes referred to in this context as constructive fraud).Y*
Liability for nondisclosure may be considered more problematic by
some courts because traditionally, at common law, nondisclosure
was not actionable.Y5 The gradual erosion of this rule, however,
and in particular, several well-recognized exceptions to it,26 ren-
der its application in the wrongful adoption context particularly
inappropriate. When a duty to disclose is created under these
274 See Schiffer, supra note 11, at 713; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §
551(1) (1977).
275 KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 106, at 737 & nn.21-22.
276 These exceptions are summarized in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551
(1977), which provides:
(1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably
induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is sub-
ject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonex-
istence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a
duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated,
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them; and
(b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his
partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading; and
(c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or
misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed to be
so; and
(d) the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation that it
would be acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is about to act in
reliance upon it in a transaction with him; and
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to
enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the
relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circum-
stances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.
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circumstances, 277 the speaker is subject to the same liability as if
he or she had made an affirmative misrepresentation
27 8
One longstanding exception recognizes that if any repiesenta-
tion is made, the speaker must disclose enough to prevent his or
her words from being misleading. 279 Allowing the impression
that half of the truth amounts to the whole, or presenting facts in
an ambiguous manner, can subject the speaker to liability just as if
the matter had been affirmatively misrepresented.8 0 When an
adoption intermediary makes any representations regarding the
health of a child, it is reasonable for prospective adoptive parents
to assume they are being given all material information. The
adoptive parents' awareness of an agency's duty to provide for the
welfare of the child and the fact that the adoptive parents will be
the future caregivers, responsible for securing future medical treat-
ment, make it reasonable for them to assume that the information
given to them includes all relevant information. This assumption is
even more reasonable when the intermediary is a private attorney
representing the adoptive parents in the adoption.
One trial judge orally lectured the attorneys on the applica-
tion of this principle in the wrongful adoption context. At a mo-
tion hearing in Krueger v. Leahy,2"' the court told the parties that
"a half truth can be as equally fraudulent as an entire falsehood
because it does not speak the entire picture .... It is false be-
cause they asked for the history and they didn't get the history,
they only got part of it."2 2 While the adoptive parents' request
for health information may be important evidence that providing
only part of the history would be misleading, the request should
not be viewed as a prerequisite to proof of fraud, as the Krueger
court may have viewed it. 283 Health and social history informa-
tion is central to any adoption. Adoption intermediaries often
volunteer a great deal of information to adoptive parents in the
course of a conversation about a particular child even though the
277 Id. § 551(2),
278 Id. § 551(1).
279 KEETON ET Al, supra note 132, § 106, at 738; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551(2)(b) (1977).
280 KEEON ET AL, supra note 132, § 106, at 738.
281 No. 89 L 18751 (Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty. Ill. filed Dec. 28, 1989).
282 Khueger transcript, supra note 251, at 29-30.
283 Id. at 29 ("[T]he duty to speak arises from the relationship of the parties and
the specific request for the information by the plaintiff."). "And had there been no re-
quest for information, one can hardly say that they have to volunteer all of this issue."
Id. at 30.
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adoptive parents had not actually made a request. Therefore, the
adoptive parents may not articulate a specific request precisely
because the information already offered misled them into believ-
ing they had been given all relevant information.
The second exception, which is perhaps the one best suited
to imposing liability in a wrongful adoption context, is that a duty
to disclose exists because of a fiduciary or similar relationship of
trust and confidence between the parties." An adoption is not
an arms-length sale of widgets. Although the primary purpose of
adoption is to promote the well-being of children, adoptive par-
ents are also in a special relationship with an adoption intermedi-
ary. Professional guidelines for adoption agencies recognize that
"child welfare agencies have a responsibility to provide prepara-
tion, counseling and support on an ongoing basis for all the par-
ties involved in an adoption,"2' and that the services provided
by an adoption agency should include protection of the interests
of adoptive parents, including their interest in making "a free and
informed decision to adopt."286 The counseling services an adop-
tion agency provides to adoptive parents further illustrate the fidu-
ciary nature of the relationship.287 As an outcome of this
counseling relationship, it is natural that adoptive parents would
place special trust in agency social workers with whom they have
worked closely and discussed intimate details of their lives.288 Of
course, when the adoption intermediary is a private attorney repre-
senting the couple in an independent adoption, the existence of a
fiduciary relationship is well recognized.289 Because adoption in-
termediaries are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship with
adoptive parents, they have a duty to proceed in "utmost good
faith" and make "full and fair disclosure of all material facts."20
Beyond these well recognized circumstances in which the duty
of disclosure is imposed, Keeton recognizes what he refers to as
284 KEETON ET AL, supra note 132, § 106, at 738-39; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1977).
285 CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 9.
286 Id. at 45-46, Reg. 5.2.
287 Id., at 40-41, Reg. 4.18.19, at 43, Reg. 4.24, at 45-46, Reg. 5.1.
288 Schiffer, supra note 11, at 713-14.
289 See Mallen, supra note 238, at 205-06; KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 106, at
738 n.38.
290 KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 106, at 739. In M.H. v. Caritas Family Services,
475 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 1991), review granted, (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991), the court
applied this exception to hold that an adoption agency could be held liable for nondis-
closure of material facts, because of its fiduciary relationship with adoptive parents.
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an "amorphous tendency" of courts in recent years to require dis-
closure under circumstances in which an ordinay ethical person
would deem disclosure should be made."' This trend is summa-
rized in section 551(2) (e) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which recognizes a duty to disclose
facts basic to the transaction, if [the speaker] knows that the
other is about to enter [the transaction] under a mistake as to
them, and that the other, because of the relationship between
them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstanc-
es, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts. 2
Thus, if a court were to" have difficulty finding that the agency was
in a fiduciary relationship, then the reasons asserted above in
defense of its fiduciary nature,"5 the professional gnidelines,' 4
and the importance of material health-related information2 5
would surely dictate that a duty to disclose exists on this basis.
In addition to the above bases for recognition of a common
law duty to disclose, a statutory duty to disclose may exist if one of
the many state statutes requiring disclosure of health-related infor-
mation in adoption proceedings was in effect at the time of the
adoption and applicable to adoption intermediaries under its
terms." 6 The use of the statutory duty to disclose as an element
of fraud or deceit is analogous to the use of a statutory duty to
prove an element of negligence. 1 7 However, the absence of spe-
cific applicability of a disclosure statute should not limit recogni-
tion of a common law duty to disclose. Many of the disclosure
statutes currently in force are woefully incomplete in their cover-
age," s often due to legislative oversight.' To interpret them
as a limitation on liability, unless such language is clearly included
in the statute, would in fact thwart legislative intent to promote
disclosure of health-related information to adoptive parents.'0 0
291 Id.; see alo FOWLER HARPER Er AL, THE LAW OF TORTS § 714, at 475 (describes
this as a "trend toward a rule of broader liability").
292 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977).
293 See supra notes 284-89 and accompanying text.
294 CWIA STANDARDs, supra note 49, at 9, 45, 46.
295 See supra notes 136-64.
296 &e supra note 74.
297 KEETON ET AT-, supra note 132, § 36, at 221 nn.11-14 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text. For a more complete discussion of
the defects in statutory regulation, see Blair, supra note 8, at 713-75.
299 For example, Oklahoma omitted independent adoptions from its disclosure statute
without discussing or paying much attention to the omission. Telephone Interview with
Representative Linda Larason (Aug. 14, 1990) (co-sponsor of the recent amendment.)
300 See O'Connell, supra note 46, at 534, 535; Gloria L Kelly, Comment, Getting to
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(iii) Liability to Child.-Although fraud may be a useful
theory for recovery by adoptive parents, its use as a basis for re-
covery by the child is more problematic."3 In general, recovery
under a theory of fraud is available only to those whom the speak-
er intended to induce to act in reliance upon the misrepresenta-
tion, 2 which in the context of wrongful adoption would nor-
mally not include the child. Although Keeton describes the class
of potential plaintiffs broadly to include "person[s] for whose use
the representation was intended,"" in context, this refers to
persons who were intended to rely upon the statement. Recovery
for physical harm resulting from misrepresentation and for emo-
tional distress have historically been categorized under the heading
of negligence,' and thus the child's recovery will more likely be
pursued under that theory.
(b) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.-The circum-
stances surrounding an intentional affirmative misrepresentation or
nondisclosure may be so outrageous that the adoptive parents or a
child could recover under a theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Recognized as a separate tort since the
1930s,"5 the elements are set out in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, section 46:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is sub-
ject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm
to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.'
Know You: Disclosure of Infomation Contained in Sealed Adoption Records Under Connecticut
Public Act 87-555, 5 CONN. PROB. LJ. 81, 82, 102-105 (1989).
301 The adopted child was not a party to the suit in Burr v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986). In Krueger, the trial court instructed counsel for
plaintiffs to drop the child from the count for fraudulent transmission. Krueger Transcript,
supra note 251, at 28. In Roe v. Catholic Charities, No. 5-89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 at *13
(Il. App. Ct. Feb. 14, 1992), the court dissmissed both the fraud and the negligence
claims made by the adopted children against the agency for failure to state a cause of
action, with no discussion as to its rationale.
302 KETON Er Ai., supra note 132, § 105, at 728, § 107, at 747.
303 Id § 107, at 747.
304 See RE TATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965).
305 KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 12, at 60.
306 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
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(i) Liability to Adoptive Parents.-Claims under this theory
have been asserted in several wrongful adoption cases that are
currently pending before the courts. °7 Intentionally withholding
from prospective adoptive parents information suggesting the exis-
tence or high risk of severe impairment of a child who is placed
for adoption may in many instances be considered sufficiently
outrageous to support liability under this cause of action. As previ-
ously discussed," s the emotional stress associated with the chal-
lenges presented by a severely disturbed or chronically ill child is
often overwhelming if the parents were unprepared to cope with
them. In some instances, it has caused adoptive parents physical
harm as well. In Krueger, for example, the plaintiffs' son's psycho-
logical problems allegedly placed a severe strain on the marriage
and caused Mr. Krueger cardiac problems.' One research study
described an adoptive mother who was so overwhelmed by the se-
rious behavior problems of her children that she was hospitalized
for two months for a "nervous breakdown" and was "on the verge
of another one" at the time of the interview."' Although in
M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, l the appellate court affirmed that
the conduct in that case was not sufficiently egregious for recovery
under this theory, the trial court in Krueger acknowledged on the
record that under the right circumstances 12 a refusal to disclose
307 M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 475 N.W.2d 94, 99-100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review
granted (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991); Krueger transcript, supra note 251, at 55-61; Complaint at
17, Gibbs v. Ernst (No. 90003066) (Ct. Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pa.) (case dis-
missed on Motion to Dismiss at trial court and currently on appeal).
308 See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
309 Kruger transcript, supra note 251, at 58.
310 NELSON, supra note 42, at 69.
311 475 N.W.2d 94, 99-100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review granted, (Minn. Nov. 13,
1991).
312 Contrary to his position on causation for fraud, the trial judge in Krueger stated
that to prove causation for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiffs must
show that the child's condition was hereditary and, thus, directly related to the subject of
the nondisclosure and the parents' psychological problems. Krueger transcript, supra note
251, at 5960. Plaintiffs' counsel had argued that if the accurate and complete informa-
tion had been disclosed, they never would have adopted the child and thereby would
have been spared the emotional distress caused by the child's condition. It is not com-
pletely clear why the court was willing to accept this causation argument for fraud and
not for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The difference appears not to be the
causation element itself, but rather, the requirement for intentional infliction of emotion-
al distress that the conduct be extreme and outrageous. The language of the Court sug-
gests this may be the case:
1992]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
certain health information to adoptive parents of a "mentally di-
minished" child could rise to the level of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. s
Appellate courts in Iowa and Illinois have considered claims
against adoption agencies for intentional infliction of emotional
distress under other circumstances. In Engstrom v. Stat 14 and
Petrowsky v. Family Service of Decatur, Inc., 15 the adoptive parents
alleged that the adoption agencies failed to appropriately inves-
tigate paternity, causing extensive litigation in the Petrowsky adop-
tion and resulting in the Engstrom's loss of custody to the father
after a two year preadoptive placement of the child in their home.
In both cases, the conduct of the adoption agency was alleged to
be reckless rather than intentional. Both courts conceded that the
agencies may not have exercised reasonable care in their efforts to
ascertain the birth father's status," 6 but held that the agencies'
actions did not "go beyond all possible bounds of human decen-
cy"31 7  and, thus, were not sufficiently outrageous. When an
agency's nondisclosure or misrepresentation is intentional, a stron-
ger case for "outrageousness" exists.
18
First, in order for you to even arguably ... allege intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress now you must allege a biological relationship between what that
child suffers from today and the condition of the parents. Because absent that,
there is absolutely no proximate causal relationship between the anxiety that
they suffered by reason of the child's present emotional circumstances and the
failure to give the information as to the parents. Short of that, you do not have
extreme outrageous conduct.
Id.
313 Id. at 60.
314 461 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1990).
315 518 N.E.2d 664 (I1. App. Ct. 1987), appeal denied, 522 N.E.2d 1256 (Ill. 1988).
316 In Engstrom, the court found that the defendant's failure to ascertain that the
father was indeed alive, despite the birth mother's insistence that he was dead, was neg-
ligent because several years earlier another branch of the Iowa Department of Human
Services had located the birth father in an attempt to collect child support. Engstrom, 461
N.W.2d at 320. The Petrowsky court found, on another count, that the question of
whether the defendants conduct failed to conform to reasonable care was a question for
the jury. In Petrowsky, the agency initially relied upon the allegations of the birth mother
and birth father that someone other than the actual birth father was the child's father,
and failed to obtain their initial statements in an affidavit. Pefrowsky, 518 N.E.2d at 665-
66.
317 Engstrom, 461 N.W.2d at 320; Petrowsky, 518 N.E.2d at 669.
318 Cf Kunz v. Deitch, 660 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (upholding claim of natural
father for intentional infliction of emotional distress where maternal grandparents inten-
tionally placed child for adoption without his knowledge or consent and blocked father's
access to child for seven months).
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Beyond this distinction, however, it would seem appropriate
for outrageousness to be judged at least in part by the potential
impact upon the victim. The court in Petrowsky compared the facts
of its case to those in which outrageous behavior had been found'
not to exist, such as Morrison v. Sandell, 19 in which defendant
placed human waste material in plaintiff's file drawer, and Harris
v. First Federal Savings '& Loan Association,2' which concerned an
employer who continuously and unconscionably criticized plaintiff
on the job. While waste is disgusting, its impact is rarely as long
term as the lifelong, daily stress that can be associated with the
challenges of raising a severely impaired child, if one is unpre-
pared for those challenges. Neither are the challenges of a partic-
ular job as long-reaching. The true impact of an intermediary's
actions should be considered in determining the outrageousness of
the conduct.
(it) Liability to ChiUl-The restrictions of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, section 46,21 if followed literally, pose an ob-
stacle to use of the theory of intentional infliction of emotional
distress to recover on behalf of the adopted children who suffer
severe emotional harm as the result of nondisclosure of health-
related information to their parents. Subsection (2) of section 46
provides:
Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the
actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly caus-
es severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is
present at the time, whether or not such distress results in
bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such
distress results in bodily harm.
This section appears to be' directed at emotional distress re-
sulting from witnessing a horrifying event causing tortious injury.
The comment suggests that the purpose of the restriction is to
guarantee the genuineness of claims to emotional distress and to
limit the number of potential plaintiffs, 22 but states that it "is
319 446 N.E.2d 290 (Ill. App. CL 1983).
320 473 N.E.2d 457 (Ill. App. Ct 1984).
321 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 46(2)(a) (1965).
322 Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 791 (W.D. Va. 1986). To illustrate the principle,
the comments note that numerous people may suffer distress at news of the assassination
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intended to leave open the possibility of situations in which pres-
ence at the time may not be required." 23 Although some courts
appear to follow this or an even stricter test, requiring plaintiffs to
be in the "zone of danger, "324 many modern cases seem to reject
the presence requirement. This is particularly true when the cir-
cumstances do not involve a horrifying event causing injury, and
when the circumstances leave no doubt as to the genuineness of
the plaintiff's claim. 25
Precedent exists supporting the assertion of a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress brought on behalf of chil-
dren against a social service agency and its employee for improp-
erly withholding information in a nonadoption context. In M.H.
ex rel. Callahan v. State,326 conservators appointed for three mi-
nor children sued the State of Iowa, its Department of Human
Services, and one of its employees for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, among other claims. 27 The claim alleges that
the employee delayed disclosing to "lawful authorities, doctors and
professionals conducting evaluations of the mother, and the juve-
nile court"32s information that the mother had admitted actively
engaging in sexual abuse of the children."s Plaintiffs allege that
the delay caused the children to suffer anxiety about the possi-
bility of being returned to an abusive environment. On an appeal
from a ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Iowa Supreme Court
affirmed the finding of the trial court that it could not conclude
as a matter of law that the misconduct was not outrageous or that
plaintiffs could not present sufficient proof to recover under the
theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress.33
0
Certainly, children adopted by families not properly advised of
their health history can suffer severe emotional distress associated
with physical or mental impairments that have developed or wors-
of a president.
323 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. 1 (1965).
324 See Schlacter v. Moss Rehab. Hosp., 695 F. Supp. 186, 189 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (moth-
er denied recovery for severe emotional distress caused by injuries suffered by her son as
a result of the defendants' care because plaintiff not in "zone of danger").
325 See Boyd v. Bulaa, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986) (allowed father recovery for
emotional distress caused by outrageous conduct of delivery room doctor that resulted in
severe brain damage to daughter, where father, although not a witness in delivery room,
was present in hospital and aware of difficulty with delivery).
326 385 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1986).
327 Id. at 535.
328 Id. at 538.
329 Id.
330 Id. at 540.
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ened due to lack of timely diagnosis."' 1 Placement with a family
emotionally unprepared to deal with a child's special needs can
also result in severe emotional distress due to rejection, lack of
nurturing, or disruption of the placement.332 M.H. ex rel.
Callahan v. State, which recognized the possibility of recovery by
children for harm resulting from nondisclosure of essential infor-
mation to third parties, suggests that if the court finds defendant's
conduct sufficiently outrageous, adopted children may also use this
theory to recover for severe emotional distress and ahy resulting
bodily harm.
(c) Negligence.-Negligence has also been employed by liti-
gants seeking recovery against adoption intermediaries for inten-
tional misrepresentation or nondisclosure of medical informa-
tion. 3 Negligence, of course, is an appropriate theory to ad-
vance to seek recovery for intentional acts.3 4 "Negligence is con-
duct, and not a state of mind."33 5 In a wide variety of factual
contexts, courts have found intentional misrepresentation or non-
disclosure to form the basis for recovery on a negligence
claim.3-"
The elements of negligence, as every first year law student
knows, are duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages.3 7
The most critical issue in the context of'"wrongful adoption" cases
will be whether intentional failure to accurately and fully disclose
331 See supra notes 13649.
332 See supra notes 150-56.
333 In Roe v. Catholic Charities, No. 5-89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 at *7-13 (Ill App. Ct.
Feb. 14, 1992), the court held plaintiffs had properly stated a claim for negligence
against an adoption agency that intentionally misrepresented and withheld important
information about the medical and psychological history of their adopted children. Id. at
*7, *12-13. Gibbs v. Ernst (No. 90003066) (Ct. Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pa.)
(dismissed at trial court level and currently on appeal); Martin v. Methodist Home (No.
90-07815) (Dist. Ct. of Dallas County, Tex.); Phillips v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs.
(Dist. Ct. of Travis County, Tex.); Richards v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs., (No.
476799) (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, Tex.).
334 KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 31.
335 Id. § 31, at 169 (quoting Terry, Negh'gence; 29 HARV. L. REV. 46 (1915)).
336 See KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 33, at 205-08 and cases cited therein; see also
Mixon v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 254 S.E.2d 864 (Ga. 1979) (employer did not tell employee
his wife was in labor until after employee finished his work shift); Brown v.
MacPherson's, Inc., 545 P.2d 13 (Wash. 1975) (states failed to ,communicate warnings
from avalanche expert).
337 See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 281, 282 (1965); KEETON ET AL, supra
note 132, § 30.
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health-related information violates a duty on the part of the adop-
tion intermediary.
(i) Recognition of a Duty.--Generaly, the duty required
under negligence law is to avoid an unreasonable risk of harm to
others."s The standard of conduct to which one must conform
to avoid negligence is commonly described as the conduct of a
reasonable person under like circumstances."3 9  Nevertheless,
when an actor has special knowledge or skill, this enhanced ability
will be considered when determining whether conduct is reason-
able.' Thus, the special training and expertise of adoption
agencies, their employees, and other professionals, such as attor-
neys, who serve as adoption intermediaries, must be taken into ac-
count in considering the reasonableness of their actions.
The recognition of a duty-the determination that certain
conduct in a particular context is unreasonable-is simply the
outcome of a careful deliberation regarding the individual and
societal interests affected. It is said that "'duty' is not sacrosanct in
itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those consider-
ations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is enti-
tled to protection.""4' Factors typically considered include the
gravity, probability, and foreseeability of risk,-4" the policy of pre-
venting future harm,343 and the burden to the defendant and
consequences to society of imposing the duty.8 4 Those factors
have been discussed in great detail above in the section addressing
the policy implications favoring recognition of liability in general
for intentional nondisclosure and misrepresentation.' To sum-
marize, the gravity of the harm caused by failure to disclose
338 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note
132, §§ 31, 53.
339 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965); KEETON ET AL, supra note
132, § 32.
340 KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 32, at 185.
341 Id. § 53, at 358.
342 See, e.g., Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 606 (111. 1991); KEETON EL
AL, supra note 132, § 31, at 169-71.
343 Richard P., 165 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
344 Id.; Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 606; KEETON ET AL, supra note 132, § 31, at 171-73.
345 See supra notes 136-220 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the specific
application of those factors in the context of a negligence claim against an adoption
agency for intentional misrepresentation and nondisclosure of background information, see
Roe v. Catholic Charities, No. 5-89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 at *12-13 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 14,
1992).
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health-related information has in many cases been ex-
treme-permanent disability or the deterioration of the physical or
mental condition of the child due to inappropriate treatment;
financial devastation to the parents;' and severe emotional trauma
to the child and the other family members.' The risk is not re-
mote, as evidenced by the large number of wrongful adoption
suits filed and the extensive media coverage given to families trau-
matized as the result of nondisclosure. 1 7 Hence, to trained pro-
fessionals who work in the adoption field, the risk of this harm
certainly is, or should be, apparent. The policy of preventing fu-
ture harm is well served by the deterrent effects of imposing lia-
bility for such intentional behavior.S Furthermore, the conse-
quence to society of imposing the duty is positive; disclosure will
facilitate appropriate medical care for adopted children and place-
ment with an adoptive family prepared to deal with a child's spe-
cial needs. 9 Nor is the burden on adoption intermediaries
great. By adopting appropriate protocols, they can avoid future
liability.3
50
The impact of custom upon recognition of a duty merits
special attention. The customary conduct of others in similar cir-
cumstances is often considered in determining the reasonableness
of certain actions.3 51 For plaintiffs whose suits against adoption
intermediaries arise out of adoptions that occurred within the
recent past, custom in the industry will be a significant benefit.
346 See supra notes.156-59, 185-89, 201-213 and accompanying text.
847 See supra notes 5, 85.
348 Se supra notes 176-81.
349 S&e supra notes 136-62 and accompanying text. In Roe v. Catholic Charities, No. 5-
89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 at *12 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 14, 1992), the court considered the
consequences of imposing a duty to disclose information in the agency's possession:
The consequence of placing that burden on defendant is [that] defendant dis-
closes what information it has in response to an adopting parent's inquiry, so
that adoptive parents assume the awesome responsibility of raising a child with
their eyes wide open. We further view the consequences of placing the burden
of disclosure upon defendant when, as in this situation, the adoptive parents ask
for this information, to include a party's being answerable for the consequences
of their own acts or omissions, a principle basic to our system of justice. Since
informed adults would be assuming the responsibility of raising an adopted
child, a favorable consequence of imposing this burden would be the encourage-
ment, preservation and strengthening of basic family units in our society ....
Id. at *12.
350 See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text; see aso Amadio, supra note 173, at
29-30.
351 K.FTON ET AL, supra note 132, § 33, at 193.
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Most adoption agencies have in recent years developed policies re-
quiring full disclosure of health-related information 3
52
It is not completely clear, however, at what point it is fair to
say full disclosure became customary. Some advocates for adoption
agencies defending suits involving adoptions that took place in the
early 1970s may argue that disclosure was not customary at that
time. " Often, even custom within a particular agency is difficult
to determine. 5 4 One measure of custom, however, might be pro-
fessional guidelines. The Child Welfare League of America, the
nation's foremost affiliation of adoption agencies, published guide-
lines as early as 1971 recommending that adoptive parents be
given all pertinent background information). 5
Even when a custom is established, however, it is not always
controlling in the determination of whether conduct is reasonable.
For example, customs that are normally reasonable can be found
unreasonable if the situation in a particular case creates higher
risk.'56 When an adoption agency or intermediary has informa-
tion that indicates a particular risk of mental or physical impair-
ment, a normal custom of not disclosing background information
in general becomes unreasonable. Moreover, customs that evolve
from efforts to save time or money, even if adopted by an entire
industry, will not provide significant protection. 5 7 Nondisclosure
policies often served multiple goals. While some may have been
352 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
353 For example, Dennis Minichello, attorney for Lutheran Social Services in Krueger
v. Leahy, commented to the author that it is unfair to judge by today's standards agen-
cies that had restrictive information policies years ago. Telephone Interview with Dennis
Minichello (Oct. 2, 1990).
One adoption expert claims that, by the 1960s, the majority of agencies began re-
cording background and revealing nonidentifying information, although there was a great
deal of controversy about revealing negative information. SOROSKY ET AL, supra note 31,
at 36.
354 In Burr, the defense counsel for the adoption agency maintained that it was their
policy in the early 1960s, at the time of the adoption, to not disclose family history to
adoptive parents. On the other hand, an agency employee or official apparently testified
that the agency had no written policy and that the only information withheld on policy
grounds was the natural parents' names. She indicates that other information was dis-
closed. Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 9, Burr (No. 85-786); see also NELSON, supra note 42,
at 87.
355 SoRosKY ET AL, supra note 31, at 36.
356 KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 33, at 194.
357 If the entire industry adopts a custom for efficiency or cost reasons, the behavior
could in effect be customary negligence. An industry should not be permitted to set its
own standard in this way. Id.
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benevolent,35 8 clearly in many circumstances bureaucratic pres-
sures, cost-cutting, and short-cutting the typically longer placement
process for a special needs child played a role."5 9
Moreover, if custom were the only measure of reasonableness,
incentive for change would be curbed.' The courts have occa-
sionally been willing to impose liability for conduct previously
considered customary. 1 Keeton observes that "where common
knowledge and ordinary judgment will recognize unreasonable
danger, what everyone does may be found to be negligent." "
Particularly after 1971, when nondisclosure flaunted "industry"
standards, evidence that a majority of agencies still followed a non-
disclosure policy, if such evidence exists, should not render their
conduct reasonable.3
s
If state statutes or administrative regulations requiring disclo-
sure of the health-related information at issue were in effect at the
time of the adoption that is the subject of a particular suit, such
statutes and regulations should be considered as evidence that the
intermediary's conduct was unreasonable. A statute need not ex-
pressly or impliedly create a claim for civil liability in tort for it to
be considered by the courts in defining the standard of conduct
of a reasonable person in the context of a common law negli-
gence claim." 4 Although courts will more commonly utilize a
358 See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
360 KEETON ET AL, supra note 132, § 33, at 195.
561 Id. at n.13 and accompanying text.
362 Id. § 33, at 195.
363 Compare Mohr v. Massachusetts (No. 87-0152) (Bristol County Superior Ct., Nov.
4, 1991), in which jury was allowed to return a verdict in favor of adoptive parents
against a state agency that had intentionally withheld evidence of a child's mental retar-
dation and a family history of schizophrenia in a 1973 adoption, despite the agency's de-
fense that nondisclosure was the established policy and procedure at that time. The
claims against the state agency were negligence claims, including negligent placement and
failure to obtain the plaintiff's informed consent to the adoption. However, claims of
misrepresentation and deceit brought against the individual social worker who handled
the adoption were rejected by the jury, following an instruction by the judge that the
social worker could not be held liable on those claims if they found there was a "secret
policy of nondisclosure." During the trial, the social worker had testified that she was in-
structed by her superiors not to reveal details of the child's medical history. Plaintiffs are
currently appealing that jury instruction. State Is Liabe, supra note 84, at 34; Neuffer,
supra note 34.
364 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 285(a),(b) (1965) provides as follows:
The standard of conduct of a reasonable man may be
(a) established by a legislative enactment or administrative regulation which
so provides, or
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criminal statute or ordinance to establish a duty, courts may also
consider statutes and regulations that prohibit certain conduct,
even if the statute or regulation itself creates no provision for
liability.365 Factors relevant to the court's decision to rely upon a
statute or regulation to establish a duty include whether the pur-
pose of the statute is to protect persons such as the plaintiff
against harm from the type of behavior the statute or regulation
prohibits.'
Over the past twelve years the majority of states have enacted
statutes which mandate that certain health-related information be
disclosed to adoptive parents. 7 Some states have similar or
more detailed requirements in their state regulations or licensing
requirements.' A major purpose of these statutes is clearly to
protect adopted children and their adoptive parents from the
harm that results from nondisclosure-improper health care and
inappropriate placement. To the extent an adoption intermediary
violates state statutes or regulations mandating disclosure, such a
violation, if not negligence per se, should at least constitute prima
facie evidence of breach of duty.
(b) adopted by the court from a legislative enactment or an administrative
regulation which does not so provide.
365 Id § 286, cmt. d.
366 KEETON Ex AL, supra note 132, § 36, at 222-27. See also the REsTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 286, which provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the re-
quirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose pur-
pose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is
invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted,
and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the
harm results.
367 See supra' note 74.
368 For example, in Texas the state accreditation rules for adoption agencies require
that an agency provide the pediatrician of the adoptive parents with all medical informa-
tion it has concerning a child placed for adoption. This regulation has been in place for
many years. In several current wrongful adoption suits in Texas, breach of this rule is
being alleged as grounds for establishing the breach of duty in a negligence claim. Tele-
phone Interview with Neil Cogan, attorney for plaintiffs in several wrongful adoption suits
(Oct. 2, 1991).
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It would be inappropriate, however, to use current state stat-
utes or administrative regulations as the sole measure of duty and
deny liability whenever a statute did not require disclosure. Cur-
rently, very few disclosure statutes are sufficiently comprehensive.
Some cover only certain types of adoptions," some address only
certain types of information,37 0 and some do not address the
role of adoption intermediaries in the disclosure process. In many
cases, these gaps are due to inadvertence. With few excep-
tions, 71 disclosure statutes, where they exist, are not intended to
limit liability. To hold that no duty exists because a disclosure
statute was not violated would thwart the intent of state legisla-
tures, which enacted these statutes to protect adopted children
and adoptive parents and to promote disclosure, not deter it.
3 72
In Roe v. Catholic Charities, 3 7 an adoption agency was sued
by an adoptive parent for both fraud and negligence arising from
369 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
370 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
371 Some of the recently enacted disclosure statutes include a limitation or preclusion
of liability for disclosure made under the statutes. The intent of at least some of these
provisions may be simply to clarify that disclosure of what would otherwise be confiden-
tial information creates no liability for breach of confidentiality or the right of privacy if
it is within the scope of disclosure authorized by statute. Unfortunately, the language of
some provisions appears broad enough to exclude liability for disclosure that is incom-
plete or inaccurate. See The Adoption Information Act of 1983, 1983 Cal. Stat. 1162, §§
13-14 (establishing a maximum liability for the state or any licensed adoption agency of
$250 for damages caused by acts or omissions of their employees with regard to pro-
grams authorized by the acts); IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522.5 (Smith-Hurd 1991)
(No liability for "acts or efforts made within the scope of. . . [the act]."). Others, while
arguably allowing liability for intentional nondisclosure or misrepresentation, would appear
to preclude liability for incomplete, inaccurate, or unauthorized disclosure due to reck-
lessness or negligence. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23(9) (1991) ("Any department employ-
ee or employee of.any placement agency who releases information or makes authorized
contacts in good faith and in compliance with this subsection shall be immune from civil
or criminal liability for such release of information or authorized contacts."); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-15-16(14) (1991) ("Any child-placing agency discharging in good faith its re-
sponsibilities under this section is immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that other-
wise might result."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.432(8) (West 1987) (civil and criminal immuni-
ty for persons who participate in good faith in the requirements of the disclosure stat-
ute).
A better approach is reflected in the proposed 1991 discussion draft of the Uniform
Adoption Act, art. 10, § 10-e(d), at 155, providing, -The [criminal] penalties [for nondis-
closure] provided in subsections (a) and (b) do not preclude an adoptive parent or
adoptee from bringing a common law action in tort against a person ... who negligent-
ly or intentionally fails to perform the duties required under [the section regulating
disclosure of background information]." Unif. Adoption Act, art. 10, § 10-e(d) (Proposed
Draft Aug. 9, 1991).
372 S&e supra note 300 and accompanying text.
373 No. 5-89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 at *5 (Ill App. Ct. Feb. 14, 1992).
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alleged intentional misrepresentation and nondisclosure. The
agency defended itself with the assertion that because adoption
was a creature of statute, any duty imposed upon the agency could
be found only in legislation. Moreover, the agency argued, at the
time of the adoption, not only did no disclosure statute exist, but
an existing statute that required confidentiality of adoption re-
cords would have rendered such a disclosure illegal. The court
rejected both arguments. It stated that adoption agencies, like
corporations and other "creatures of statute," are subject to all of
the laws of the state, including both statutory law and common
law, and could thus be held liable for both fraud and negligent
conduct.37 4 The court also observed that the confidentiality law
remained in effect after the Illinois legislature enacted a statute
mandating disclosure of health-related information by adoption
intermediaries, indicating disclosure of this nature was not in con-
flict with the confidentiality provisions.
Similarly, courts have recognized the duty of a state agency to
warn foster parents of psychiatric problems involving violent pro-
pensities.375 Moreover, in Snyder v. Mouser,7 the court rejected
the argument of a county welfare department that because no stat-
ute imposed a duty to disclose the child's known dangerous pro-
pensities, no duty to disclose existed. 7 The court found that a
duty to disclose could arise under common law and that the com-
plaint, alleging negligent failure to warn the foster parents of a
foster child's "homicidal propensities," stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted. 78
(ii) Liability To Child.-Negligence may be one of the
most appropriate theories to assert on behalf of an adopted child
who suffers mental or physical harm or emotional distress as the
result of an intentional misrepresentation or nondisclosure to his
or her parents. It is well established that liability for misrepresenta-
374 Id.
375 Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 355 (Cal. 1968) (holding the state has a duty to
warn foster parents of latent, dangerous qualities suggested by the foster child's criminal
history or character, and of any matter state employees knew or should have known
might endanger the foster family); Snyder v. Mouser, 272 N.E.2d 627, 634 (Ind. App.
1971) (claim for negligent failure to warn foster parents of known vicious propensities of
a foster child is a valid cause of action).
376 272 N.E.2d 627 (Ind. App. 1971).
377 Id. at 634.
378 Id. at 633-34. The Court further found that whether a duty to disclose existed
under the particular circumstances of this case was a question for the jury. Id.
[Vol. 67:850
LIABIITY FOR WRONGFUL ADOPTION
non or nondisclosure under a negligence theory is not confined
to the person to whom information is falsely stated or from whom
it is conceaed. 7'9 Liability is extended to those "who may be rea-
sonably expected to be endangered" as a result of the misrepre-
sentation or nondisclosure."O The rationale supporting liability
in this situation is that truthful disclosure would have influenced
the -person receiving the information to exercise precautions to
protect the plaintiff, the misrepresentation or nondisclosure, then,
prevents these precautions." This is precisely the impact of fail-
ure to disclose health-related information to adoptive par-
ents--precautions in the nature of health care are not taken be-
cause the parents are not forewarned of or are unable to meet
these needs.
(d) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.-As previously dis-
cussed, emotional distress resulting from the consequences of the
misrepresentation or nondisclosure may be a significant element
of the damages of the adoptive parents, and in some cases, of an
adopted child. 2 In addition to utilizing other theories of recov-
ery, 3 emotional distress may be included as an item of damages
in a negligence claim or pled as a separate claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress. 4 If the defendant's conduct is
determined to be extreme and outrageous, of course, damages for
emotional distress are recoverable under the theory of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, discussed above.' If the court
finds that the defendant's conduct, though intentional, is not
extreme or outrageous, plaintiffs may encounter some restrictions
on their ability to pursue this type of damages under a negligence
theory, even for "intentional" conduct.
379 KEETON ET AL, supra note 132, § 33, at 206.
380 I&
381 Id. § 33, at 207. However, in the only published "wrongful adoption" case to
examine a negligence claim for intentional misrepresentation and nondisclosure, Roe v.
Catholic Charities, No. 5-89-0-411, 1992 WL 29911 at *13 (I1. App. Ct. Feb. 14, 1992),
the court rejected without discussion the children's claims.
382 See supra notes 150-56, 187, 199-207 and accompanying text.
383 See supra notes 224-332 and accompanying text (discussing fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
384 The choice to include it in one cause of action, or to separate the claim, is in-
fluenced predominantly by the pleading style of the attorney in states that follow a feder-
al notice pleading system.
385 See supra notes 305-32 and accompanying text.
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Under the traditional view, recovery for emotional distress
caused by a defendant's negligence is not recoverable unless ac-
companied by physical injury, illness, or other physical conse-
quences."6 Several states have now completely rejected the re-
quirement of physical symptoms and permit a negligence cause of
action for infliction of serious emotional distress alone.387 In
1987, the Texas Supreme Court declared that elimination of the
requirement of physical manifestation for recovery under the tort
of negligent infliction of emotional distress had become the "es-
tablished trend in American jurisprudence."' Nevertheless, most
states still retain the requirement of bodily harm. 9 In Merace v.
Children's Service Society,3" a negligent misrepresentation action
discussed in detail below, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied
adoptive parents recovery for emotional distress because neither
parent had put forth sufficient proof of physical injury accompany-
ing the emotional distress.5 9'
The bodily harm requirement will not preclude recovery of
damages for emotional distress under a negligence theory in all
386 KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 54, at 361. According to the REsrATEMENT (SEc-
oND) OF TORTS §§ 312-13 (1965), regardless of whether the actor intends to cause emo-
tional distress, which would be highly unlikely in an adoption context, or unintentionally
causes emotional distress, the actor's negligence will not create liability for emotional dis-
tress alone. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) provides:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing
either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such
emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage,
the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance.
387 See KEETON Er AL., supra note 132, § 54, at 364-65 & nn.57-60; Martha Chamallas
& Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A Histoly, 88 MIcH. L REV.
814, 820-21 (1990) (requirement of physical injury has been eliminated in a minority of
states where a showing of serious mental distress is made, but the majority still retain
requirement); Merritt, supra note 267, at 21; see also, eg., Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.
2d 602, 609 (Ill. 1991); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652 n.3, 654
(Tex. 1987) (note cases cited therein).
388 St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Gakrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex. 1987).
389 Se, e.g., Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 517 N.E.2d 824 (Mass. 1988) (mother of sexually
abused child could not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress without phys-
ical consequences); Reilly v. United States, 547 A.2d 894 (R.I. 1988) (parents of severely
brain damaged child could not recover against negligent obstetricians for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress without physical symptoms); Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 362
N.W.2d 137 (Wis. 1985) (question of whether sister, who witnessed brother's accident,
had physical manifestations of her emotional distress was one for the jury, where she had
experienced hysteria and insomnia).
390 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989).
391 Id. at 536.
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contexts. Under the traditional approach, when plaintiffs suffer
bodily harm as the result of a defendant's negligence, courts have
been willing to allow recovery for emotional distress that is con-
temporaneous with the injury, often referred to in this context as
"parasitic" damages. 9 2 If an action is brought on behalf of an
adopted child seeking recovery for nondisclosure or inaccurate
disclosure of health-related information to the adoptive parents, in
most cases the nature of the child's injury will be deterioration of
a physical or psychiatric condition due to improper medical treat-
ment. Assuming adequate proof of this injury, the child would
easily satisfy the requirement of bodily harm and be entitled to
seek recovery for emotional distress as well. Physical harm result-
ing from the emotional distress itself is also sufficient. Thus,
adopted children who suffer serious emotional distress as a result
of inappropriate placement, b ut who experience no deterioration
of their condition as a result of the misrepresentation or nondis-
closure, may still recover damages for emotional distress if they
can demonstrate physical symptoms resulting from their mental
anguish. This would also be true for the adoptive parents. In
states that retain the bodily harm requirement, symptoms such as
recurrent headaches, nausea, or insomnia have often been deemed
sufficient to satisfy the requirement3 93
The primary purpose of the bodily harm requirement is to
separate trivial or false claims from substantial, genuine
injuries. 94 Many states, while not completely abandoning the
bodily harm requirement, have recognized that for certain types of
negligent conduct, the very nature of the circumstances create a
"special likelihood of causing real and severe emotional
distress,"395 and render the bodily harm requirement unneces-
sary.396 For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in La Feur v.
Moshei 9' allowed recovery to a fourteen-year-old girl who had
been accidentally locked up in an unused wing of a police station
392 Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Mass. 1982); see KEETON ET AL., su-
pra note 132, § 54, at 362-63.
393 St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652-53 (Tex. 1987); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS § 436A cmL c (1965).
394 See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965); see aso, eg., Payton
v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (Mass. 1982); La Fleur ex rel Blackey v. Mosher,
325 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Wis. 1982); KEETON Er AT-, supra note 132, § 54, at 360-61.
395 La F/eur, 325 N.W.2d at 317.
396 Id.
397 Id., 325 N.W.2d 314.
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overnight and subsequently experienced traumatic neurosis. The
court found that deprivation of her liberty was a "wrong sufficient-
ly worthy of redress that the physical injury requirement should
not be necessary."398  Unfortunately, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Meracle was unwilling to apply this principle in the wrong-
ful adoption context, holding that the adoptive parents were not
deprived of a constitutional right nor did "the nature of their
claim present a similar guarantee of the genuineness and severity
of the injury. "9 Possibly, the court employed a strict interpreta-
tion to refute a defense argument that plaintiffs claim for emo-
tional distress had occurred several years earlier, at a time when
the child had not yet developed the disease, and was therefore
barred by the statute of limitations.4° Outside of that unique
context, such a comparison, quite frankly, defies reason. It is in-
comprehensible to conclude that the distress of a fourteen-year
old who was uncomfortable and afraid for a fourteen-hour over-
night period would be more genuine and severe than the grief
suffered by parents who watch their child, from the age of seven,
slowly deteriorate over several years and eventually die of
Huntington's Disease. The "constitutional" nature of the right was
not emphasized in La Fleur, nor has it been present in cases in
other contexts in which courts have found that the circumstances
guarantee the genuine and substantial character of the assertion
of emotional distress.4°1 Moreover, a court evaluating a mental
distress claim should not focus on whether a defendant's actions
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. When the issue be-
fore the court is measurement and validation of mental anguish,
courts should consider the psychological "deprivation of liberty"
and emotional stress that is exacted by the type of twenty-four-
hour-a-day nursing and caretaking demands that necessarily be-
come part of parenting a child with a severe impairment such as
Huntington's Disease.
Courts adjudicating claims for emotional distress in the wrong-
ful adoption context should consider the application of a similar
exception to the bodily harm requirement applied by the Virginia
398 I at 317-18.
399 Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Wis. 1989).
400 Id.
401 See KEETON ET AL, supna note 132, § 54, at 362 (citing cases in which courts have
allowed recovery without bodily harm for mental anguish caused by negligent transmis-
sion of a message, particularly one involving death, and for negligent mishandling of
corpses).
[Vol. 67:850
LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL ADOPTION
Supreme Court in Naccash v. Burger, 4 2 a wrongful birth case.
The parents of a child born with Tay-Sachs disease sued a physi-
cian and other medical care providers who were responsible for
mislabeling a blood test that would have alerted the parents to the
risk of Tay-Sachs early in the pregnancy.4°3 Tay-Sachs is a genetic
disorder affecting the central nervous .system. It causes affected
infants to begin deteriorating at four to six months, suffer blind-
ness, deafness, paralysis, seizures, and mental retardation, and
eventually die within two to four years.' The court determined
that the rationale of discouraging spurious claims was inapplicable
in this context, as no one would seriously contend that the emo-
tional distress of parents under such circumstances was feigned or
fraudulent.4° The evidence showed an "unbroken chain of caus-
al connection" between the erroneous information, "the depriva-
tion of the parents' opportunity to accept or reject the continu-
ance" of the pregnancy, and "the emotional distress the parents
suffered following the birth of their fatally defective child."' To
require proof of physical injury accompanying the emotional dis-
tress in such circumstances, the court reasoned, "'would constitute
a perversion of fundamental principles of justice. ' °7
In states that continue to adhere to the bodily harm require-
ment, a similar exception should apply to adoptive parents who
have experienced emotional distress resulting from deprivation of
the opportunity to make an informed choice about the adoption
of a child with a severe mental or physical-impairment. Common
sense in these circumstances dictates that emotional distress is not
402 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982).
403 Id. at 826-27. Had the correct results been forwarded to the parents, they could
have conducted further testing upon themselves and through amniocentesis to confirm
the baby actually was afflicted with Tay-Sachs, and chosen to abort the pregnancy.
404 Id. at 827.
405 d. at 831.
406 Id.
407 Id. (citing Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. 1979)). Several other courts
have allowed damages for emotional distress in wrongful birth actions without discussing
a requirement for physical injury. E.g., Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209, 214 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1981); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 394
N.Y.S.2d 933, 936 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 493
(Wash. 1983) (statute allowed recovery). But see, eg., Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852 F.2d
773 (4th Cir. 1988); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (111. 1987) (no
claim for emotional distress damages if plaintiffs suffered no physical injury or illness);
Goldburg ew reZ Goldburg v. Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Smith v. Cote,
513 A.2d 341, 351 (N.H. 1986) ("[D]amages for emotional distress are not recoverable in
wrongful birth actions."); Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977).
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trivial or feigned. The same exception should apply to children
who offer sufficient proof of serious emotional distress experi-
enced as the result of placement in an adoptive family that was
not adequately informed or prepared to meet their special needs.
Disruption of the placement or expert psychological testimony of
the deleterious emotional impact on the child should be sufficient
to demonstrate that the emotional harm endured by a child in
these circumstances is no more trivial or feigned than the harm
experienced by the fourteen-year old in Le Fleur.
Another obstacle adoptive parents may encounter in seeking
damages for emotional distress under a negligence theory is a
related restriction which requires that plaintiffs who are not direct-
ly injured must witness the occurrence that caused injury in order
to recover for their grief and anxiety resulting from the injuries to
a third party. This requirement, sometimes referred to as the
bystander proximity doctrine, is often applied in the context of
parents who seek damages for emotional distress suffered as the
result of a tortious injury to their child."8 Some courts have re-
tained a zone of danger test that requires the plaintiff be in the
zone of danger in order to recover for emotional distress resulting
from the tortious injury to a third person.4° The purpose of
these restrictions is to limit the liability of a defendant, who might
otherwise owe damages to numerous people who experienced
sorrow over the injury defendant caused to plaintiff, and to ensure
that recovery is -limited to those to whom harm was reasonably
foreseeable. 4 °  Unfortunately, the "bystander rule" was me-
chanically applied in a recent Kansas wrongful birth case to pre-
clude recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The
court held that "visibility of results as opposed to visibility of a
tortious act does not give rise to a claim of emotional damag-
es."
4 1 1
Application of the "bystander rule" in both wrongful birth and
wrongful adoption cases is totally inappropriate. As has been rec-
ognized in other recent wrongful birth cases, Karlsons v.
Gueiinot412 and Naccash v. Burger415 the parents in a wrongful
408 KEETON Er AL, supra note 132, § 54, at 366.
409 Id. This requirement is eroding for family members who observe their loved ones
harmed, beginning with the case of Dilon v. Leg 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
410 KEETON ET AL, supra note 132, § 54, at 365-66.
411 Arche v. United States Dept. of Army, 798 P.2d 477, 482 (Kan. 1990).
412 57 A.2d 73 (N.Y. 1977).
413 290 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Va. 1982).
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birth case are not mere witnesses or bystanders observing a tor-
tious injury. Rather, in a wrongful birth action, the parents are the
ones to whom a duty to provide accurate prenatal diagnostic test-
ing is owed. When the duty to them is breached, they are entitled
to recover for all the damages, including mental anguish, they
incur as a result of the breach.414 Similarly, in a wrongful adop-
tion action, the adoption intermediary owes a duty to the adoptive
parents to provide accurate and complete health-related informa-
tion, and the parents should be entitled to recover for all damages
they suffer when that duty is breached. Moreover, the rationale of
the bystander rule is inapplicable. Adoptive parents are not among
a potentially unlimited group who could suffer distress, as a group
of bystanders might be.415 They are the persons to whom the
misrepresentation or nondisclosure was made. Their emotional dis-
tress is clearly foreseeable to a trained adoption intermediary.
Thus, application of the "bystander" or "zone of danger" rules to
limit recovery of adoptive parents for emotional distress damages
in a wrongful adoption suit would be totally inappropriate.
(e) Breach of Contract.-In addition to the pursuit of damages
under one or more tort theories, adoptive parents who weie the
victims of affirmative misrepresentation or nondisclosure may
choose to pursue relief for breach of contract.4 16 Unfortunately,
in a few cases rejecting contract liability (under circumstances in
which rejection may well have been appropriate),417 the court
used overly broad language, seemingly rejecting the appropriate-
ness of contract theory under any circumstances in the wrongful
adoption context. One Ohio appellate court pronounced that the
"better reasoned view" regarding contract actions is that "a bar-
414 Kadsons, 57 A.2d at 73; see also Naccash, 290 S.E.2d at 831.
415 See MERRr, supra note 267, at 22-23 (applies this argument as a rationale for
resisting application of this restriction to fraud plaintiffs in general).
416 Several plaintiffs in wrongful adoption suits have alleged breach of contract under
some theory. The theory alleged as the nature of the breach, however, is not necessarily
the one proposed -herein, but rather a breach of a promise to place a healthy child, or
a breach of warranty theory, which are discussed below. See Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar
Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (alleging breach of contract
and breach of warranties based on failure to place a healthy child); Allen v. Children's
Servs., 567 N.E.2d 1346 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (breach of contract alleged based on fail-
ure to place healthy child); see also Complaint, Richards v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs.
(No. 476799) (Travis County. Dist. Ct., Tex.), (filed Apr. 18, 1990) (alleging breach of
oral agreement to place children with certain health histories).
417 See infra notes 537-56 and accompanying text.
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gained-for exchange . . .with respect to the life of a child is re-
pugnant."48  Such language misconstrues the nature of the
breach. If an adoption agency or other professional intermediary,
through intentional misrepresentation or nondisclosure, has failed
to provide services reasonably and in good faith, the breach lies in
the failure to provide the services the intermediary contracted to
provide. There is nothing repugnant in the notion that an adop-
tion agency should be held to its agreement to provide services in
a professional manner, as must other professionals who contract to
provide a service.
A written contract between adoptive parents and some adop-
tion agencies may specifically provide that all material
nonidentifying health-related information will be released to adop-
tive parents, in which case, proof of intentional misrepresentation
or nondisclosure may constitute breach of an express duty. An
express duty would also be created by an oral promise to provide
this information,419 which might occur more frequently than a
written promise.
Even when the duty to provide complete and accurate health-
related information has not been expressly undertaken, the court
should be willing to imply this duty. In Petrowsky v. Family Services
of Decatur,420 an action brought by an adoptive couple against an
adoption agency for failure to properly investigate the paternity of
their child, the Illinois appellate court observed, "Every contract
contains an implied duty of good faith. Good faith between con-
tracting parties requires the party vested with contractual discre-
tion to exercise it reasonably," and not "arbitrarily, capriciously, or
in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expectation of the
parties .... Society especially expects service contracts to be exe-
cuted with a reasonable degree of care and skill."42" The court
determined that the adoption agency had an implied duty to per-
form the terms of the adoption agreement "reasonably and in
418 Allen, 567 N.E.2d at 1349. The court in Allen was quoting a New Jersey opinion,
A.L. v. P.A, 517 A.2d 494, 497 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), a case in which a court
denied recovery to an adoptive couple who sued natural parents for revoking their con-
sent in a private adoption. The Allen court deleted from the original quote the words
"through an improper intermediary," which were critical to the message in A.L The
court in A.L was condemning "black market" adoptions in the original quote.
419 Depending upon the circumstances and the formulation adopted by the particular
jurisdiction, the parol evidence rule may create an obstacle here. See generally, CALAMARI
& PERILLO, supra note 184, §§ 3-2 to 3-8.
420 518 N.E.2d 664 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
421 Petrowsky, 518 N.E.2d at 667.
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good faith," and it was a question for the jury to determine if this
duty had been breached under the circumstances of the case.422
Their determination is, of course, consistent with the general prin-
ciples reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section
205, which recognizes a duty of good faith performance that
emphasizes "faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and con-
sistency with the justified expectations of the other party.4 24
In Petrowsky, the court noted that evidence of adoption agency
custom was relevant to a determination of the reasonableness and
good faith of the agency's actions in performance of the contract,
but that custom would not be a "conclusive measure of the stan-
dard of care."4 25 As noted in the discussion of custom's impact
on negligence liability,"s in recent years the custom of disclo-
sure has been established. 1 7 Before a majority of agencies adopt-
ed a policy of full disclosure, however, professional guidelines and
experts called for it.4 28 Thus, if the practices of a majority of
adoption agencies were unreasonable, the absence of "custom"
should not preclude recovery under a contract theory.
A couple anticipating adopting a child who contracts with an
adoption agency reasonably expects that representatives of the
agency will not intentionally misrepresent the background of the
child or withhold vital information concerning the mental or phys-
ical health of the child. Such behavior should be found to be a
breach of the good faith to which the adoptive parents are enti-
tied.
The ability to assert a contract claim may have some very
practical advantages. The statute of limitations for contract claims
are often longer than for tort claims.4 29 Contract actions against
422 Id. But see Engstrom v. Iowa, 461 N.W.2d 309, 313-14 (Iowa 1990) (Court dismiss-
es claim for breach of implied duty of good faith against adoption agency for failure to
properly investigate paternity, in part because claim was not properly pleaded. Addi-
tionally, the court attempted to distinguish between the duty of good faith in performing
a contract, which they said was alleged in Petrowy, and the absence of a duty of good
faith in entering a contract, which the court contends was alleged in Engstrom and should
be addressed by tort law).
423 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) provides: "Every contract im-
poses upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement."
424 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
425 PetrowsAy, 518 N.E.2d at 667.
426 &e supra notes 351-63 and accompanying text.
427 See supra notes 48-51, 352, 355 and accompanying text.
428 &e supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
429 The statute of limitations has been a contested issue in several of the wrongful
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public adoption agencies may be more viable in jurisdictions that
retain governmental immunity over tort claims.4'
Moreover, damages for emotional distress may be available
under a contract theory. Although as a general rule, damages for
emotional distress are not available for breach of contract, 1
many courts have recognized, as an exception to this rule, the
availability of such damages when emotional distress is reasonably
foreseeable as a consequence of the breach at the time the con-
tract is entered. 2 Other exceptions allow damages for mental
anguish in contracts of a personal nature433 or when the con-
duct accompanying a breach is willful or reckless.4m Certainly
contracts for adoption are of a personal nature. Intentional mis-
representation or nondisclosure is by definition willful. Moreover,
emotional distress on the part of adoptive parents is foreseeable.
The court in Petrowsky recognized this element of foreseeability in
the context of adoption, declaring: "Due to the delicate nature of
adoption proceedings the parties are especially susceptible to emo-
tional trauma of some kind. Adoption agencies must be aware of
the human element behind the contract, anticipate, and be re-
sponsible for any mental suffering a breach might trigger."435
Despite its potential usefulness to parents, breach of contract
is unlikely to be an effective basis for an adopted child to seek
recovery for injuries caused by nondisclosure, as the child is nor-
mally not a party to the adoption contract. An adopted child who
has been harmed might explore the possibility of recovery as a
adoption tort cases. In Burr, the statute of limitations for fraud was four years from the
time the claim accrued. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1108. The court held that the claim did not
accrue until the fraud and wrongdoer were actually discovered. Id. In Meracle v.
Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532, 534 (Wis. 1989), the court held a three year stat-
ute of limitations for negligence began to run from the time a plaintiff discovered, or
with reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, and that it was caused by
defendant's conduct. In Meradce their time began to run when their daughter was actually
diagnosed with Huntington Disease. Id. at 536.
430 Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Governmental Tort Liaility for Social Service Agmc's
Negligence in Placement, or Supervision After Placement, of Children, 90 A.LR.3d 1214, at 1218
(1979).
431 Gregory C. Sarno, Annotation, Recoverability of Compensato" Damages for Mental
Anguish or Emotional Distress for Breach of Service Contract, 54 A.LR.4th 901, 911 (1987).
432 I& at 911.
433 I& at 921-22. Among the cases annotated is Chrum v. Charles Heating and Cool-
ing, Inc., 327 N.W.2d 568 (Mich Ct. App. 1982), wherein the court noted that "where
deep, personal human relations are involved, damages for emotional suffering for breach
of contract are allowed." See also 54 A.LR.4th at 922.
434 Petrowsky, 518 N.E.2d at 668.
435 Id.
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third party beneficiary, alleging he or she was an intended bene-




Several types of'negligent conduct on the part of an adoption
intermediary can lead to the failure to accurately disclose critical
health-related information to adoptive parents. The intermediary
may negligently misrepresent a material fact related to the health
of the child that the intermediary should have known was not
true. The intermediary may be negligent in the actual transmission
of the information, so that, unintentionally, information it possess-
es that should have been revealed was not. Finally, an intermedi-
ary may be negligent by failing to properly investigate the health
history of a child, and thereby not disclose information it should
have been able to disclose. These categories are not completely
distinct. Often, an intermediary will make a general remark that a
child is in good health *when, in fact, proper investigation would
have revealed the falsity of such a statement. Thus, negligent mis-
representation and negligent failure to investigate may in many
instances be two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, it is useful
to analyze each duty separately when exploring the limit to which
liability should extend.
1. Treatment by the Courts
(a) Negligent Misrepresentation.-The first published appellate
decision to impose liability upon an adoption agency for conduct
that was admittedly unintentional was Merace v. Children's Service
Society.4 7 When the Meracles adopted twenty-three month old Er-
in from a private adoption agency, they were told that her pater-
nal grandmother had died of Huntington's Disease.3 a They al-
436 See generally, CAiAMARI & PERILLo, supra note 184, at § 17-1 to 17-4, 17-14. I am
unaware of any published or unpublished decisions that have explored this theory in the
wrongful adoption context. This was alleged as the basis of a claim by an adopted child
against an adoption agency in Wristen v. Jansen. Complaint at 13, Wristen v. Jansen (No.
86CV-10-64(21) (Franklin County Ct. C.P., Ohio, filed Oct. 12, 1986). The case was set-
tled without a published opinion having been entered. Telephone Interview with Pete
Milless, Plaintiff's attorney (Sept. 18, 1991).
437 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989). Plaintiff's attorney never argued the social worker's
conduct was intentional in this case. Telephone Interview with Charles Stierman, attorney
for plaintiffs, (Oct. 11, 1990).
438 This disease is referred to as Huntington's Chorea, Huntington's Disease, or Hun-
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lege that the social worker handling the placement told them that
Erin's natural father had tested negative for the disease, and that
therefore Erin had no greater chance of developing the disease
than any other child." 9 Several months after the adoption was
finalized, the Meracles learned of the inaccuracy of the statement
regarding Erin's father when they heard on television that no
reliable test had yet been developed" to determine if someone
at risk had inherited the disease."' Just prior to her seventh
birthday, Erin Meracle was diagnosed with Huntington's Disease,
the same disease that afflicted Patrick Burr."2
Erin's parents sued the adoption agency and its two insur-
ers4"  for negligent placement and negligent misrepresenta-
tion.4' Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment
for the defendants, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that public
policy should not bar a claim for negligent misrepresentation in
the adoption context. 5 The agency had voluntarily assumed a
duty to inform the Meracles about Huntington's Disease and
Erin's risk of developing it, and thus could be held liable for
making an affirmative misrepresentation about the child's
health.446 Damages, the court emphasized, would be limited to
extraordinary medical expenses.4 7
tington Disease. STEDMAN'S supra note 97, at 299.
439 437 N.W.2d at 533. At her deposition, the social worker did not recall making
such a statement. At the time of Erin's birth, her natural father was only 15 years old.
Telephone Interview with Stephen Juech, attorney for defendants, (Aug. 9, 1990).
440 Since 1979 when the statement was made, the development of predictive testing
for Huntington's Disease has become far more accurate: in 1983 the DNA marker was
identified for Huntington's Disease and in some cases the degree of risk now can be
predicted with greater certainty. See generally, Marguerite Chapman, Invited Editoriak Predic-
tive Testing for Adult-Onset Genetic Disease 47 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS. 1 (1990).
441 437 N.W.2d at 533. Apparently, the birth father had undergone a test indicating
that he did not have any symptoms of Huntington's Disease. These tests would not indi-
cate whether he was at risk, and thus could not confirm whether he was capable of
transmitting the disease to Erin. Telephone Interview with Charles Stierman, attorney for
plaintiffs (Oct. 11, 1990).
442 437 N.W.2d at 533. It is highly unusual for someone to develop Huntington's Dis-
ease at this age. Id. at 535. Normally onset of symptoms occurs between ages 30 to 50.
See STEDMAN'S, supra note 97, at 299.
443 Wisconsin allows direct actions against insurance companies, and thus insurers are
routinely named as parties. One defendant carrier provided error and omission coverage
to the agency at the time of the adoption, and the other defendant insurance company
had issued the policy in effect at the time the diagnosis was made. Telephone Interview
with Stephen P. Juech, Counsel for two defendants (Aug. 9, 1990).
444 437 N.W.2d at 533.
445 437 N.W.2d at 537.
446 Id.
447 Id. The court denied damages for emotional distress because the plaintiffs had
[Vol. 67:850
LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL ADOPTION
Recently, in Wallerstein v. Hospital Corp. of America, 4 a Flori-
da appellate court also recognized a claim for negligent misrepre-
sentation, this time in the context of an adoption arranged by a
private attorney rather than an agency.449 Suit was filed by the
adoptive parents on behalf of themselves and their child against
physicians whom the parents had employed to examine the child
prior to release from his post-birth hospitalization and report to
them on his health. They alleged in their complaint that the doc-
tors assured them Shawn was healthy and suitable for adoption.
The parents proceeded with the adoption and subsequently discov-
ered, when Shawn was approximately eleven months old, that he
had chronic, non-progressive brain dysfunction with spastic
quadriparesis (paralysis) that has been tentatively diagnosed as
cerebral palsy.4"0 His condition will result in permanent and se-
vere motor impairment.45 1 Plaintiffs alleged that information con-
tained in the medical records at the time of defendants' exam-
ination indicates that the neurological impairment should have
been evident to defendants at that time."2 The appellate court
held the adoptive parents' alleged reliance upon a representation
"made under circumstances in which its falsity should have been
known" was sufficient to state a claim against the defendant doc-
tors and the hospital that employed them.4
A Minnesota appellate court in M.H. v. Caritas Family Seruic-
es,454 provided the most recent opinion to endorse recognition
of a claim for negligent misrepresentation. 45- Expressing concern
over the need 'for deterrence and maintaining public confidence
in adoption, the court held that "public policy does not preclude
not demonstrated any physical injury. Id. at 536. See supra notes 386-407 and accompany-
ing text.
Press reports indicate that the case was settled prior to going to trial for $250,000.
Patrick Jasperse, False Information Suit from Adoption &tled, MILWAUKEE J., July 10, 1989. At
'the time of settlement, it was anticipated that Erin would live approximately four-to-six
more years with annual medical expenses of $30,000 per year. Telephone Interview with
Charles Stierman, attorney for plaintiffs (Oct. 11, 1990).
448 573 So. 2d 9 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1990).
449 Telephone Interview with Bill Thompson, attorney for plaintiffs (Oct. 8, 1991).
450 573 So. 2d at 9.
451 Telephone Interview with Bill Thompson, attorney for plaintiffs (Oct. 8, 1991).
452 Id.
453 573 So. 2d at 10. The case is currently back in the trial court awaiting trial. Tele-
phone Interview with Bill Thompson, attorney for plaintiffs, (Oct. 8, 1991).
454 475 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review granted, (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991).
455 See supra notes 123-25, and accompanying text.
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a negligent misrepresentation action against an adoption agen-
cy " 45 6
Courts have not unanimously embraced the claim of negligent
misrepresentation in the adoption context, however. In one of the
earliest wrongful adoption cases, Richard P. v. Vista del Mar Child
Care Serv.,4s7 a California appellate court denied recovery to
adoptive parents who sued an adoption agency for negligent mis-
representation, among other theories. Plaintiffs alleged that at the
time they adopted their infant son, they had been told he was
premature and had large earlobes, but at that time had no neuro-
logical damage, was in good health, and was, as the complaint
phrased it, "a proper subject for adoption."45 ' They also alleged
'that their pediatrician, whom they also named as a defendant, had
recently told them the child's medical problems were predictable
at his birth, although he himself had found no health problems
when he examined the child the day after placement.4 5 9 The ap-
pellate court sustained the lower court demurrer to the
pleadings.'
Several factors make an analysis of the court's reasoning prob-
lematic. The sketchy facts included in the appellate court opinion
make it difficult to assess whether a sufficient allegation in the
complaint of an essential element existed, i.e., that the misrepre-
senter, the agency, should have known of the falsity of its state-
ment. 1 Somehow, the court concluded that the agency had
made a full disclosure of the child's medical history to the adop-
tive parents.4 2 Moreover, plaintiffs' position was not enhanced
by characterization of the misrepresentation as one of failure to
correctly represent the child's future health, which the court
deemed an expression of opinion and not actionable."5 The
general nature of the representation distinguishes this case from
Merade (although not from Wallerstein) in that the representation
made was one of "present good health" rather than a misrepresen-
456 M.H., 475 N.W.2d at 97.
457 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. App. 1980).
458 165 Cal. Rptr. at 373. The offensive nature of this characterization probably did
not advance the plaintiff's cause.
459 165 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
460 165 Cal. Rptr. at 372, 374. Although the pediatrician was a named defendant, he
was not a party to the appeal.
461 See infra notes 508-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of this element of
the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
462 165 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
463 165 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
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tation of a specific matter, such as the import of specific test re-
sults and resultant risk of Huntington's Disease. Nevertheless, it
would appear that the allegation that subsequent problems "were
predictable at birth," combined with the allegation of a representa-
tion that the child had no neurological damage, should have been
sufficient to constitute an allegation that the agency should have
known of the falsity of its statement and therefore withstood a
demurrer. The case illustrates the link between a negligent misrep-
resentation claim and the breach of a duty to reasonably investi-
gate. Had the case been allowed to proceed to summary judgment
or trial, the evidence may or may not have established that based
upon what the agency did know, it should have known of the
falsity of its statement or at least undertaken further investigation
to find out.
Unfortunately, in granting the demurrer, rather than focusing
on specific pleading defects, the court made the sweeping pro-
nouncement that "no cause of action for negligence should be
recognized based on considerations of public policy."464 The
court concluded that an agency which had made full disclosure
was not morally blameworthy, that subsequent impairment was not
foreseeable merely from the fact of prematurity, and that imposi-
tion of liability would impede the functioning of adoption agen-
cies and make them the "guarantor of the infant's future good
health."46
(b) Negligent Transmission and Negligent Failure to
Investigate.-In Foster by Foster v. Bass,' the duty of an adoption
agency to investigate the health of a child and to accurately trans-
mit the information to adoptive parents was addressed for the first
time by an appellate court. Of all the cases examined herein, this
one is perhaps the most tragic, because, had appropriate measures
been taken, the child's severe impairment would have been com-
pletely prevented.
In 1972 Jean and Kevin Foster adopted Geoffrey, a newborn,
through a private adoption agency, Catholic Charities, Iric. In their
brochure, Catholic Charities advertised that as -part of its place-
ment process, it would "conduct a painstakingly thorough and
time consuming investigative procedure" into, inter alia, "the
464 1&L
465 Id. at 373-74.
466 575 So. 2d 967 (Miss. 1990).
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child's physical and mental health potential."1 7 As part of this
process, a Catholic Charities worker reviews the hospital records
and copies information onto a form which it presents to the adop-
tive parents to provide them with some medical history on the
child. The parents are then instructed to give this form to their
own pediatrician and provide medical care for the child. The form
reports a variety of test results and significant factors regarding the
birth and post-natal course, and includes a space next to the word
"PKU" to report the results of a routine screening test for PKU.
The hospital records themselves are not forwarded to the adoptive
parents or their pediatrician, nor do the parents or pediatrician
have access to them because they are not given the birth name of
the child nor the name of the physician who cared for the infant
in the hospital.'
Geoffrey was placed directly with the Fosters six days after his
birth, at which time they were given the medical form. Geoffrey's
form, however, contained several blank lines, including a blank
space on the line for reporting PKU test results."9 "PKU" is an
abbreviation for phenylketonuria, an inherited, recessive metabolic
disease that inhibits a person's ability to process certain amino ac-
ids. When the disorder is discovered at or near birth, a change in
the infant's diet can prevent "all the clinical manifestations of the
disease."'7 ° If left untreated, however, the disease causes severe
and irreversible brain damage, resulting in severe retardation
(I.Q.'s between 25-50), and often in seizures, cerebral palsy, mi-
crocephaly, and behavior disorders.471  Although a simple
screening test was available and in use in Mississippi for PKU, the
physician supervising his care prior to placement had not ordered
the test.472
Geoffrey's pediatrician, Dr. Nichols, interpreted the blank to
mean that Geoffrey's test results had not yet been received, as it
could take up to two months to receive the report. Because he
467 Id. at 977.
468 Id. at 970-71. The agency also provides the parents with a Placement Health Ex-
amination Report, which they are instructed to give to their pediatrician and to return
when completed to the agency.
469 Id. at 970.
470 Id. at 969-70.
471 Id. at 969.
472 Although at least one of the hospitals in Jackson at the time of Geoffrey's birth
routinely administered PKU tests to newborns, the hospital at which Geoffrey was born
had no policy for performing the PKU test as a routine screening procedure. State law
did not mandate the test until 1985. 575 So. 2d at 969-70.
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did not have Geoffrey's birth name, he had to rely upon the agen-
cy to serve as conduit to report the results. He testified later that
he assumed that the adoption agency would contact him if the
results were positive, based on his past experience with adoption
agencies. Dr. Nichols was extremely knowledgeable about PKU,
having actively worked to institute a mandatory newborn PKU
screening procedure at one of the local hospitals. He insisted that
if he had known the PKU test has not been administered to
Geoffrey, he would have immediately ordered the test.4 '3
When Geoffrey was four years old, he was diagnosed as having
severe and irreversible brain damage caused by phenylketonuria.
He will never be able to function independently.4 4 His father
ultimately filed suit on his behalf, as next friend, against the doc-
tor who supervised his care in the hospital, the pediatrician, 475
and Catholic Charities. The father alleged the agency was negli-
gent in failing to have the child tested for PKU in the hospital
prior to his release, failing to order the PKU test prior to adop-
tion when their own form failed to record the results of the test,
and failing to provide necessary medical information. Plaintiff
never asserted or argued fraud or misrepresentation, 476 nor was
there an allegation of intentional nondisclosure. Rather, the es-
sence of the complaint was that the agency was negligent in its
transmission of the information and in failing to investigate the
child's health history and ensuring that appropriate screening tests
were performed.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, affirming a summary
judgment in favor of the agency, appears to have concluded that
there was no breach by the agency of a duty to exercise reason-
able care in investigating the child's health or of the duty to trans-
mit health information. In a 5-1-2 decision that was poorly rea-
soned and somewhat vague,477 the majority emphasized that the
duty to determine whether Geoffrey had PKU was with his doctors;
the agency had no doctors on staff, and the injury was not fore-
seeable because the disease was rare. The majority further found
that the agency's actions were not the proximate cause of
473 575 So. 2d at 970-71.
474 Id. at 971.
475 Both doctors reached a settlement with the plaintiff. 575 So. 2d at 968.
476 Id. at 981.
477 As the dissent points out, the majority never stated whether there was no genuine
issue about whether the agency owed the adoptive parents a duty, or whether the agency
breached a duty owed. 575 So. 2d at 986.
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Geoffrey's injuries, and that the physician's negligence superseded
the agency's actions. 47 These rulings were made in spite of testi-
mony by the agency's own director that the many blanks on
Geoffrey's form were evidence of poor record keeping; that the
agency could have contacted the hospital or the doctor who treat-
ed Geoffrey while he was in the hospital to obtain accurate in-
formation about whether the test had been performed; that cur-
rent practice is to check back with the hospital so that all informa-
tion required by the form can be provided; and that the agency
has a duty to investigate a child's health and report that informa-
tion to the adoptive parents. 79
On the issue of negligent transmission, the majority opinion
was not sufficiently precise about its rationale. It is not clear
whether the court concluded that an adoption agency has no duty
to accurately transmit health information, or whether the court
found as a matter of law that the duty simply was not breached.
The majority observed that the creation of the medical form did
not obligate the agency to make sure it was completed, 480 which
might indicate that the majority's conclusion was that there was
simply no duty to transmit health information. On the other
hand, the majority contended that Catholic Charities informed the
Fosters of all information it had, which might indicate it simply
felt that the duty to accurately transmit had not been
breached."' The majority's discussion of duty did not really sep-
arate the question of negligent transmission from the issue of the
failure to investigate, which further complicates the effort to prop-
erly characterize the court's analysis. The two duties, although
often involved in the same factual setting, should be analyzed
separately. One focuses on the duty to exercise reasonable care to
accurately transmit the information the agency has. The duty to
investigate goes one step further, and requires reasonable efforts
to obtain information regarding health matters that is not other-
wise in the agency's possession.
For the reasons elaborated upon below,48 2 adoption interme-
diaries should be charged with a duty to exercise reasonable care
to accurately transmit the health information they possess. The
majority concluded that the agency did not know whether or not
478 Id. at 982.
479 575 So. 2d at 989-91.
480 Id. at 978.
481 Id. at 981.
482 See infra notes 492-93, 496-99, 516-17 and accompanying text.
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a PKU test was conducted.' An equally plausible conclusion
from the facts would be that the worker who filled out the form
knew that the test had not been administered and intended to
communicate that fact by leaving the line next to "PKU" blank. In
any event, the court should have held that the agency had a duty
to accurately and clearly communicate what it knew; either that
(a) it did not know if a test had been performed, or (b) that it
knew a test had not been performed. Whether the agency then
breached that duty by leaving the line blank should have been a
jury question. Reasonable people could differ over whether the
blank would in fact communicate a lack of knowledge or no test,
or whether it was ambiguous and misleading and would create an
unreasonable risk of misinterpretation by the pediatrician.
Regarding the duty to investigate, it would be fair to distill
from the majority's discussion that they rejected imposing such a
duty upon adoption intermediaries in general. While some of their
rationale clearly focused upon the rarity of PKU, at other points
the majority was more general, arguing that the doctors had a
duty to determine whether Geoffrey had PKU, that the agency had
no doctors on staff,' and that the agency should not have been
"cloaked with the same kind of duty" to investigate the blank
beside TKU."' After summarizing many of the wrongful adop-
tion cases discussed above, the majority warned of the need to
"approach slowly any attempt to make an adoption agency liable
for the health of the children that they place."4s Such a
statement overlooks the fact that liability is imposed for the
agency's unreasonable conduct in not pursuing health information
that would allow it to present a complete and accurate health
history, rather than for placing a child with a latent health risk.
Nevertheless, such a statement is consistent with the Meracle case,
483 575 So. 2d at 981. The majority states, "[N]o one informed Catholic Charities
that a test had not been conducted." The most plausible interpretation of this was that
the "information" the worker possessed when filling out the form was that the agency did
not know whether the test had been conducted. Had this been communicated dearly, it
should have alerted Dr. Nichols, the pediatrician, to check further and administer the
test. If the "information" the worker thought the agency had was that a test had been
conducted and the results were not in, then the error was not really one of negligent
transmission, because the worker communicated through the form exactly what he or she
intended to communicate. Rather, it would be another example of negligent misrepresen-
tation, a theory the majority did not consider.
484 Id.
485 I& at 978.
486 Id. at 981.
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which was quick to make clear that it was not addressing whether
agencies have a duty to discover health information. 487
2. Policy Considerations Favoring Recognition of Liability
The policy arguments favoring liability for negligent conduct
of adoption intermediaries parallel the arguments for imposing
liability for intentional conduct.4 Deterrence and compensation
have long been viewed as sufficient rationales for imposing liability
for negligent conduct in general,4 9 and they are equally compel-
ling in the context of wrongful adoption. Recognizing liability for
negligence will also aid the institution of adoption. Although de-
fendants who negligently cause injury are generally not perceived
to be as morally blameworthy as those Who intentionally cause
harm, moral blameworthiness has never been a prerequisite to
attaching liability for tortious conduct,49 outside of the punitive
damages context.491
(a) Deterrence.-The law must also deter negligent conduct of
adoption intermediaries that inhibits transmission of full and
accurate health-related information. The tragic consequences of
failing to receive this information49 2 occur regardless of whether
the cause of the failure is intentional or negligent conduct. More-
over, liability can have a deterrent effect upon even negligent
behavior, particularly when it is an organized activity such as
adoptive placement. Intermediaries must implement adequate
training for employees on how to disclose information and the
steps that must be taken to investigate health history. Imposing
liability for negligent conduct will thus motivate careful assessment
of training practices and internal procedures. 493  Increased
487 Meracle v. Children's Serm. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis. 1989). Se also M.H.
v. Caritas Family Servs., 475 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (making an identical
disclaimer), review granted, (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991).
488 See supra notes 131-223 and accompanying text.
489 See KEETON Er AL., supra note 132, § 4 at 20, 25-26, See generaly, Posner, supra
note 133, at 12-19; Sugarman, supra note 133, at 126; Calabresi, supra note 133, at 175-
82.
490 See Posner, supra note 133, at 17 (pointing out that we impose negligence under
the reasonable person standard against people who are "clumsier than most" and insane
people incapable of reasonable conduct).
491 Generally, negligent conduct is not sufficient to support an award of punitive
damages. KEETON et al., supra note 132, § 2 at 9-10.
492 See supra notes 136-64 and accompanying text.
493 Even advocates for adoption agencies concede that negligent conduct may be
avoidable with good risk management. See Rosenberg & Pierce, supra note 177, at 3030.
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pressure from insurers to limit exposure will have the same effect.
It will also close an escape hatch for many intermediaries who
might otherwise argue that their failure to disclose critical
information was merely negligent, rather than intentional.
There is a risk, however, that if liability is imposed only for
negligent misrepresentation or negligent transmission, and not for
negligent failure to investigate or, worse yet, intentional nondisclo-
sure, then the goal of deterrence will be thwarted. The ultimate
purpose of deterring certain conduct is to increase the accuracy
and content of health information disclosed. If intermediaries are
liable only for misrepresentations, but not for failure to disclose,
they may be motivated to decrease the amount of background
information revealed--or perhaps say nothing at all.494 Even if
intentional nondisclosure and negligent misrepresentation and
transmission are actionable, if there is no duty to make reasonable
efforts to investigate, adoption intermediaries could choose to
record only information volunteered to them on the supposition
that the less information they possess the less they are obligated to
disclose, and their potential liability for negligent misrepresenta-
tion would be minimized.495 Obviously, such a result would be
counterproductive, and thus reinforces the need to include within
Mr. Rosenberg and Mr. Pierce were, respectively, the Director for Adoption Services and
the President of National Committee for Adoption, an advocacy and lobbying organiza-
tion for adoption agencies.
494 This concern was expressed by Charles Stierman, attorney for plaintiffs in Merad,
who indicated that although the decision was favorable to his clients, he feared that the
narrow approach taken by the Wisconsin Supreme Court would in fact cause agencies to
simply not volunteer anything. Telephone Interview with Charles Stierman, attorney for
plaintiffs (Oct. 11, 1990). See akso Dickson, supra note 11, at 962.
495 Stephen Juech, counsel for defense in Merade, predicted that the decision may
result in social workers making less effort to seek out information. Discovery in Merade
apparently revealed that this social worker stated she had in fact called a medical spe-
cialist in Milwaukee who had worked with the paternal birth family. The social worker
also said that she had transmitted the information that she had been given by the doc-
tor. There was a factual dispute about what was actually said to the Meracle family,
which was never resolved because the case was settled. Telephone Interview with Stephen
Juech (August 9, 1990).
If the statements the Meracles allege were in fact made, however, it is quite likely
that they were made because the social worker misunderstood the information she had
been given by the doctor. No one in that case ever alleged that her misrepresentation
was intentional. Mr. Juech expressed the opinion that based on conversations he has had
with social workers, he feels the decision may influence them to seek less outside infor-
mation. Id. This result could be avoided, of course, if a duty to investigate is also im-
posed.
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the scope of actionable negligent conduct the failure to make
reasonable efforts to investigate.
(b) Compensation.-The emotional trauma that can result for
both adoptive parents and adopted children,4" as well as the fi-
nancial pressures created by extraordinary expenses, 497 can occur
regardless of the nature of the fault that deprived the adoptive
parents of the critical information. Victims of negligent behavior
in the adoption context, just as victims of other types of negligent
behavior, deserve to be compensated.
(c) Foster the Institution of Adoption.-In both Merade and M.H.
v. Caritas Family Serices, the courts explicitly responded to the con-
cern raised by the California Appellate Court in Richard P. that to
expose adoption agencies to liability for negligence would "impede
the proper functioning of adoption agencies." 498 Both courts
concluded that, on the contrary, to renounce such liability might
actually inhibit adoptions because prospective adoptive parents'
confidence in the adoption process would be eroded if agencies
were immunized from liability.4' Imposing liability, observed the
court in M.H., would promote accurate communication of health
information, rather than inhibit an agency's performance of its
role.-'
Recognizing a duty not only to carefully communicate the
information the agency possesses, but in addition to make reason-
able efforts to investigate potential health problems, also aids the
institution of adoption. The importance to the adoption process of
making a full and complete investigation is recognized in the
professional guidelines developed by the Child Welfare League of
America, which emphasize the significance of assessing the child's
medical and psychological characteristics and needs for appropri-
496 See supra notes 136-56, 186-89, 199-207 and accompanying text.
497 See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
498 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (citation omitted).
499 Meracle v. Childrens Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis. 1989) ("Further, our
decision will not inhibit adoption. Indeed, it will give potential parents more confidence
in the adoption process and in the accuracy of the information they receive. Such confi-
dence would be eroded if we were to immunize agencies from liability for false state-
ments made during the adoption process."); M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 475 N.W.2d
94, 98 (Minn. C. App. 1991) ("'o renounce such liability may actually inhibit adoptions
because prospective parents would be warier of the process if the agency had no
disincentive to make false statements."), review grante4 (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991).
500 M.H., 475 N.W.2d at 98.
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ate placement.50' Imposing liability for breaching this duty moti-
vates compliance and prevents intermediaries from taking the
approach of "see no evil, hear no evil, say no evil." The ultimate
goal of adoption, to place children in families that will best meet
their needs, is better served. 2 Enforcing this duty will not "ex-
pose agencies to potentially unlimited liability."0 ' The duty neg-
ligence law imposes is generally one of reasonable conduct. 4 If
the efforts taken by the intermediary to investigate health history
were reasonable under the circumstances, liability would not be
imposed.
3. Theories of Liability
(a) Negligence and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
(i) Negligent Misrepresentation.-Negligent misrepresenta-
tion, although essentially just negligence in a specific context, has
been treated to some extent as a separate theory or theories de-
pending upon whether the setting was commercial or not, with its
elements separately identified.' 5 These elements are well summa-
rized in Wallerstein v. Hospital Cop. of Am.:506
501 CWIA, Standards for Adoption Seitc4 supra note 49, at 25-28. Standards 3.1 to 3.6
describe in some detail the steps needed to make. a developmental history, medical exam-
ination, psychological history, and family history. These standards also describe how to
confer with specialists and coordinate findings in order to determine the kinds of fami-
lies into which children should be placed.
502 See id. at 9, 25. (-'he primary purpose of an adoption service should be to help
children who would not otherwise have a home of their own, and who can benefit from
family life, to become members of a family that can give them the love, care, protection,
and opportunities essential for their healthy personal growth and development." Id. at
9.).
503 The concern of expanding liability too far was expressed by the court in Merade;
although the statement was not specifically directed to the duty to investigate.
504 See supra notes 338-63 and accompanying text.
505 KEETON et a., supra note 132, § 107 at 745-48, discusses the development of the
tort of negligent misrepresentation creating pecuniary losses, which is often recognized in
a commercial context. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS, § 552 (1965) (Information
Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others).
Liability has also been recognized for negligent misrepresentation in a more general
context, particularly when the misrepresentation caused physical harm. see Id. 304 ("A
misrepresentation of fact or law may be negligent conduct.") See § 311 (Negligent Misrep-
resentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm; see supra notes 387-88, 392-407 for a discus-
sion of the erosion of the physical harm requirement to recover for emotional distress in
negligence actions.
506 573 So. 2d 9, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).
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In order to be actionable, a suit for negligent misrepresen-
tation must contain the following elements: (1) misrepresenta-
tion of a material fact; (2) the representor must either know of
the misrepresentation, must make the representation without
knowledge as to its truth or falsity, or must make the represen-
tation under circumstances in which he ought to have known
of its falsity; (3) the representor must intend that the represen-
tation induce another to act on it; (4) injury must result to the
party acting in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.
All of these elements, as applied in the context of a wrongful
adoption proceeding, have been discussed in detail above, 0 7 ex-
cept, of course, the one element that distinguishes this tort from
intentional misrepresentation. Liability for negligent misrepresenta-
tion can be imposed even if the false statement was not intention-
al or reckless, but simply "was made under circumstances in which
its falsity should have been known."5° If an adoption interme-
diary does not make reasonable efforts to determine if its state-
ments are true, liability should be imposed for any resulting harm
to the adoptive parents or the child."° Thus, when an affirma-
tive representation is made, it is clear that a duty to reasonably
investigate exists to ensure the statement's accuracy. When negli-
gence in the manner of communication creates a misrepresenta-
tion, that also has been deemed a sufficient basis for liability.510
Although the court in Wallerstein recited the standard lan-
guage that the injury must result to the party acting in reliance
upon the statement, the court did not specify that Shawn's claim
under that theory should be dismissed. The more restrictive lan-
guage is probably derived from a recitation of the elements made
in a commercial setting.51 ' In the context of an adoption, recog-
507 See supra notes 225-73 and accompanying text.
508 573 So. 2d at 10.
509 None of the cases in which a claim for negligent misrepresentation has been rec-
ognized in the adoption context has yet been tried. Merade settled; M.H. and Walerstdn
are awaiting trial. Thus, the cases give us little guidance on the application of this
standard.
510 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 311(2)(b) (1965) reprinted infra at note
512.
511 See Id. § 552, which relates to Misrepresentation Causing Pecuniary Loss, and pro-
vides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject
to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in ob-
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nizing the child's claim is appropriate and consistent with both
the specific recognition of a right of recovery for one physically
harmed by another whose actions resulted from a negligent
misrepresentation,512 as well as the general rule that liability for
negligent misrepresentation extends to anyone who "may reason-
ably be expected to be endangered."53
(it) Negligent Transmission and Failure to Investigate.-When
accurate and complete health information is not conveyed due to
lack of reasonable care in the transmission or investigation of the
information, liability should be imposed under a general negli-
gence claim. 14 The elements of negligence-duty, breach, causa-
tion and injury-have been discussed above.51 5 The element of
duty deserves special attention in this context, however.
To the extent that there is a duty to disclose health informa-
tion, there logically must follow a duty to make reasonable efforts
taining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1)
is limited to loss suffered
(a)by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose ben-
efit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipi-
ent intends to supply it; and
(b)through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the in-
formation to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantial-
ly similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the
duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect
them.
512 Id. § 311 provides:
(1) One who negligently gives faUse information to another is subject to
liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable
reliance upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the
action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information,or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
513 See supra notes 379-81 and accompanying text.
514 Damages for emotional distress can be sought in this claim or in a separate claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See supra notes 382-415 and accompanying
text.
515 See supra notes 337-78 and accompanying text.
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to communicate it in such a manner that the information is actu-
ally received in an understandable form. The arguments for recog-
nizing a duty to disclose health information, i.e. the gravity, proba-
bility, and foreseeability of harm if such information is not con-
veyed, the benefits to society, and the comparatively light burden
to an adoption intermediary, have been reviewed above in de-
tail.1 These arguments equally support recognition of a duty to
exercise reasonable care in the transmission of the information,
for the consequences are no less grave simply because the failure
to receive the information resulted from faulty communication
rather than the absence of an effort to communicate.517
Recognition of a duty to make reasonable efforts to investi-
gate health information, when no misrepresentation has been
made, is by far the most problematic basis for liability. To date no
court has recognized this duty and several have explicitly18 or
implicitly rejected it... Several commentators, however, have
forcefully argued such a duty should be imposed.520 The policy
factors that courts must consider to determine whether a duty ex-
ists-the gravity, probability, and forseeability of risks, the policy of
preventing future harm, and the burden to the defendant and
consequences to society of imposing the duty5 2-favor recogni-
tion of a duty to investigate. Where reasonable efforts could have
uncovered critical health information, failure to take those steps
can result in harm to adoptive families that is no less tragic, prob-
able, or foreseeable than if the harm were caused by intentional
failure to disclose. The policy of preventing future harm is well
516 See supra notes 136-64, 341-50 and accompanying text.
517 A wrongful adoption case that recently settled illustrates an error of this nature.
The adoptive mother of a one-year-old, who later developed a serious behavioral disorder
and required special schooling, sued the agency for failure to reveal that a birth parent
or parents were diagnosed as schizophrenic and low functioning. There was a factual dis-
pute about whether that information was ever included in any oral conversation, but in
addition, the department claimed they sent a background letter to the adoptive mother
that got lost in the mail. Telephone Interviews with Peter Milless, attorney for Ellen
Wristen, regarding Wijsten v. Jansen, No. 86CU-10-641 (Franklin County, Ohio, October
15, 1986) (Oct. 16, 1990 and Sept. 18, 1991). If in fact the evidence at trial would have
shown that the letter was the only method the department actually used to communicate
this information, and it was not sent by certified mail, such a circumstance might be a
good example of negligence in the transmission of information.
518 Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 981 (Miss. 1990).
519 Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis. 1989); M.H. v.
Caritas Family Servs., 475 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review granted, (Minn.
Nov. 13, 1991); Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1109 (Ohio 1986).
520 Dickson, supra note 11, at 965; Schiffer, supra note 11, at 718.
521 See supra notes 341-50 and accompanying text.
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served by the motivating effect that imposing liability for failure to
investigate should generate. The consequences to society of im-
posing the burden are favorable-i.e. the chances for appropriate
placement and adequate post-adoption health care are enhanced.
The real stumbling block has been the perceived burden on
the intermediary. Courts fear exposing intermediaries to "potential-
ly unlimited liability." Such a fear is unwarranted. In a myriad of
settings, courts have asked juries to determine whether conduct
was reasonable under the circumstances. There is no reason why
such a determination cannot be made in the context of adoption
practice. The Child Welfare League's standards provide a starting
point in summarizing what steps should be required.522 These
standards recommend obtaining a family history from birth par-
ents, a developmental history from birth parents and others, if
any, who have temporarily cared for a child, and a medical exami-
nation and evaluation from a qualified physician which includes
assessment of the child's medical records. Psychological testing
may be warranted if there are indications of risk in that area.
Specialists should be consulted about any indication of risk for
specific health problems."2 Again, custom in the industry is rele-
vant, but not controlling. 24
Foster v. Bass is the perfect example of why recognition of this
duty is so vital. The adoption intermediary normally has sole ac-
cess to the birth family, prior caregivers, and medical and genetic
history." It is not enough to say, "take this child to your pedia-
trician and let us know if there are problems." The pediatrician
chosen by the adoptive parents simply does not have access to the
medical history that can provide diagnostic clues.5 26  The
pediatrician's lack of access to this information led to tragic conse-
quences for Geoffrey Foster.
Obviously the requirement of reasonable efforts to obtain
missing information must be assessed on a case by case basis.
Tracking down a paternal grandmother in the deserts of Outer
Mongolia may be excessively burdensome. On the other hand,
522 See CWLA Standards, supra note 49, at 26-28 (Standards 3.1 to 3.6).
523 Id.
524 &e supra notes 351-63 and accompanying text.
525 See Schiffer, supra note 11, at 718.
526 Dr. Stella B. Kontras, M.D., Professor at Ohio State University, in testimony be-
fore the Ohio Senate, stated that "approximately three-fourths of the information a phy-
sician seeks in evaluating the health of a baby involves medical history." O'Connell, supra
note 46, at 533 & n.6.
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calling up the hospital to check on the results of a PKU test is
not.
The court in Foster emphasized that foreseeability of risk must
be a factor in determining duty. This is certainly accurate, but the
court's application of that factor was faulty. The court emphasized
that phenylketonuria occurs only once in every 10,000 births
among those of European ancestry.527 Nevertheless, the grave
consequences of the disease and the consequent importance of
the test were obviously known to the agency, since the agency
routinely included PKU test results on the brief standard form
sent to adoptive parents. In such a circumstance, it seems evident
they foresaw the potential impact of this information in the pre-
vention of this disease. Obviously, the extent to which it is reason-
able to expect intermediaries to detect risk factors and seek addi-
tional information expands as medical science expands. The gen-
eral availability of knowledge about particular conditions affects
the determination of what risks are foreseeable. It should be re-
membered, however, that adoption intermediaries have special
skills and access to training that would warrant a court holding
them to a higher standard.5 2' For several years geneticists in par-
ticular have undertaken training conferences52 and provided ex-
pertise to adoption intermediaries to develop forms to aid in their
investigation.53 ° Thus, the reasonableness of the intermediaries'
efforts and the foreseeability of risk must be assessed in the con-
text of the medical information available to them at the time and
their access to specialized training and ability to consult with med-
ical experts.
The dissent in Foster forcefully argued that the agency did
have a duty to investigate, but based that duty in large part upon
the fact that Catholic Charities advertised that it would undertake
a thorough investigation of health matters."' Recognition of the
duty to investigate under tort law, however, should not be depen-
dent upon the nature of an intermediary's 'advertising. Such a
527 Foster, 575 So. 2d at 969.
528 See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
529 For example, in 1984 the Wisconsin Clinical Genetics Center sponsored a continu-
ing education project, entitled "Continuing Education in Genetics for Adoption Workers."
GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY, supra note 43, at iv.
530 A committee of geneticists, pediatricians, and adoption workers are working to
develop a form to take medical history of adopted children. Diane Plumridge, Joan Bums
& Nancy L. Fisher, ASHG Activities Relative to Education: Heredity and Adoption: A Survey of
State Adoption Agencies, 46 Am. J. Hum. Genetics 208, 214 (1990).
531 Foster, 575 So. 2d at 986-989 (SullivanJ., dissenting).
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duty should be recognized as inherent in the undertaking to place
a child for adoption, because in most adoptions, no one else can
supply the missing link to information the adoptive parents cannot
access by themselves.
(b) Breach of CGmtract.-Breach of contract, express or im-
plied, should also be a theory available to adoptive parents who
failed to receive complete and accurate health-related information
as the result of the negligent conduct of an adoption intermedi-
ary. In some instances, a commitment to investigate and disclose
health background might have been made expressly through writ-
ten materials, as in Foster,' 12 or orally. In the absence of an ex-
press commitment, the court could still determine, as in
Petrowsky,533 that the contract with the adoption intermediary im-
plied a duty to perform reasonably and in good faith, a duty
which could be violated by negligent conduct alone. In Petrowsky it
was the implied duty to make reasonable efforts to investigate
paternity that was held to be actionable."M Similarly, failure to
make reasonable efforts to investigate and communicate accurately
the health history of a child to adoptive 'parents, a function that is
also central to the adoption process, should also be viewed as a
breach of the implied contractual duty of good faith." 5
C. The Existence of Impairment and Absence of Fault
In several wrongful adoption cases, plaintiffs have asserted,
among other theories, claims for breach of warranty, strict liability,
and breach of contract.5  Such claims were based on the allega-
tion that the intermediary promised and failed to provide a
healthy child. To date the courts have uniformly and appropriately
532 Id. at 988.
533 Petrowsky, 518 N.E.2d at 667; See supra notes 420-28.
534 Id. at 667-68.
535 A breach of contract claim was never asserted in Foster, presumably because the
only plaintiff in that action was the adopted child, who was not a party to the contract.
In Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Sera., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374 (Cal. App. 1980),
a breach of contract was alleged, but the court's brief discussion of it made no reference
to a- breach based on the conduct of the agency. The breach that was alleged is dis-
cussed below, infra notes 542-47.
536 This must be distinguished from a breach of contract action that identifies the
breach as inappropriate conduct, either intentional or negligent, on the part of the agen-
cy.
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rejected these attempts to recover under theories that impose
liability without fault.
1. Treatment by the Courts
In Allen v. Children's Serices,'s7 an Ohio appellate court re-
versed the judgment of a trial court that had awarded $17,000 to
an adoptive mother for breach of contract. The mother, Geraldine
Allen, entered into an "Agreement for Adoptive Placement" with
defendant in September 1977 when nine-month-old Erika was
placed in her home. Based upon several examinations that Erika
had received by a physician prior to placement, the social worker
assigned to the case had told Ms. Allen at the time of placement
that Erika was healthy. Approximately two months later, the adop-
tive mother became concerned about the child's unresponsiveness
to sound. She sought further examinations, which confirmed that
Erika was severely to profoundly deaf. It was undisputed that this
fact was unknown by either party at the time of placement. The
agency offered to take Erika back, but Ms. Allen chose to proceed
with the adoption because of the strong emotional bond that she
had .already formed with the child- during the three months Erika
had been in her care.538
After several years of negotiations, Ms. Allen filed suit against
the private agency for negligence, fraud, and breach of contract,
in an attempt to get assistance with the special schooling, equip-
ment and extraordinary medical expenses Erika required.51 9 The
case proceeded to trial on the contract claim alone. Erika's moth-
er claimed that the agency breached both a written and oral con-
tract to place a healthy child.' In reversing the jury award of
$17,000, the appellate court held that Ohio does "not recognize a
breach of contract action by adoptive parents against an adoption
agency."54
1
In Richard P.,"M2  discussed in detail above,54  plaintiffs
537 567 N.E.2d 1346 (Ohio App. 1990).
538 Id. at 1347-48. The private agency also advised her that she could try to adopt
the child through the county to become eligible for adoption assistance. Unfortunately,
there was no guarantee that the county would agree to place Erika with Ms. Allen, a
single mother, and Ms. Allen did not want to risk losing Erika, with whom she was al-
ready very emotionally attached. Telephone Interview with Blaine Schwarz, attorney for
plaintiff (Sept. 17, 1991).
539 Id. at 1348 and telephone interview with Blaine Schwarz (Sept. 17, 1991).
540 Id. at 1348 and Telephone Interview with Blaine Schwarz, attorney for plaintiff
(Sept. 17, 1991).
541 Id. at 1349.
542 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. App. 1980).
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sought, in addition to their negligence and fraud claims, recovery
for strict liability in tort, breach of express and implied warranties,
and breach of contract for "failure to procure for plaintiffs a child
that was physically and mentally healthy."' The trial court sus-
tained a demurrer to the complaint and plaintiffs appealed all but
the strict liability claim." s Claiming Gregory was a healthy child
at the time of placement, the California appellate court denied a
breach occurred. s4 The court also rejected the warranty claims,
and posited a rational that the Alen court echoed ten years later:
[T]o accept a warranty theory under circumstances as
involved in this case, is to give legal recognition to the impossi-
ble, for no human. being, no matter how healthy at birth, can
ever be guaranteed to be unaffected by physical or mental
impairment in later years.m7
2. Policy Considerations Disfavoring Recognition of Liability
Imposing liability upon adoption intermediaries who have
undertaken reasonable efforts to investigate an adoptee's health
and who have fully and accurately disclosed health-related informa-
tion serves none of the goals of deterrence, compensation, or fos-
tering the institution of adoption. Deterrence is not served be-
cause there is no inappropriate conduct to deter. Strict liability,
breach of a contract to place a healthy child, and breach of war-
ranty are not premised upon wrongful conduct by the intermedi-
ary, but rather upon the existence of some present or future
health impairment in the child. If the agency has made reasonable
efforts to investigate, was unaware of this condition at placement,
and accurately revealed all that it knew to the prospective adoptive
543 See supra notes 457-65 and accompanying text.
544 Pchard P., 165 CAL. RpR. at 374.
545 The appellate court's recitation of the issues on appeal omits strict liability, nor is
it discussed in the opinion, suggesting the plaintiffs chose not to pursue this issue.
546 It is difficult to see how the court reached this conclusion on a demurrer. Plain-
tiffs alleged Gregory had the neurological problems at birth and that they were detect-
able at that time. Id. at 371-72.
547 Id. at 374; see also, Allen v. Children's Services, 567 N.E.2d 1346, 1349 (quoting
Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1109 (Ohio 1986). In Roe v.
Catholic Charities, No. 5-89-0411, 1992 WL 29911 (Il. App. Ct. Feb. 14, 1992), at *13,
the court also upheld dismissal of the adoptive parents' claim for breach of contract,
simply stating, that the defendants had fhiled to plead a cause of action for breach of
contract and explicitly refusing to rule on whether a breach of contract action would be
appropriate in an adoption setting.
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parents, imposing liability under these circumstances can have no
deterrent effect.
A judgment for damages under one of these theories will
place funds in the hands of adoptive parents, or an adopted child,
who have suffered a loss as a result of the child's impairment, so
to that extent compensation will occur. However, with limited ex-
ceptions, both tort law and contract law compensate losses only
when the losses are created by some behavior of the defendant
that justifies the liability. In the field of tort law, compensation is
awarded for losses caused by conduct which is "socially unreason-
able.'M4 In contract law, the doctrines of impossibility and im-
practicability of performance were created to fairly allocate risk
when a contract cannot be performed. 49 When an adoption in-
termediary takes reasonable steps to discover and inform adoptive
parents of health-related risks, there is no analogously unreason-
able behavior. The intermediary should not bear the burden of
compensation for losses related to impairments in the child that
could not have been discovered at the time of placement with the
exercise of reasonable care, and which were in fact unknown to
both parties.
Moreover, imposition of liability under such circumstances
would not foster the institution of adoption. To award monetary
damages in situations where the loss is totally beyond the control
of the intermediary would subject intermediaries to the risk of un-
limited liability. To the extent that inappropriate conduct is not
the basis of liability, no adjustment in their procedures can avoid
future liability. Recognizing liability under these circumstances
would in fact make adoption intermediaries "the guarantors of
their placements" and impose "an untenable contract of insurance
that each child adopted would mature to be healthy and hap-
py."550 Such a guarantee is impossible to fulfill.
3. The "Product" Theories of Liability.
Although strict liability was mentioned in the pleadings of
Richard P.,551 it has not been addressed in a published opinion.
The doctrine of strict liability has evolved to impose liability with-
548 KEETON ET AL, supira note 132, § 1 at 6.
549 See generally CALAmARi & PERILLO, supra note 184, §§ 13-1 to 13-14.
550 Bu, 491 N.E.2d at 1109.
551 See Richard P. v. Vista del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 372 (Cal. CL
App. 1980).
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out fault (i.e. without violation of an intentional tort or negli-
gence) upon defendants who engage in unusual, abnormal, and
highly dangerous activities,5 2 a group which could hardly be said
to include adoption intermediaries; and upon manufacturers and'
merchant sellers who produce or sell unreasonably dangerous
defective products."' This theory is neither applicable nor ap-
propriate to adoption intermediaries. Adoption agencies and attor-
neys who serve as intermediaries do not "manufacture" or sell chil-
dren-they offer a service. Nor are the children "products" whose
condition can be controlled by the intermediaries.
The other two theories contain the same flaw. Breach of war-
ranty encompasses several theories of recovery Which compensate
purchasers or users for defects in products,5 4 without regard to
the "fault" of the one who warranted the goods.55 To a large
extent today breach of warranties are governed by Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which applies to transactions in goods
and does not govern contracts which are strictly for services., 6
Breach of contract for failure to place a healthy child also treats
the child like a product and imposes liability with'out fault. In
both Richard P. and Allen, the plaintiffs sought relief under con-
tract theory, because they had contracted to adopt healthy chil-
dren, but after placement it became apparent their children had
significant health impairments. In neither case were the facts with
regard to fault on the part of the intermediary developed in the
record, because Richard P. was dismissed at the demurrer stage
and Allen, although alleging negligence, proceeded to trial on the
contract theory alone. In both cases the courts were justified in
rejecting liability on the contractand warranty theories. To treat a
child as a product is, as the court stated in Allen, repugnant and
demeaning to the child. To impose liability without fault is unfair
to the intermediary who, unlike a manufacturer or seller of goods,
has absolutely no ability to control the physical or mental develop-
ment of the child it is placing for adoption. If the intermediary
has made reasonable efforts to investigate and fully and accurately
552 KEETON ET AL, supra note 132 § 75, at 537.
553 Id. § 98, at 692-93.
554 Id. at § 95.
555 JAMES WHrE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-1 (3d ed.
1988).
556 Id. at § 9-2.
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disclose health information, its obligation should be fulfilled and
the risk of latent impairment must be borne by adoptive parents.
IV. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS BASED ON
THE NATURE OF THE INTERMEDIARY
When intermediaries are private attorneys or governmental
agencies, additional theories of liability may be available to plain-
tiffs considering wrongful adoption litigation.
A. Private Attorneys
Private attorneys play a significant role in the adoption of
children in this country. The National Committee for Adoption
reports that 31.4% of the domestic unrelated adoptions in the
U.S. in 1986 were independent adoptions handled by private indi-
viduals, usually attorneys.55 7 The nature of the attorney's role in
an adoption may vary significantly, depending upon the preferenc-
es of the parties and the law of the state. In many states, an attor-
ney may serve as an intermediary, to put a birth mother in con-
tact with a couple who wishes to adopt."' In some of these
states the adoption may occur through indirect placement, in
which the birth parent(s) agrees to allow an attorney to choose
the adoptive parents."' In California, an attorney may serve as
facilitator,"6 but an attorney may not actually "place the child,"
(i.e., select the adoptive parents); rather, the birth parent(s) must
place the child, and must personally know the prospective adop-
557 NATIONAL COMMrTE9 FOR ADOPTION, supra note 1, at 4, 60. Just over half of all
domestic adoptions in the U.S. in 1986 were related adoptions, meaning that at least one
of the adoptive parents or guardians is related to the child by blood or by marriage to
the child's biological parent (i.e., a stepparent adoption). Id. at 59. In all likelihood the
majority of these adoptions are handled by private attorneys rather than agencies.
558 For example, California allows attorneys to serve in this capacity. See D. LEAVrrr,
supra note 7, at 5-6. Often when attorneys serve in this capacity they are referred to as
facilitators. I& at 8.
559 This is the typical manner in which independent adoptions are handled in
Oklahoma, for example.
560 See supra note 558.
In California, only 12% of all independent adoptions are originated with private
attorneys.. . . In the greatest percentage the birth mother is first presented with names
of couples wishing to adopt through her obstetrician. The attorney enters the process
after the birth mother has selected a couple she would like to investigate further, often
to arrange for a meeting.
HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 7, § 5.03[1], at 5-14.
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tive parent(s)."' In other states, attorneys are not allowed to
place children for adoption or to serve as intermediary in helping
birth parents and prospective adoptive parents locate each
other.5 62
In virtually all adoptions, however, agency or nonagency, an
attorney will represent the adoptive parent(s), preparing the neces-
sary court documents and representing the adoptive parent(s) at
the hearings. If no agency is involved in the adoption, then the
attorney's obligation as counsel for the adoptive parents should
include performing an appropriate health investigation, or having
a social worker do it, either as part of the home study or separate-
ly.5" Moreover, as part of the attorney's duty to advise his or
her client, the attorney should fully disclose all health-related
information to the prospective adoptive parents or verify that such
disclosure has been made. If an agency made the placement, it
remains the duty of the attorney for the adoptive parents to make
reasonable efforts to ascertain whether the health history of the
child was investigated and the results disclosed to his or her client,
to the extent the attorney can reasonably verify this."'
561 See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 224.20 (West Supp. 1991) which provides:
The selection of prospective adoptive parent or parents shall be personally
made by the birth parent or parents of the child and may not be delegated to
an agent. The act of selection by the birth parent or parents shall be based
upon his, her, or their personal knowledge of the prospective adoptive parent or
parents.
See also CAL. CIVIL CODE § 224q (West Supp. 1991) (repealed July 1, 1992):
§ 224q. Place for adoption, defined
As used in this chapter, "place for adoption," in the case of an adoption
to which neither the State Department of Social Services nor a licensed adoption
agency is a party, means the selection of a prospective adoptive parent or par-
ents for a minor child by the parent or parents. The selection shall be person-
ally made by the parent or parents of the child and may not be delegated to
an agent. The act of selection by the parent or parents shall be based upon his,
her, or their personal knowledge of the prospective adoptive parent or parents.
"Personal knowledge" includes, but is not limited to, their full legal name; age;
religion; race or ethnicity; employment; whether other persons, whether children
and adults, reside in their home, any health conditions curtailing their normal
daily activities or reducing their normal life expectancy; and their general area
of residence, or upon request, their address. "Prospective adoptive parent' means
a person who has filed or intends to file a petition to adopt a minor who has
been or who is to be placed in his or her physical care.
562 See HOLLINGER, supra note 7, § 6.041] [a], at 6-94 (describing New York's restric-
tions on the role an attorney may play in placement and the initial contact).
563 See LEAVrrr, supra note 7, at 25-26 (describing the role of counsel in an indepen-
dent nonagency adoption and emphasizing the importance of obtaining a complete
health history from both birth parents to be given to the prospective adoptive parents).
564 Raymond W. Godwin & Kenneth Biedzynski, Liability for Wrongful Adoption Looms
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If an attorney has failed to fulfill this obligation, adoptive
parents may wish to pursue a claim for legal malpractice against
the attorney who represented them in an adoption.565 The ele-
ments of legal malpractice are derived from the elements of an
ordinary negligence claim.' To prevail, a plaintiff must prove
(1) a duty to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge6 7 arising out
of the contract for professional services; (2) a breach of that duty
by "failure to exercise professional skill,"5" and (3) damages
caused by the breach.5" In determining the standard of care,
the trend is to compare the degree of care and skill exercised by
the attorney with a statewide or national standard, rather than a
local or community standard.7 0
To date, no published opinions have considered a wrongful
adoption claim against a private attorney.571 The most difficult
obstacle may be establishing the duty to investigate and disclose as
part of the contract for professional services. In nonagency adop-
tions in which the attorney plays a role as facilitator or intermedi-
ary, the attorney representing the adoptive parents should be
bound by the same professional guidelines5 72 that govern an
adoption agency. Even in cases in which the attorney is hired after
the birth parent(s) and adoptive parent(s) have found each other
through some other process, competent adoption representation
Largr, NJ.LJ., Sept. 12, 1991, at 7. The authors, an attorney who concentrates in adop-
tion matters and his law clerk, advise fellow members of the New Jersey bar that attor-
neys representing adoptive parents in agency adoptions must be aware of the statutory
disclosure requirements and "ensure that the agency fully complies with such guidelines
by inspecting and analyzing the agency's medical report for its comprehensiveness and
conformity. Overlooking this precaution will be inviting claims of legal malpractice." Id.
565 Id.
566 Keith J. Pflaum, Comment, 77Te Heart of Att"rey Malradic: A Discussion of the
Standard of Care Required of Attorneys, 13 J. LEGAL PROF. 311, 313 (1988).
567 Mallen, supra note 238, at 205.
568 Richard Bridgman, Legal Malpradtice - A Consideration of the Elements of a Strong
Plaintiff's Case, 30 S.C. L. REV. 213, 221 (1979).
569 Id.
570 Pflaum, supra note 566, at 317; Ronald Mailen, Legal Malpractice: The Legacy of the
1970s, 16 FORuM 119, 126 (1980).
571 Nor is the author aware of any such claims that have actually been filed.
Wallerstein involved a claim against physicians who gave reports to an attorney handling a
private adoption on the health of a child. Plaintiffs asserted a claim for breach of fidu-
ciary duty against the doctors, among other claims. (Brief for Appellants, Wallerstein v.
Hospital Corp. of Am., 573 So. -2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (No. 89-1260). See supra
notes 448-53 and accompanying text. This claim was dismissed by the trial court and,
apparently, summarily rejected by the appellate court, which refused to discuss it in the
opinion. 573 So. 2d at 10.
572 See supra notes 48, 71-74, 165, 285-86, 522-23 and accompanying text.
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requires that the attorney undertake this vital function.575 In ad-
dition, in many cases state statutes impose the duty to investigate
and disclose health information upon an attorney who serves as
intermediary or who files a petition for adoption. 7 4
When an attorney represents adoptive parents in an agency
adoption, the attorney's client is the adoptive parents, not the
agency, and the attorney should still have an obligation to make
reasonable efforts to ascertain whether the agency fulfilled its duty
to investigate and disclose background information to his or her
clients. In other contexts, attorneys have been found guilty of
malpractice for failure to adequately advise their clients about
matters intrinsic to the transaction for which the attorney was
hired. For example, attorneys have been held to commit malprac-
tice for failure to properly advise a divorce client about the com-
munity property interests in a military pension and for giving
erroneous advice as to the meaning of a contract.5 75 A similar
obligation should be recognized in adoption practice for attorneys
to advise clients of the agency's duty to investigate and disclose
health information and to make reasonable efforts to verify that
this has been done.
576
573 See supra note 563.
574 See, eg., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie 1991) ("Prior to placement for adop-
tion, the licensed adoption agency, or where an agency is not involved, the person, entity
or organization handling the adoption shall compile and provide to the prospective adop-
tive parents a detailed, written health history and genetic and social history of the
child . . . .); ALASK& STAT. § 25.23.185 (1991) ("At the time a petition for adoption is
filed with the court, the agency or individual placing the person for adoption, or the
petitioner, shall file with the court. . . "background information which includes medical
and social history).
On the other hand, in a few states, the confidentiality statutes may restrict an
attorney's ability to disclose. In Oklahoma, this potential exists, although it has never
been fully explored. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 57, 60.5A, 60.17 (West Supp. 1991).
575 See Mallen, supra note 570, at 126-27.
576 An attorney hired by the adoption agency to represent adoptive parents may en-
counter a conflict of interest in this regard. If the attorney is representing the adoptive
couple in court, the attorney's client is the adoptive couple, and the duty to advise and
ensure disclosure extends to them. Despite the fact that normally the agency and the
couple are not in an adversarial relationship, the potential for such a relationship could
develop if health information has not been adequately disclosed. Such potential suggests
it is not advisable for an attorney representing the agency to also represent adoptive
parents in agency adoptions.
A potential for conflict, although to a lesser degree, exists in a state such as Cali-
fornia in which an attorney is permitted, with written consent, to represent both the
adoptive parents and the birth parent(s). See CAL CIV. CODE § 224.10 (West Supp. 1992).
If a birth parent should request that vital health information not be disclosed (such as a
potential AIDS infection), the attorney would have a conflict of interest requiring with-
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The ability of an adopted child to rely upon a legal malprac-
tice theory to recover for damages that nondisclosure may have
caused is far more tenuous. Courts have been willing to recognize
liability for malpractice in favor of third parties, i.e., nonclients,
only in very limited circumstances.5  The one relevant circum-
stance in which an attorney has been held liable to a third party
is when the attorney's services to the client were intended by the
client to directly benefit the nonclient 78 For example, some
courts have been willing to allow beneficiaries who were intended
to inherit under a will drafted by the attorney to recover under
this theory.5 79 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, which con-
cededly applies the exception more narrowly,580 refused recovery
in Pelham v. Griesheimer to children whose mother's divorce attor-
ney had failed to ensure their father had named them as benefi-
ciary of his life insurance policy, a requirement of the decree. 8'
The court felt recovery should be limited to cases in which the
nonclients were intended third-party beneficiaries of the attorney-
client contract.82 However, the Pelham court also pointed out
that a divorce is an adversarial proceeding, and courts are more
reluctant to recognize third party rights in this context.58 3 Even
though adoptions are not normally adversarial proceedings, adopt-
ed children may have difficulty convincing courts that the services
rendered by the attorney were intended to directly benefit them,
as opposed to providing them incidental benefits, and thus they
may be precluded from utilizing malpractice as a theory of recov-
ery.
drawal from the case.
577 Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ill. 1982) (citations omitted) ('The
traditional, general rule has been that the attorney is liable only to his client, not to
third persons.")
See generally, Donald B. Hilliker, Atorney Liability to Third Parties: A Look to the Future,
36 DEPAUL L REv. 41 (1986); Patrick E. Braun, Comment, The Pelham Decision, Attorney
Malpractice and Third-Party Nondlient Recovey: The Rise and Fall of Pivity, 1983 N. ILl L.
REV. 357.
578 Pelham, 440 N.E.2d at 99 (The nonclient must prove the clients intend to benefit
the nonclient.). See Hilliker, supra note 577, at 60-61; Braun, supra note 577, at 376.
579 Hilliker, supra note 577, at 55, 59 (citing, inter alia Lucas v. Harm, 364 P.2d 685
(Cal. 1961); Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983)).
580 Pelham, 440 N.E.2d at 100; Hilliker, supra note 577, at 58; Braun, supra note 577,
at 376.
581 Pelham, 440 N.E.2d at 101.
582 Pelham, 440 N.E.2d at 99.
583 Braun supra note 577, at 375; Pelham, 440 N.E.2d at 101.
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B. Governmental Agencies
When the adoption intermediary is a public agency, plaintiffs
in wrongful adoption actions may wish to consider seeking damag-
es under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,m which creates a civil cause of ac-
tion for those who are deprived of a constitutional right by a
person exercising authority under the power of state law.585 One
such case, Collier v. Krane, 86 was brought by an adoptive mother
seeking damages under Section 1983 against a state adoption
agency that allegedly failed to disclose health history to her about
her son, asserting that this failure violated her rights to substantive
due process under the 14th Amendment. A similar suit, Griffith v.
Johnston, was filed by a group of adoptive parents and children in
Texas who sought only specific relief, but no monetary
damages.57
Seeking damages under Section 1983 has certain advantages.
It may allow a plaintiff to bring a claim that would be time-barred
under other theories.5" A state law restriction on governmental
tort liability might be avoided. 9 Unfortunately, plaintiffs will en-
584 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
585 RONALD D. ROTUNDA, Er AL, 2 TREATISE ON CONsTrurIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 19.13, 19.16, 19.17 (1986).-
586 763 F. Supp. 473 (D. Colo. 1991).
587 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 712 (1991). Plaintiffs sought
only injunctive relief, requesting the court order that the State disclose the full content
of their files on the plaintiffs' children, with identifying information redacted, and that
the state provide medical care and services to plaintiffs' children. In addition to this re-
lief, plaintiffs also brought a § 1983 claim alleging violation of the Federal Adoption
Assistance Act, and requested that the court order the state to inform prospective adop-
tive parents of the availability of federal adoption assistance, determine eligibility for
these benefits with due care, and negotiate in good faith a federal adoption assistance
agreement with prospective adoptive parents. Complaint, Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d
1427 (5th Cir. 1990).
588 Counsel for plaintiff in Collier v. Krane, 763 F. Supp. 473 (D. Colo. 1991), sug-
gested the reason a § 1983 theory, rather than a state law tort or contract claim, was
pursued was that the statute of limitations had probably expired for claims under other
theories. Telephone Interview with Paul Radosevich (Oct. 18, 1991).
589 For example in Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189 (1989), a suit against a social worker for failure to intervene prior to the death of a
child at the hands of an abusive father, the court might have denied a tort claim by
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counter so many restrictions and obstacles that recovery of damag-
es under this theory is not likely to be successful.
In the first place, the scope of permissible defendants is very
limited. Section 1983 actions may be brought only against persons
acting under color of state law, which includes governmental agen-
cies and officials and persons participating in a joint activity with
them.5" In a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court declared
that a state is not a person subject to liability for damages under
Section 1983.59' In addition, the court held state governmental
entities and state officials acting in their official capacities cannot
be sued for damages under Section 1983.592 Thus, damages for
"wrongful adoption" cannot be recovered under Section 1983
against public adoption agencies which are subdivisions of a state
department or agency, or state employees acting in their official
capacities. Employees of state agencies may be sued in their indi-
vidual capacity,5 although respondeat superior is inadequate to
establish their liability.594 It must be shown an individual acted
personally in the deprivation of the civil rights of the plaintiff.5 95
In addition, individuals are subject to qualified immunity. To be
found liable, it must be shown that their conduct violated "clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."59 ' In Collier, the judge held the so-
cial worker who had been sued individually violated no clearly
established right even if she had failed to disclose health back-
ground, and that to be held liable she would have had to be
"plainly incompetent" or to "knowingly violate the law."597
Counties and cities can be sued for damages under Section
1983598 and qualified immunity does not apply to their employ-
characterizing the social workers acts as discretionary or applying a $50,000 ceiling on
tort recovery against governmental subdivisions. Thomas Eaton & Michael Wells, Govern-
mental Inadion As a Constitutional Tort: Deshaney and its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107,
134 (1991).
590 ROTUNDA, supra note 585, § 19.17.
591 Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 (1989).
592 Id. at 71. See ROTUNDA, supra note 585, at § 19.16 (1991 Supp.); JACK RUZICHIO
& Lou JAcoBs, EMPLowmENT LAw CHECKLIST & FoRMs 2-3.3 (1991).
593 Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358, 365 (1991) ("State officials, sued in their individual
capacities, are 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983" and may be held personally liable
for damages based upon actions taken in their official capacities.)
594 RuziCHio & JAcoBs, supra note 592, at 2-3.4.
595 Id.
596 ROTUNDA, supra note 585, § 19.29, quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
810 (1982).
597 Collier v. Krane, 763 F. Supp. 473 (D. Colo. 1991).
598 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); RuzICHIo & JACOBS,
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ees.5" However, liability cannot be imposed against them for
wrongful acts of employees not authorized to make or in execu-
tion of the governmental entity's policy.' Liability will be im-
posed only where the conduct is authorized by the law or official
custom of the governmental body.6"' Custom can be adopted
formally or informally, through widespread or persistent practice,
actual or constructive knowledge by the policymaking official, or
ratification of a series of decisions.0 2 However, cities or counties
will not be liable under Section 1983 solely on the basis of respon-
deat superior."3 Since public agency adoptions in most states are
handled through state subdivisions rather than city or county sub-
divisions, and since one must prove an official policy or at least
knowledge or ratification of the nondisclosure by city and county
agencies, the opportunity to recover damages under Section 1983
will be limited for wrongful adoption plaintiffs.
The other major obstacle is the difficulty of establishing viola-
tion of a constitutional right. Section 1983 does not itself create
rights; rather it provides a remedy for rights guaranteed by the
constitution or federal laws.' In both Collier and Griffith, plain-
tiffs alleged their right to substantive due process under the 14th
amendment was violated. Both courts refused to find such a viola-
tion.6°5
In both Collier and Griffith, plaintiffs asserted that failure to
disclose health information to prospective adoptive parents' vio-
lated the parents "fundamental interest" to make an informed
decision about whether to adopt.' In Griffith the adoptive par-
ents further elaborated that their liberty and property interests
were violated by the state's practice of intentionally or recklessly
supra note 592, at 2-3.5.
599 ROTUNDA, supra note 585, §§ 19.28.
600 ROTUNDA, supra note 585, §§ 19.19, 19.32. Ruziclmo & JAcoBs, supra note 592, 2-
3.5.
601 ROTUNDA, supra note 585 §§ 19.17, 19.18; Se, eg., LaShawn v. Dixon, 762 F.
Supp. 959, 991 (D.D.C. 1991) (Foster children suing D.C. Dept. of Human Services must
show "alleged unconstitutional action amounts to an official policy or custom and that a
causal link exists between the policy or custom and the alleged harm.")
602 RUZicHIO & JACOBS, supra note 592, § 2-3.5.
603 Id.
604 See, e.g., Collier v. Krane, 763 F. Supp. 473, 475 (D. Co. 1991).
605 Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1437-41; Collier, 763 F. Supp. at 475-79.
606 Griffth, 899 F.2d at 1437-38. The opinion in Collier refers to the asserted right
more generally as a right of familial association and a right of privacy to receive impor-
tant information. Colle, 763 F. Supp. at 475-78.
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placing children in their homes who "physically attacked them or
other children in the home, destroyed property, and committed
crimes for which the family was responsible."6 °7 They contended
that if they had been properly informed, they either would not
have chosen to adopt these particular children, or they would
have been able to provide early care and treatment that would
have avoided this violent behavior. They argued that the actions of
the state agency, by failing to provide information that could pro-
tect them, was analogous to "quartering soldiers in their home,"
or invading the privacy of their homes by searching for contracep-
tives." Adoptive parents might further argue that because due
process guarantees freedom of choice in the decision to create a
family through biological means,' when the mechanism to cre-
ate a family is in the hands of the state, the state must disclose all
information to provide prospective adoptive parents the opportuni-
ty to make an informed choice about the creation of their family.
Both the Collier and Griffith courts took a broad approach to
rejecting the existence of a fundamental right of this nature. They
held that there is no fundamental right to adopt, and therefore
the manner of handling an adoption cannot violate the prospec-
tive parents' fundamental rights.610 Because adoption is created
by statute rather than biology, it is not the type of family tradition-
ally protected by due process. Such an argument, of course, is too
broad. The plaintiffs were not arguing they had a fundamental
right to adopt, a contention that would, as the courts pointed out,
create conflicts with the fundamental rights of natural parents.61
Instead they argued that if the state selected them as prospective
adoptive parents and agreed to place a particular child with them,
they had a fundamental right to health information that could
enable them to make an informed decision. The Griffith court
acknowledged this distinction and argued that even if the funda-
mental right was conceived more narrowly, it fails because due
process prohibits governmental interference; it does not require
607 Brief for Appellants at 17, Grifith, 899 F.2d 1427.
608 Id.
609 See, eg., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599.600 (1977) (The right to privacy pro-
tects "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.");
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (Right to procreate is a fundamental right);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (right to use contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of women
to terminate pregnancy). See also ROTUNDA, supra note 585, § 18.26.
610 Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1437; Collie, 763 F. Supp. at 476.
611 Qffith, 899 F.2d at 1427; Collie, 763 F. Supp. at 476.
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governmental assistance.1 2 When the government is the only
source of critical information, the Griffith court's distinction be-
tween interference and assistance appears arbitrary. Nevertheless,
given the current reluctance of the U.S. Supreme Court to expand
the coverage of substantive due process and their adherence to its
application only in "traditional" familial contexts,613 successful as-
sertion of substantive due process rights on behalf of adoptive
parents does not appear promising in the near future.
Similarly, the argument presented in Collier that adoptive par-
ents have a privacy right to receive important information is un-
likely to be successful soon. Adult adoptees have on' occasion un-
successfully asserted a privacy and first amendment right to receive
important information in an attempt to gain access to their confi-
dential adoption records.614 The courts' refusal to recognize this
right has been based in part upon the need to protect the privacy
interests of birth parents, '15 a factor that would rarely be signifi-
cant in the adoptive parent's desire for nonidentifying health
information.616 The right to information gathered in the adop-
tion process also has been distinguished from other types of infor-
mation to which parties have been found to be entitled, such as
information on contraceptives, 17 because this information is the
product of a judicial process of adoption-whereas the privacy and
first amendment cases establishing a right to information focused
on state statutes forbidding the flow of information from one
person to another.618
In Griffith, plaintiffs also asserted that the failure to disclose
health information to their adoptive parents violated the due pro-
cess rights of the adopted children. These plaintiffs claimed that
the children's psychological problems were greatly exacerbated, to
the point of requiring institutionalization, because they did not
receive appropriate treatment that would have been provided if
612 Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1438.
613 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Plurality held biological father
had no fundamental liberty interest in relationship with child born during mother's mar-
riage to another man.) '
614 See, e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1978); Mills v. Atlantic City
Dept. of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651-652 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
615 In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 762; Mill 372 A.2d at 651-52.
616 See Blair, supra note 8, at 745-65 for a discussion of potential conflicts with the
privacy rights of birth parents when an intermediary makes "reasonable efforts" to investi-
gate health-related information.
617 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
618 In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 762.
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their parents were given accurate health information.6 19 The
Court rejected this argument, relying upon the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in De Shaney v. Winnebago Soc. Servs. that in general
the due process clause confers no affirmative right to governmen-
tal aid.62 In De Shaney, the Court conceded that a person in a
special relationship, i.e., in state custody and restrained from act-
ing on his own behalf, is entitled to affirmative duties of care and
protection.621 The Griffith Court, however, held that the special
relationship created by foster care622 lapsed upon placement or
upon adoption.6 2 Given the recognition of both Griffith and oth-
er courts that foster care does establish a special relationship cre-
ating a liberty interest in reasonably safe placements, free from
physical, psychological, and emotional harm, 24 the decision in
Griffith is inconsistent with the fact that the conduct of state offi-
cials for which relief is sought occurred while the adopted
children were in the custody of the state. The selection of adop-
tive homes and the decision not to disclose vital health informa-
tion occurs prior to placement. Moreover, even after placement
and during the several months prior to adoption, the children are
not wholly outside the authority of the public agency, which has
the obligation to ensure that their needs are being met during
this period. Due to the custodial responsibility the state has to-
wards children placed for adoption through a public agency, the
Section 1983 claims of children who suffer physical or psychologi-
cal deterioration resulting from nondisclosure should be far more
viable than the Griffith court was willing to recognize. Nevertheless,
when the agency is a state as opposed to a county or municipal
619 Brief for Appellants at 10, Griffith v. Johnston, 849 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1990).
620 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
621 Id. at 200.
622 Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1439. Although the Court in DeShaney recognized that foster
care could create a special relationship, it refused to rule on this issue. De Shaney, 489
U.S. at 200, n. 8. Other federal courts have recognized that foster care creates a special
relationship entitling a child to protection and creating potential liability under § 1983.
See, e.g., KH. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 848-850 (7th Cir. 1990); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818
F.2d 791 (lth Cir. 1987); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 991-994 "(D.D.C.
1991); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Cf Milburn v. Anne
Arundel DSS, 871 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 1989) (No affirmative duty to protect child
from foster parents whenever child voluntarily placed in foster home by natural parents.).
623 899 F.2d at 1439.
624 LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 992-993.
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entity, the other obstacles625 discussed above may prevent recov-
ery.
A final impediment to recovery in some cases will be the U.S.
Supreme Court's determination that ordinary negligence cannot
form the basis of a Section 1983 action.6 26
In sum, while under the right circumstances adopted children
may have a more viable claim to recovery under Section 1983 than
adoptive parents, current precedent and the numerous restrictions
on liability under Section 1983 will make recovery of damages




Adoptive parents and their children need and deserve the
protection of the courts from all forms of intentional or negligent
conduct by adoption intermediaries which prevent adoptive par-
ents from receiving complete and accurate health-related informa-
tion about their children prior to placement. For too many years,
adoptive parents have frequently been denied the opportunity to
make an informed choice about whether to adopt a particular
child and about their ability meet that child's needs. In far too
many instances, adopted children have failed to receive critically
needed medical or psychological treatment because vital informa-
tion was not disclosed to their parents. And on far too many occa-
sions, children have been placed with adoptive families who were
unprepared or unable to meet the challenges, both emotional and
financial, that a child's impairment created, resulting in trauma
for all members of the adoptive family and occasionally in disrup-
tion of the adoption.
625 See supra notes 591-97 and accompanying text.
626 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1986); cf. Pagano v. Massapequa Public
Schools, 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (Seventeen separate incidents of negligence
may be considered to rise to the level of deliberate indifference to an affirmative duty
and be actionable.).
627 An additional consideration in all actions against public agencies is the extent to
which sovereign immunity has been waived. Sovereign immunity was a major issue raised
in the cases against public agencies. See Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d
1101, 1108-09 (Ohio 1986); Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoptions, 247
Cal. Rptr. 504, 507-511. Discussion of the extent to which various states have waived sov-
ereign immunity is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Holding adoption intermediaries liable for intentional and
negligent nondisclosure is necessary to deter future nondisclosure,
to compensate the victims of the intentional or negligent conduct,
and to foster continued confidence of potential adoptive parents
in the adoption process, particularly in regard to the adoption of
children with special needs. In order for those goals to be effec-
tively achieved, it is imperative for courts to recognize as action-
able not only intentional misrepresentations, but also intentional
nondisclosure, negligent misrepresentation, negligent transmission,
and negligent failure to investigate health history, when any of
these types of conduct by an adoption intermediary prevents adop-
tive parents from receiving full and accurate health history prior
to placement. Anything less might actually inhibit full and accu-
rate disclosure by prompting intermediaries to discover and/or
disclose as little as possible, in order to limit potential liability, or
to excuse their actions as merely negligent rather than intentional.
Several legal theories, both in tort and contract, are available
for plaintiffs to recover for the physical, emotional and pecuniary
injuries inflicted by the intentional or negligent failure to accu-
rately disclose health history. These theories include, under the
appropriate circumstances, fraud, intentional infliction of emotion-
al distress, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and legal mal-
practice. When an adoption was handled by a public agency, re-
covery under Section 1983 may also be considered, although its
viability is in doubt.
In some instances courts have restricted or denied recovery by
applying tort or contract doctrine in a manner that is inappropri-
ate in the wrongful adoption context. Traditional impediments to
recovery of damages for emotional distress, in jurisdictions where
they have not already been jettisoned, should not inhibit such
awards in wrongful adoption cases. The mental anguish, inflicted
upon adoptive parents by severe impairments with which they were
unprepared to cope and upon adopted children who were thereby
denied critical medical care are neither trivial nor feigned and
should fit within the doctrines and exceptions that allow recovery
even under traditional approaches. Another obstacle wrongful
adoption litigants have encountered is the hesitance of courts to
apply contract law in wrongful adoption actions. Such misgivings
are misplaced when the breach asserted is the failure to provide
reasonable and professional service.
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Recognition of liability for the intentional or negligent failure
to investigate and fully and accurately disclose health information
enforces a reasonable standard of conduct upon adoption interme-
diaries. Liability should extend no further. In some cases, despite
reasonable and good faith efforts of an adoption intermediary to
investigate and disclose health history, a severe impairment will de-
velop or be discovered that was unknown to the intermediary or
the adoptive parents at the time of placement. Imposing liability
for damages in these circumstances, under theories such as strict
liability, breach of warranty, or breach of a contract to place a
healthy child, is unfair to the intermediary and fails to achieve the
benefits that liability for intentional or negligent misconduct would
accomplish. Adoption intermediaries should not be required to
guarantee the health of children whom they place, as if they were
products manufactured or sold. What they should be required to
do is make reasonable efforts to investigate and disclose health
history so that adoptive parents will be prepared for and willingly
accept the challenges presented by adoption, and adopted chil-
dren will have the best opportunity possible for a satisfying rela-
tionship that meets their needs.
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